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In th'e years following the mili tary 'defeat o'f Jacobi tism 
: .~, "", - : .'. , "'. ' ,'.. • , ~~." ~ '"\ ~ ;''', f" 'I;' ~ '~'l t., -: ~, . 
in 1746 and the legal destruction of the' Highland' clan system, 
~... _~, :'": "c. ~.'.' _ ,,~.,~":.-,! ., :: ""71'" 1 ';"~ .~" 
the Highlands of Scotland provided many thousands of troops for 
service in the Brit1sh army and especially in the numerous High-
, -.. !', ." ~. f' ~',:'-" . ~ ~ '1 ' ,"" ,- .," , ,"': ; 1:~. "7 ~ ~ .... 
land corps, both Fenc1 ble B.ndregular 'of th'e line ~s 'well LaS 
~ ,', ~.' ": ~ " _, l , , ' '" .., - ~'j" "\ .' ,- ~ . ,_ "It. '\ 'y" • 
Volunteer and M1l1tia, 'which 'were raised after 1756.' ,~ : .• 
... .f ~ -'>', r,-;~,!"'~ ~) ... ~ 
Al though 'other H1ghland. co'rp's ~~ ·the ,Argyfesh'1re Highl'anders 
-~ . ,," -: "" ~. . T t \, _ t ":.~. '" 
ra1sed. in 1689, the 'Bl~'ck Watch composed of the amalgamated' 
Inde;'endent C~mJ)a~ie~' 1~ 1739 and Loudon'lS Highlanders embOdied' 
, , 
1n 1745, had been ra1sed prior to 1756, the great fear of Jacob-
ite activity~and ~f '~rm1ng the Highlanders on the part of the 
English poli tical 'ne,t1on ~ pr~vented the ext'ensi ve 'use of High-
landers 1n the British army throughout the first half of the 
18th ~en~u~y. With" the . re~ew~l ' o'f 'wa~wi th 'Fr'a~d~'in 1756 ~~~w'€ver, 
,.', ." • eo>. -~, .... ~ '",' .'~; " i,.;! 1"> , ,.' .. T,:"~ .. ,.-,'~,' >.11"'-[ 
in persuad1ng the Cab1net an.d King George of the "great advantages 
of emploY1~g Highla~d~rs"1~ army serv16~.~· Not> 0 ~i o3d1dc th1:S ~ctio n 
• 't I 1;' ~ ') " ~", ,,, 'Y' _,' ~ '. ",' 1c .,', l' 
remove the d1saffected 'H1ghla!'1ders from the 'country'and employed 
them against th~ f~r~ig~'; en~~ies;' the POli~y~pen~d ':up 'a' storehouse 
of w1lling,aggress1ve; loyal·a.~d first~~~te-tr6op~"fJ; the Wars 
of the 18th and early 19th Centur1es o f .. f/' / 
Thousa.nds of Highla."1ders enl1sted in th~H1gh{~o~.d reg1ments 
and as many as 100,000 men served from 1793 to:, 1815 ,a figure' 
, ~i' ", .::.,,-
""",, ,; / 
out of proport1on to the poptilat1o'1 of the region 1n the 18th 
. .' ,,~ ~ . ..-
Century. Not orily the pressures of e.rap1dly r1s1ng populat1on 
and unemployment, but also the appeals to clan loyalty a.nd 
2. 
duty to one's superior served to bring out the Highlanders in 
great numbers. The area of heaviest recruitment proved to be the 
110rthwest Highlands and Islands where the pressures of populati:on 
and unemployment were most heavily felt. Th~s region Was also 
the most conservative and traditional, a phenomenon brought 
about by the relative isolation from the modernizing influences 
of Lowland Scotlando 
The over-recrui ti n.g of the Hlghla,"lds, especially after 
1800, led to the eventual collapse of Highland recruiting. Not 
only WaS the surplus manpower severly drained, but appeals to 
clan loyalty an.d spirit had diminish€d in strength, especially 
Under the impact of a, changing economy and the growing alienation 
of clan chieftains to their tenants a,nd the erosion of the 
patriarchal social system. 
Several factors were of importance to the patterns of 
recrui tment of the Highland regime'1.ts such as the matter of 
financial arra''1gements. Bounties became increasingly important 
as the recruiting efforts began to falter. The growing dependence 
on non-Highla'1ders, particularly Lowlanders a,nd Irish, clearly 
indicate the breakdown of Highland recruiting. This thesis, theo, 
eXamines in detaiL these major themes and patterns of recruiting 
for the Highland regiments from the begin1ing of the Seven 
Year's War to the final defeat of ~apoleonic France in 1815. 
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CHAPrER I. 
~ Clan Hili tary Culture. 
CHAFfER I. 
SECTION 1 
Clan Warfare as a Natural Extension of Environment. 
- - - - ---~----------
Between the years 1756 and 1815, a tremendous number of troops were 
drawn from the Highlands of Scotland for service in the army of Great 
Britain in the form of Regulars of the line, Fencibles for home service 
in the British Isles ~~d Volunteers or Ydlitia for part time local 
service. The ease with which these troops were raised was directly 
related to the military, social and economic structure of the traditional 
clan system. The eventual breakdown of the pattern of relative ease in 
recruiting in the 1790's was due in some measure to the erosion of the 
traditional culture and values. 
Before examining the dynamics and patterns of recruitment for the 
Highland corps after 1757, attention should be focused on the military 
and Social structure of the pre-1745 period in order to build a 
framework upon which the system of Highland recruiting may be more 
easily discerned. 
Prior to the demise of the old patriarchal clan system in the 
latter half of the 18th Century, constant warfare had been carried on 
among the clans. Very elaborate systems of alliance and counter-alliance 
were developed and altered. Foreign princes, notably those of Norway, 
LOWland Scotland, England and ;egional Irish rulers periodically vied 
for alliances ·with the various Highland clans as counters to the 
activities of rival kingdoms in the pOwer struggles of pre-modern Europe. 
Given the fierce internecine warfare of the clans as well as the 
belligerency between rival princes, it was not unnatlrral for the clans 
to develop along the lines of a military society •. 
1. 
2. 
The topography and lack of natural abundance of the Highlands and 
Islands encouraged the development of war-orientated cultures. The 
Grampian Mountains, liberally supplied with glens, valleys and a western 
seacoast of very irregular features meant that very large, conclusive 
", 
battles were not as easily fought as in the lower and flatter areas. 
Great movements of large forces, except by dangerous sea passage was quite 
difficult given the geography of the region and decisive engagements were 
rare until the period of the several Jacobite uprisings after 1688. For 
this reason, small scale warfare could be extensively carried on over a 
number of centuries without seriously threatening the existence or life 
style of the native population. 
In terms of material support for a society, the Highlands were also 
rather deficient. Arable land was at a premium and agriculture was 
sUsceptible to the. occasional harshness of a northern climate. Agriculture 
and food production remained at a barely subsistence level for most of the 
pr e-1145 period and often depended heavily upon imports of meal from outside 
areas. Other natural resources, including mineral wealth such as iron and 
Similar metals were also in short supply. 
Given those aspects of patriarchal tribalism, geography and lack of 
natural resources, the system of warfare developed in the area was a natural 
extension of the controliing factors. The nature of clan warfare developed 
Within this culture was to have a tremendous impact upon the recruitment of 
t . * roops from this area in later years. 
-
* It is not the place of this thesis to discuss in detail the development 
of the clan system or its structure, rather, those aspects which bear 
uPon the recruitment for the army after 1756 only are dealt with, notably, 
military organization and the hierarchy of classes and their role in the 
clan army. 
SECTION 2 
The Military state of the Clans Prior to 1745 • 
. Despite the accepted theory that all clru1smen were directly 
descended from a common ancestral progenitor, social divisions within 
a Clrul evolved as a usual condition of human society. Not unnaturally, 
the divisions of this society were along the lines of most other types 
of a community development. The form taken by the Highland society 
was that of a ruling figure supported by a small aristocracy, with a 
larger body of lesser gentry, below which was the most numerous group, 
the common people. At the pinnacle of the society was the clan chief 
or ceann cinn: who occupied the hereditary position based upon direct 
lineal descent from the common ancestor. l The Tanist would be the heir 
to the chieftainship, though not necessarily the eldest son as in the 
law of primogeniture practiced elsewhere in Europe. By the Law of 
--
!anistrl, the heir was named by the chief and the chieftainshlp would 
often devolve onto a younger brother of the chief rather than the 
eldest natural son. Since the state of the society required a competent 
. military leader, this type of succession was quite necessary and 
2 provided a reasonably stable military command structure. The 
Highlanders recognized the importance of a stable command and thus 
avoided the turmoil which often accompanied minority and Regency 
periods in European societies. 
Following the chief in seniority were the ceanntigh~ or the various 
heads of the houses. 3 In many cases these were the close relations to 
the chief or the prominent families of the district, the cadet branches. 
The senior cadet of each clan ,"as known as the Tosh.lch and generally 
3. 
was responsible for the collection of rents. With the introduction of 
Norman style baronies, the Toshich often became the baron baillie of the 
district among those clans powerful enough to be styled baronies.4 
Below the principal heads of houses would be the Dulne Vaisle or 
the gentry of the clan. 5 . Again, many of these lesser aristocrats would 
have been distantly related to the chief or would be sons and relations 
of the principal cadet branches of the clan. From among this class 
. 6 
would be drawn the bulk of the tacksman or "goodmen". These 
individuals would be granted large leases, called tacks, from the lands 
held by the chief. The tacksmen would then subdivide' their holdings, 
granting portions to lesser tenants who comprised the small farmers 
class and from whom the tacksman collected rents out of which he paid 
his own rent to the superior proprietor •. Tacksmen were quite often of 
the same family as the primary land ow~er even in districts where 
multiple families had combined to form compound units either through 
mutual alliance or conquest. In 1775, for example, of 13 major tacksmen 
on the Clanranald estates, 10 were of the surname MacDonald. Eleven of 
Cameron of Lochiel's 13 major tacksmen were Camerons, while 11 of 12 
on the Fraser of Lovat estates were of the family Fraser. 7 
Most tacksmen would have been reasonably secure materially and 
financially prior to 1745 and most remained so during the latter half 
of the 18th Century. The Parish ~linister of Lochgoil-head in Argyle 
described the tacksmen there as very respectable both morally and 
intellectually. The Reverl'llld MacDougall goes on to state that: "The 
tacksmen are opulent, comfortably lodged and live with great decency".8 
Though it can not be positively asserted that all tacksmen lived well, 
it is fairly certain that a great majority would have been more 
materially secure than would the average small tenant or ordinary clansman. 
Below the tacksman on the social scale would be the small tenant 
who held his land from the tacksman, and therefore, indirectly from 
the chief. This body of small farmers would be reasonably secure in 
their possessions and could manage a few material goods with some 
cattle, the p~incipal market product of the H1ghlands. Below the 
small tenant would be the large group of agricultural labourers and 
artisans who provided valuable services in terms of goods and labour. 
Within the structure of clan society, there existed a number of 
offices and societies, usually relating to military matters. 
Surrounding the chief would be the Cille-coise or bfu~d of Hanchmen. 
These office" holders would be the primary servants of the chief 
and would be as follows: 9 
Bladair or spokesman, 
Bard, 
Piobaire or piper, 
Cille-piobaire or piper's servant, 
Cille-mor or bearer of the chief's sword, 
Cille-casfluich who carried the chief over rivers, 
Cille-comhstraithaim or keeper of the horses, 
Cille-Trusatneis or bagcage man, 
Cille-ruithe or running footman. 
Within a clan would be found a small and elite society of a military 
.nature known as the Luchdtachk or the cr~ef's band. This body was 
selected from among young men of the best families and in most cases 
would have been appointed by the Tanist. IO This group of young men 
w"s highly trained in military skills, the use of arms and athletic 
endeavours. It was their responsibility to accompany the chief and, 
in reality, formed a personal bodyguard of very highly skilled warriors.ll 
These members of the chief's bodyguard were often required to prove their 
martial talents, an exercise which usually took the form of a raid on 
a neighbour's cattle stocks. 
The Luchtachk was formed into distinct companies called ,cathraI?-L 
6. 
and as such, engaged in cattle stealing raids upon neighbouring clans, 
and more especially, the Lowland areas when possible. The great zeal 
with which these raids were carried out no doubt played some part in the 
Lowlander's great fear and loathing of the mountain men. 
Very often, these raids into othe~ parts of the cou.~try or into a 
rival clan's territory, had an economic motivation. In ,an area where 
agriculture was carried out on purely a subsistence level, the only 
significant cash product was cattle, mainly the long-haired Highland 
breed. A raid, of which the ultimate purpose was the thievery of an 
enemy's cattle stock, was considered honourable as well as necessary. 
Indeed, one's own stock was susceptible to theft from another band. There 
were, however, ways to limit the amount of cattle stolen, all of which were 
only minimally successful. Money was sometimes paid for the return of 
t 12 s olen stock and was known as tasga1. It must be noted that this fee 
was not always paid. A second method of protecting one's stock was the 
payment of black-mail. In essence, the owner paid a certain sum of 
money in return for which, the receiver would protect the stock and aGree 
not to steal the cattle himself. Again, this system did not always work 
as well as hoped.* A chief generally received a share of the spoils of 
a raid and often as much as two-thirds of the total which, therefore, 
provided an'economic motivation for the continuation of this type of 
activity.l3 
Raids could also be of a belligerent nature as well. In a 
relatively hostile system, this method of sorting out grievances was 
often the only method of resolving the matter in an area where there 
-
* See Appendix B for Graham of Gartmore manuscript dealing with the 
P~actice of paying black-mail. 
. 7 • 
. existed little or no rule by central government or national law. These 
military actions might range from petty harassment up to full-scale 
battles and might be of a simple nature such as redress for an insult 
or one of a number of clashes resulting from extended clan feuds such 
as that which existed between the Campbells and the MacDonalds. 
Although much of clan warfare consisted of petty cattle raids 
or harassment, major engagements on a larger scale did occur, especially 
after 1688. Prior to that time, clan warfare had been carried out 
primarily by the military societies and gentry class of the clans. With 
the rise of Jacobite militarism, however, the bulk of the clan tenantry 
were called up for service. In such a case, the entire tenantry of a 
district or clan would be summoned for duty. There are several reported 
methods for mobilizing a clan army for general action; however, the most 
important seems to have been the "burning cross" or cran-taraidh.14 By 
this method, an animal, usually a goat., was slain and a partially burned 
cross with a scrap of , cloth attached was dipped in the animal's blood. 
Utilizing a system of relay runners bearing the cross, the whole of the 
district could be alerted in a very short time.15 It is thought that 
the burned and bloody cross signified a threat of "fire and sword" to 
those who did not immediately obey the summons.16 Lord George Murray 
is reported to have been the last clan chieftain to summon his tenantry 
by means of the fiery cross late in 1745 after his declaration of 
allegiance to Prince Chexles Stuart. Variations of this method are 
known. On the Seaforth estates in Caithness and Ross, a barrel of 
burning tar would be placed on the highest point of land, called 
!Ulloch-ard, and would be the signal for the armed clansmen to assemble 
at Donan Castle the following rnorning. 17 
When the entire clan was engaged in an action, the internal 
8. 
organization was very much like that of a European regiment of foot. 
This would not be unusual owing to the large number of Highland gentry 
who had s~rved in the armies of Europe previous to the Jacobite uprisings. 
Ranks and appointments depended very much on seniority rather than 
military efficiency.18 There are conflicting reports as to whether 
the field officers were the chief's sons or the elder cadets though it 
iethought that the Tos~·ich or eldest cadet would lead the van on the 
march and would command the right of the line in battle.19 The various 
companies would be divided along family or geographic lines, each with 
2 captains, 2 lieutenants and 2 ensigns.20 The heads of the major 
families would serve as the captains while the subalterns would be made 
up of the gentry of the district.21 
In the order of battle, the gentlemen and larger farmers of the 
clan held the first rank. This is not'unusual as their higher economic 
status allowed for better weaponry. The lesser armed would take the 
rear ranks, usually armed with agricultural tools.22 The clan regiment 
Was generally drawn up into a formation of three ranks deep and in a 
wedge-shape called the ceinneach-cath.23 The psychological element in 
combat was not overlooked in clan warfare. Companies were arranged by 
families and one would always be placed among brothers, cousins and 
other relations. This method of grouping was designed to give an emotive 
stimulus, especially when one saw close relations being killed or wounded. 24 
In this type of warfare, the bards and pipers took on an added importance 
as they shouted.the clan war cries or piped the clan regiment into battle.25 
The piper actually laid aside his pipes and charged with the men; however, 
his playing would have had the desired psychological effect prior to an 
enga.gemen t • 
The basic tactical manoeuvre of this type of warfare was the quick 
charge with broadsword, targe and Lochaber axe. This method of combat 
could have devastating effects even upon disciplined troops as 
witnessed at Killiecrankie in 1689 during the first of the Jacobite 
uprisings with the destruction of General Mackay's a:rmy, most of whom 
were trained regulars. Similar results were seen at Falkirk and 
Prestonpans in later rebellions.26 In the early part of the 18th 
Century, many of the more affluent clansmen acquired firearms. Clan 
tactics merely adapted these weapons to the mode of attack rather than 
altering the basic tactic. Those with firearms would discharge some 
yards from the enemy and continue into his line utilizing the traditional 
cutting weapons. 
As to the actual numbers encaged in warfare of this type, there is 
very little statistical evidence. Some indication, however, is given 
in the Statistical Accotunt for the Parish of Kilchrenan and Dalavish 
in Argyle. According to the writer, 80 volunteers responded to the 
Duke of Argyle's summons within 24 hours. The population of the parish 
at that time was near 1000 persons, therefore, this number would have 
represented a goodly proportion of the adult male population capable 
of bearing arms. 27 The total number of Highlanders under arms cannot 
be adequately calculated since they tend to drift in and out of both 
armies, but in particular, the Jacobite forces. Charles never had at 
anyone time more than 6,000 clansmen under his comrnand. Nevertheless, 
a goodly portion of the available clan troops were active in the '45. 
The final engagement of inter-clan warfare occurred at the Battle 
of Hulroy in 1688 between a party of the NacIntoshes and Colin NacDonald 
of KepPoch or "Coll of the Cows".28 From 1689 until 1746, the martial 
energies of the Highlanders was taken up in the several uprisings, either 
in sUPPort of or,oPPosition to the deposed House of Stuart. In each of 
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the three major uprisings of 1689, 1715 and 1745, clans came out in 
arms in greater numbers than had been seen in the internecine warfare 
of previous periods. Traditional Whig families such as the Campbe1ls, 
Grants, Munros and Mackays raised their fo1lowings for the House of 
Orange in 1689 ana the House of Hanover in subsequent rebellions. 
Major engagements of this period utilized the mode of clan warfare of 
previous centuries and it initially worked quite well against the 
Royal troops. The Highland charge, however, met its demise at 
Culloden due to the development and perfection of the bayonet as a 
defensive weapon and the Stuart cause was Ultimately defeated in 
April 1746. 
Many Highland chiefs, though Jacobite in sympathy, refused to 
join Prince Charles in 1745 •. Due to the efforts of Duncan Forbes of 
Culloden, Lord President of the Court of Sessions, some Jacobite chiefs 
were induced to raise troops in support of the government, notably 
* Macdonald of Sleat and MacLeod of MacLeod. The end of the Stuart 
threat after 1746 effectively terminated the raising of clan levies 
in the Highlands for any purpose other than government service. 
Reforms legislated by the Hanoverian government and Parliament 
leb~lly ended the traditional structures upon which the clan system 
Was supported. More importantly, fundamental changes "!ere taking 
place in the Highlands which were to have a remarkable impact on the 
nature of Highland society. The effects of an economic revolution to 
the south and the opening up of the Highlands to intercourse with the 
rest of the world through traae were the ultimate factors in the 
* See Appendix B for letter to Duncan Forbes from the :Harquis of 
Tweedcl4.le. on this matter. 
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demise of the ancient clan system. 
The traditional authority of the chief stem~ed from two paramount 
powers, that of ward-holding and the right of heritable jurisdictions. 
Through the system of ward-holding, the tenant owed personal and 
military service to the superior, either the tacksman directly or the 
chief indirectly through the system of subdivided holdings. In exchange 
for this service and a fixed rent, the tenant held ward lands for his 
own use from the tacksman.29 The second power of the chief was that 
of heritable jurisdiction which, in the absence of royal authority in 
the Highlands, gave to the chief or local magnate the right to arrest, 
try, judge and punish all persons accused of crimes in his district or 
area of influence. 30 
In exchange for service, both military and labour, the chief or 
superior was required to return favours particularly in time of famine 
When the landowner was expected to furnish emergency food supplies. 
Ey the ~2! Kincogish, the chief was answerable for every member of 
his clan and was expected to protect his followors. 31 The primary duty 
of the chief in return for service was to provide land on which the 
clansmen could maintain a reasonable standa~d of subsistence. The 
obligations to the superior took on various forms in addition to 
military service. On the Isle of Skye, for example, every able-bodied 
male was required to render 6 day's service per year in road maintenance 
and construction.32 
Following the final Jacobite rising, Parliament enacted legislation 
to undercut the authority of the chiefs, and, in doing so, destroy their 
ability to successfully raise their tenantry, by forced means, in revolt 
against the standing government. Consequently, the Heritable Jurisdictions 
Act of 1747 was enacted which stripped the proprietor of his right to 
reSolve legal matters on his estates. The act established a system of 
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Justices of the Peace and Sheriffs to enforce royal law in the Highlands. 33 
Although many of the government offices were given to large estate O\mers 
and clan chiefs, the exercise of arbitrary legal decision was no longer 
Possible, and, as crown officials, these officers were answerable to 
royal authority. A sum of £580,000 was paid to several estate owners 
as compensation for the loss of this traditional privilege. 34 To undercut 
the ability of chiefs to force their tenants out in arms, the system of 
"Tard-holding was made illegal and military service was replaced by a 
"reasonable money payment" for lands held in tack or from a subdivided 
tacksman's estate. 35 
FollOwing the rebellion of 1715, !tAn Act for the Disarming of the 
Highlands" was enacted in 1725. This attempt at destroying the military 
capability of the Jacobite clans was only partly successful as the bulk 
of arms surrendered came from the loyal'clans. 36 A more successful 
measure, the Disarming Act of 1747, abruptly curtailed the clan's 
abilities to stage successful revolts. In addition to making the carrying 
of arms illegal, this act proscribed the wearing of the Highland clothing 
and the playing of the bab~ipe, as both were seen as motivators of rebellion 
and dissent. 37 Stringent penalties were given to violators of these laws 
and a first offence for the wearing of any item of proscribed clothing 
meant a 6 month prison sentence. On a first conviction for carrying arms, 
a £15 fine was levied. A second conviction on either charge generally 
meant a sentence of 7 year's transportation to the colonies, usually 
Georgia in North America. 38 
A goodly 'number of estates were forfeited as penalty for rebellion 
after the uprisincs of 1715 and 1745. In 1752, the Forfeited Estates 
Commission was established to oversee the administration of estates lost 
through Jacobite activity. Despite the efforts of the Comrrdssion and 
Crown offiCials to collect rents, many tenants continued to pay their 
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rents to the former proprietor. 39 The paying of rents to exiled 
Jacobite nobles and chiefs through their agents in the Highlands 
was common, particularly after the 1715 revolt. In the Parish of 
Glenshiel in Ross, William, Earl of Seaforth, continued to receive 
rent monies from his forfeited estates in Kintai1 after his exile 
for participation in the risings of 1715 and 1719. Collection parties 
freguent1y were attacked in this district while attempting to collect 
the re~ts.40 
The legislative efforts of the government did succeed in destroying 
the traditional underpinning of the patriarchal clan system with the 
abolition of ward-holding and rights of heritable jurisdiction. 
Government could not, however, destroy through legislation the affections 
and attitudes towards superiors developed over centuries of habit. 
Feelings of obligation to the hereditary patriarch continued strongly 
for many years, particularly in the northwest and islands. A petition 
dated 16 September 1777 from the tacksmen of Skye to their proprietor, 
MacLeod of MacLeod)is illustrative of the feeling of obligation and 
support for the hereditary chief. Although the motivation for this 
. petition may have been the removal, in that same year, of the tacksmen 
on Lord Macdona1d's Skye estates, the accepted theory of mutual support 
between the chief and his clansmen is the dominant theme of this 
document. 4l 
We the undersigned tacksmen, tenants and possessors, on the 
estate of Norman HacLeod of Jl1acLeod, Esg., wishing to shew 
our attachment to the family, and our desire to contribute 
as far as our ability will admit, towards the support of their 
interest, and preservation of their estate, do hereby, in the 
hope that it may enable l1acLeod and his Trustees to re-establish 
his affairs, and preserve the ancient possessions of the family 
bind ourselves and our successors for the space of three years 
to pay an additional rent of one shilling and six pence in the 
pound of,the rent now payable, on condition that, as our 
prinCipal motive for becoming under this burden is our 
attachment to the present }1acLeod, to the standinG of the family 
and our desire of the estate being preserved entire, that we 
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shall be freed therefrom if we should have the misfortune 
to lose him by death or if any part of the estate should be 
sold within the above-mentioned time. 
The notion of onets duty to the superior was still viable late in 
the 18th CentlITY despite the efforts made through legislation to break 
down the clan attachments. Colonel ]avid Stewart of Garth relates an 
episode \'1hich occurred in the American Revolutionary War at the Battle 
of Green Springs, Virginia, 6 June 1781. A private of the 76th Regiment, 
Macdonaldts Highlanders rushed in front of Lieutenant Simon Macdona1d of 
Morer exc1aiming: 42 
You kno"T that "Then I ene;aged to be a soldier, I promised 
to be faithful to the King and you. The French are coming, 
and while I stend here neither bullet nor bayonet shall 
touch you except through my body. 
The episode may be a bit stylized; nevertheless, the sentiments of 
the event 'and speech are quite clear •. 
The attachment to traditional values and attitudes towards superiors 
had a great impact on the efforts of recruiting throughout the remainder 
of the century. These attitudes were eventually broken down, not by 
legislation or coercion, rather through the influx of alien ideas and 
theories of commerce, industry and education. These char.ges profoundly 
altered the complexion of Highland society in the century following 
Cul10den. This change of attitudes and tradition vIas to exert a strong 
5.nf1uence on the state of recr-ui ting for the army', particularly after 
1793 as will be examined in Chapter y. But the old attitudes to\'lards 
cianship and military service to the superior did provide a great 
abundance of manpower for the army in the seventy-year period from the 
t45 to the end of the Napoleonic vlars. The remnants of clan culture 
provided a basis upon which the government successfully used to draw men 
from the Highlands and the old military structure of the clans provided 
a solid basis for the internal structure of the subsequent regiments. 
SECTION 3 
Scots in Service prior to 11&2. 
Although the first standing Highland regiment of the line was 
not embodied Uk~til 1740, the tradition of milita~T service had been 
strong in Scotland for some years. A great many Scots served in the 
British forces during the 17th and 18th Centuries, but the tradition 
of Scots in the service of foreign nations dates to a much earlier 
period. 
The first known instance of a permanent Scots corps in foreign 
service dates from 1421 '-Then a Scots regiment was in the service of 
France. 43 This corps continued in the French army for roughly two 
centuries. In the 17th Century, it ... ras known variously as 12. 
Begiment d 'Hebron (Hepburn' s Regiment), 12. Regimen! DoU{;'las and 
Dumbarton's Regiment, depending upon the colonel of the period. 44 
In 1661, the Regiment was placed on the English establishment as the 
Scotch Regiment of Foot and later became the 1st Regiment of Foot 
(The Royal Scots) in 1751. 45 This corp' s extremely lengthy existence 
brought about the nickname "Pontius Pilate's Bodyguard" which dates 
from 1643.46 
The Dutch and Swedish services were equally popular with Scots, 
both Highland and LO\·Tland. During the Thirty Year's War of 1618 -
1648, the chief of the }1ackays raised 3,000 of his clansL1en and 
tenants for the Protestant Army and served under the Swedish King, 
Gustavus Adolphus. 47 The nmnber of Scots serving in the army of 
Gustavus Adolphus has been placed as high as 12,600, many of whom 
would have been Highlanders. 48 There were also during this ;eriod 
six Scottish regiments in the Dutch service kno\<m as The Scots 
Brigade. 49 
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As well as enlisting for foreign service, Scots were quite 
frequently found in the English service (Ilritish after 1707). In the 
first half of the 18th Century, a quarter of all officers serving in 
the British Army were Scots. 50 Clearly twenty per cent.of the regimental 
colonels were of Scottish origin. 51 Of these, 19 were titled nobles, 7 
were sons of nobles and 10 were Baronets. Of the total, 25 served as 
members of Parliament while 12 Peers represented the Scottish nobility 
in the House of Lords. 52* 
A primary motivation for service in the army was that of economics. 
Nany of the established aristocracy and gentry of Scotland could not 
command the higher incomes of their English counterparts. With usually 
large families to support, the price of a commission could well be worth 
the cost in terms of removing a son from the burden of the household. 
Traditionally, then, a greater proportion of Scots served in the army 
than the English, relative to the popu1ations of each country.53 It 
is interesting to note that Highland officers \-rere more inclined towards 
the foreign service than the Eritish, and a great many officers of 
predominantly English regiments were of Lowland Scottish origin. 54 
Not all Highlanders opted for service with the cont~nental powers, 
however. The first llighland regiment to do active service in the Eritish 
army was the Argyleshire Regiment. A warrant vIas issued to Archibald 
Campbell, lOth Earl of Argyle, in 1689 for the raising of a Highland 
corps of 600 men from his estates. 55 This regiment saw active service 
against the Jacobite forces commanded by Viscount Dundee in that same 
year in favour of the deposed King James II. The notorious episode 
of Glencoe in 1692 was, unfortunately, the work of this regiment 
-
* Figures given represent the period 1714 to 1760. 
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(Campbe11 of G1enlyon t s Company), though it must be realized that the 
soldiers were merely the instruments of the instigators of the scheme, 
the }Taster of stair and other of King Wi11iam' s ministers in Edinburgh. 56 
In 1693, the Argy1eshire Highlanders ,.,ere posted to Flanders vTith 
the army under the command of Kine Wil1iam ,.,here they were engaged in 
many of the significant battles of the War of English Succession or 
King Wi11iam' s War. 57 The Argy1eshire Highlanders were disbanded in 
Flanders in 1697.58 
The Crown of Scotland had exercised nominal control over the Highland 
areas since the 15th Century with the fall from power of the house of 
MacDona1d, the Lords of the Isles; however, it was not until the final 
defeat of Jacobitism in the 18th Century that firm, uncontested control 
was a Political reality. Until that time, the King and royal government 
had been compelled to rely upon the alliances with various powerful 
clans, notably the Campbe11s, to maintain some form of sovereignty over 
much of the Highlands. Some attempt was made to police the Highlands 
through the use of Independent Companies of troops raised from among the 
loyal clans. Given the pmfer of the local chiefs and magnates, the 
primary purpose of these troops was not to carry out the King's justice 
in all quarters, a feat quite impossible before the 18th Century. Rather, 
the early companies were designed to demonstrate that the Crown did intend 
to exercise sovereignty over the whole of Scotland. These companies did 
attempt to control the more blatant acts of theft and black-mail. 
The first Independent Companies were raised as early as 1624 when 
two units of twenty men each were stationed in the Highland districts. 59 
Companies of varying strength were maintained in the IIigh1ands throughout 
the 17th Century and were finally disbanded in 1717 following 
the unsuccessful revolt of 1715. 
After the defeat of the Jacobite forces under the Earl of I-Tar, the 
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Hanoverian government determined upon a stricter policy of control over 
the activities of the Highland Lords and olans. General George Wade was 
dispatched to the Highlands to undertake that responsibility. Throughout 
the 1720' sand 30' s, General vlade construoted 246 miles of military roads 
into and throughout the Highlands utilizing the labour of the most 
. . t b • d 60 ~mportant group of Independent Comp~es 0 e ra~se • 
The second thrust of the plan to oversee the aotivities of the clans 
\OTas based upon a suggestion from Duncan Forbes of Culloden who proposed 
the plan to re-raise several companies from among the loyal clans for 
the purpose of protecting the populace, eliminating the practices of 
black-mail and cattle theft and to guard against Jacobite activity. 
General Wade raised, in 1725, six companies of Highland troops for these 
61 purposes as well as for the construotion of the road system. Three 
companies of 110 men each were recruited from the tenants of Lord Lovat 
(Fraser), Sir Duncan Campbell of Lochnell and Grant of Eallindalloch. 
Three companies of 70 men each were raised from and captained by 
Campbell of Finab, Camp bell of Carrick and Munro of Calcairn. These 
companies were later augmented to 110 men each. The six Independent 
Companies \'lere given the name !fIE. Freiceadan 12£!2h, or Elack Watch, by 
the Highlanders. 62 In 1138, Duncan Forbes recommended to Lord Hilton, 
The Lord Justice-Clerk, that fOl~ or five regiments of Highlanders 
should be raised as regulars of the line from among the clans of Jacobite 
. 6 SJ~pa~hy in order to undercut potential pro-Stuart activity_ 3 Forbes' 
recommendation was only partially accepted, however.* With the outbreak 
of War with Spain in 1139, knOlm as The 'var of Captain J enkins' Ear, 
and followed by the opening of general hostilities on the continent in 
1140 with the War of Austrian Succession, troops were required for service 
* The text of the letter to Lord Hilt on is found in Appendix E. 
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against the Spanish and later the French. In 1739, the six Independent 
. Companies were augmented to ten and Vlent onto the establishment as the 
Highland Regiment of Foot with the Earl of Crawford as its co10nel. 64 
Originally designated the 43rd, the Highland Regiment saw its 
first combat at Fontenoy in 1745 u-'l1der Colonel Sir Robert !1unro of 
FOulis. 65 The Regiment "Tas renu,llbered 42nd in the reorganization of 
1751 and was designated the Royal lfighland Regiment of Foot in 1758. 
The title of :Slack \'latch remained the nickname until 1861 when the 
full title became the 42nd (The Royal Highland) Regiment, The :Slack 
Watch. 66 This first permanent Highland corps was in Flanders during 
the uprising of 1745 and took no active part in suppressing t~e rebellion. 
During the uprising of 1745-46, other Highland troops were raised, 
both regulars and Independent Companies. Through the efforts of 
, 
Duncan Forbes, 18 Companies "Tere raised to patrol the areas vacated by 
the Jacobites in order to prevent further recrtutment for Prince Charles' 
army and to retard the raising of funds from among the Jacobite clans. 
The greatest success of Forbes was tl1e inducement of several Jacobite 
chiefs to raise Companies fron among their tenants for the goven1ffient 
service. Among these chiefs were Sir Alexander Macdonald of Sleat and 
the MacLeod of MacLeod. 67 In September 1745, Forbes was empowered to 
raise the Companies "Thich he did with great alacrity. 68 
The service rendered by the :Slack Watch in the Flanders campaign 
Coupled with the need for replacement troops, induced the government 
to raise a second Highland regiment of the line. A \"rarrant "Tas granted 
to Lord Loudon to raise a corps with commissions dated 6 June 1745. 
This new regiment patrolled the west Highlands and "Tas involved in the 
Rout of Moy \'There Charles ",as saved fron capture by a small body of 
Lady I1acIntosh's tenants. In fairness, it must be pointed out that 
Loudon's Highlanders had not been properly drilled and equipped when the 
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emergency of tl'le uprising thrust them into immediate duty without 
adequate discipline. Lord Loudon's Hi.ghlanders "lere disbanded in 1748 
after Some service against the French in Flanders. 69 
Until 1740, the raising of Highland units had simply been 
reactions to conditions in the Highlands rather than for foreign service 
except in the case of the Argyleshire Highlanders. The Independent 
Companies had been raised to enforce the King's law whenever possible 
and to prevent flagr2~t thefts and disturbances. The embodiment of the 
Black "latch in 1740 began a new era for the Highland soldier. With the 
final defeat by arms of Jacobitism as a viable threat to the Hanoverian 
accession, clan ''larfare and rebellion were no longer possible. After 
1746, the martial energies of the clansmen were turned aeainst the 
foreign enemies of Great Britain. Considering the extreme fear of a 
reClITrence of Jacobite militarism and the sincere doubts about allowing 
Highlanders under arms after 1746, it is rather surprising that the 
Black Watch was not disbanded ",ith Loudon's in 1748. The policy of 
keeping the Highlanders disarmed remained in force until 1757. 
William Pi tt, in need of troops for the ne,." war with France, recognized 
the incredible potential for raiSing troops in the Highlands for foreign 
as well as home service. His policy and that of the government during 
the period immediately following the '45 will be dealt with in 
Chapter II. 
Having examined the background to the raising of the Highland 
regiments from 1757 onwards, this thesis will now turn to the matter 
of the actua1. dynamics of recruiting in the Hic;hlands from 1756 to 1815; 
the position of the governments, the attitude of the chiefs and 
landowners; and the various factors and conditions in the Highlands 
during this period of contin:al warfare which affected the pattern of 
reCl:'U1tment and the abUity of the government to draw troops from the 
Highlands during this period. 
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CHAPl'ER II . 
Goverp~ent Policy, Reconciliation ~~ 
Raisin~ 2£~ Regiments. 
CHAPTER 11. 
) SECTION 1 
~ ~ f2.:£. Troops in the L8.St Half of the 18th Century. 
Between the years 1756 and 1815, Great Britain was involved in several 
Wars on the European continent as well as in various parts of the colonial 
world. Within this sixty-year period, no fewer than 36 years were in a 
state of declared war, primarily with the great powers of Europe, especially 
France and Spain. Much of the inter-war years were burdened with colonial 
conflicts , primarily in the North American colonies and the growing British 
trading empire in India. 
From the early 1750'sgrowing pressure had been exerted on the coastal 
colonies of British North America by France and its American Indian allies. 
The French colonials, who controlled eastern Canada and much of what is 
~resently the American mid-west, were apprehensive as to the plans for 
Westward expansion of the British colonies., The American Indian, who had 
been previously forced out of coastal areas, was equally concerned and 
reacted fiercely and violently to any sign of expansion. King Philip's 
War and Pontiac's War were both attempts to unite the several tribes on 
the north western frontier in opposition to westward expansion by the 
colonists. 
Although it was British colonial policy to limit as far as possible the 
~ush across the Alleghenz and Appalachian mountain ranges, this policy was 
only partly enforceable. Settlements west of the Appalachians such as 
Boonesboro in eastern Kentucky were already beginning to make inroads into 
Indian domains. Indian resentment at these incursions in the 1750's was 
USed to their advantage by the French, also fearful of colonial expansion 
beYond the coast. 
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On 8 July 1755, a force of 1373 British regulars and colonials 
under General Edward Braddock were ambushed on the Monogahela River. l 
This event led to a more serious consideration on the part of the 
government as to events in the colonies. In May 1756, war was 
declared on France, thus legalizing the unofficial war which had been 
taking place in America. for almost two years. Known as the Seven 
Year's War in Europe and the French and Indian War in America, this 
\ 
conflict was fought largely over colonial interests. The engagements 
which were of importance to the future of British arld French colonial 
interests were fought in the West Indies, Indj,a and Canada rather than 
in Europe.-;t Upon the cessation of hostili ties in 1763, Great Britain 
had expanded its overseas possessions at the expense of French and 
. , 
Spanish colonial interests. Canada and parts of the French west Indies 
and India were ceded to Britain as well as Florida from the Spanish. 
The second great war of the last half of the 18th Century was, 
. again, a colonial affair J,v/4.»;th land fighting in Europe proper. The 
War of the American Revolution (1775-83) which ended with the Treaty 
of Paris, was, primarily, an internal revolt by a sizeable number of 
rebels in the American colonies excluding Canada. By 1778, France 
was actively engaged in the conflict by materially assisting the 
American revolutionaries and harassing the operations of the Royal 
Navy with the threat of invasion of England. By 1781, French troops 
were engaged on the American continent and were largely responsible 
for the surrender of Lieutenant-General, The Earl Cornwallis, and 
his force of 6,000 troops at Yorktown, Virginia, on 19 October 1781, 
a defeat which effectively terminated the revolution in favour of 
the colonists.2 In 1780, the Dutch and Spanish governments declared 
war on Britain, though their contributions to the war were minimal. 
Although the defeat at Yorktown ended major military action in America, 
*' p,,> "'el~rs -/0 (,,1,,"',. ... [ Ja.d CM.j 4t S-c.t"tt!".,-h ,,"'.'c,Jo. bfI~ri!lce:;..r,...'~J 
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the war continued for two years against the E-Jropean enemies while 
treaty negotiations were carried on. The fighting occurred primarily 
in India and the West Indies. 
From 1792 to June 1815. most of the European continent was engaged 
in active warfare. This was the period which saw the rise and decline 
of the Revolutionary French Republic followed by the Empire under 
Napoleon Buonoparte. The War of the French Revolution from 1792 to 1801 
and the Napoleonic War of 1803 to 1815 had been set in motion by the 
French Revolution of 1789. an event which created continued turmoil 
and instability in France which forced Europe into a period of twenty 
years of conflict. War between France and Britain began in 1792 and 
CUlminated in the di~astrous campaign of H.R.H. The Duke of York in 
Flanders in 1794-95. The Treaty of Amiens in 1801 temporarily ended 
hostilities; however, Great Britain again declared war on France in 
May of 1803.3 The wars with Buonoparte continued until finally resolved 
at the Battle of Waterloo on 18 June 1815. 
Throughout much of this period, British forces were engaged in the 
Indian subcontinent against native levies raised by the various 
provincial rulers. To a great degree, local princes such as l~der Ali 
and Tipoo Sahib were used as instruments of French policy to harass 
British trading interests as well as to draw off troops which might 
have been utilized elsewhere. Although India was the domain of the 
East India Company since the early 17th Century, it had been British 
colonial policy for most of the 18th Century to provide troops for the 
Protection of the company's interests, which were s~en as vital to the 
overall British economy. The first regular troops arrived in 1748 
under the command of Admiral : Boscawen" and were posted to India in 
increasi~~ n~llbers after that date. By the early 19th CentUry, much of 
India had been pacified or was under direct British rule as a result of 
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military activity. 
Throughout the entire period of more or less constant warfare, a 
primary concern of the government was the raising and maintenance of 
British troops both at home and overseas. Traditional mistrust and 
neglect of the standing army, which had been reinforced by the military 
abuses of the Cromwellian Interregnum, meant a usual lack of trained 
and combat-ready troops when war was inevitable. Efforts to raise troops 
from the English, Irish and 'velsh counties was of only limited success. 
Not even the use of the military press gang or the offering of bounties 
as high as £3 for regular regiments and £6 for Guards regiments were 
sufficient to raise the required numbers in a short amount of time. 4 * 
At the outbreak of the American War in Apri~ of 1775, for example, 
there were 11,500 British troops stationed in North America. By mid-1776, 
prior to Lord Howe's successful invasion and capture of New York, the 
number of troops had risen to 27,000 with a contingent of 2,000 Royal 
Marines. 5 In order to raise troops to replace those sent overseas and 
for casualties, emergency methods were employed. Although the rank and 
file of the army had traditionally been filled out by convicts released 
from the prisons and gaols in lieu of serving active sentences, three 
regiments of the line were manned almost entirely by convicts during 
the American War. 6 The difficulties experienced in 1775 were the normal 
Pattern of recruiting throughout the 18th century. Considering the bad 
reputation of the services and the poor rate of pay, it is not surprising 
that the army~'generally attracted only the poor, destitute and desperate. ** 
* This amount paid at the beginning of the Arrlerican War. Bounties rose 
rapidly during the 1790' s to the end of the Napoleonic '·lar. 
** Pay for a private soldier had only risen to Is. per day by the 1790's 
and this was before stoppages for mess, .uniform, shoes, barber, 
necessaries and so on. 
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This period was before the development of 19th Century European 
nationalism by which time, appeals to patriotism could more easily fill 
the ranks. 
As the British colonial empire swelled through successful conquests 
and the gradual ldthdrmlal of France from the colonial sphere, the British 
commitment in number of troops grew. Difficulty was had in providing 
garrisons in peacetime, particularly in Ireland where rebellion was a 
constant threat. In order to meet the requirement for troops to maintain 
garrisons as well as to meet the need overseas, special measures were 
taken to alleviate the problem of manninff. Among the steps taken after 
1758 was the embodiment of several Regiments of Fencibles, either cavalry 
or foot, to be used only for home service or in Ireland. From 1759 to 
1783, eight Fencible regiments were raised, six of which ~ere from Scotland.7 
, . 
Between 1793 and 1802, a total of 60 battalions of Fencible troops were 
8 
raised for service. Many of the Fencible corps served in Ireland and were 
involved in quelling the rebellion of f798. Others served in the home 
islands and provided a trained, armed ~~d disciplined body of troops able 
to resist an invasion attempt. The bTeatest value of these troops was the 
SUbsequent releasing of line regiments for overseas duty and also to serve 
as a training and replacement depot for the reeular regiments. 
Despite such measures as the creation of Fencibles, raisinG of bounties 
and use of convicts, adequate numbers of troops were not easily found. 
New resources of manpower were required if Britain was to meet the 
cOmmitment for both home defence and overseas activity. The Highlands 
COuld provide the necessary resources, but anti-Jacobitism was the 
fundamental obstacle to the recruiting of the Highlanders prior to 1757. 
SECTION 2 
Government Policy, William Eiii ~ the Crisis of 115.§.. 
The Eritish government in 1756, faced with a massive overseas troop 
commitment, utilized a traditional method to alleviate the shortaGe of 
trained men by hiring mercenary troops from Hesse and IIanover. The 
war with Prance escalated and the British forces suffered severe checks 
* and defeats such as the loss of Hinorca in the spring of 1756. Apathy 
in the American colonies led to a further erosion of the Eritish position 
as Americans were initially reluctant to enlist in the army in their own 
defence. The hiring of Germans and the home recruitment fell far short 
of the necessary manpower requirement. 
The government of the Duke of Nev/castle had attempted to alleviate 
the crisis through the augmentation of several battalions of foot, the 
raising of new regiments of dragoons and the reform of the Royal Marines 
Who vlere placed under Admiral ty cont~ol. 9 General Ligioner had been the 
motivating force behind the Newcastle ~eforms. The moves proved 
insufficient, hOvlever, and the loss of the post of Oswego in New York 
and the general lack of British success contributed to the fall of the 
Newcastle government. In its place was brought in a war government 
under the D~ce of Devonshire with Wi1liam Pitt as principal minister 
for the war effort. 
Pi tt moved s\viftly. Two paramount actions were undertaken in the 
years 1756-57 to bolster the crippled British military establishment • 
.An act for the raising of :f.1ili tia in England and 'vales was adopted in 
December 1756 which allo':led for the raising of 30,000 recruits for home 
-
'* For account of the siege of Hinorca and the early battles of the war, 
See Fortescue, Volume 11., pages 297-301. 
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service. The German troops of Hanover and Hesse-Cassel were returned 
to the continent as the Militia took up the responsibility of home 
defence, even though the full complement could not be raised. 
The second, and perhaps most crucial policy for the future, was 
the raising of two regiments of foot from the Scottish Highlands. This 
was a bold manoeuvre by Pitt. Fears of Jacobite activity were of great 
Concern to the British governments of the post'45 period and any attempt 
to arm the Highlanders was seen as folly. 
Proposals to raise regular regiments of the line on the basis of 
undercutting Jacobitism had been made previously from prominent Whigs 
in the Highlands, notably Duncan Forbes in 1738. Following the 
Jacobite rising of 1745, the Duke of Argyle again suggested the raising 
of troops from among the disaffected clans; however, the proposal was 
again refused. lO In addition to the legislation designed to destroy' 
the ability of the clans to take arms against the government, other 
measures were taken which included the removal of stands of arms from 
cities and burghs near the Highland line such as Aberdeen.ll 
Government policy between the quelling of the uprising and the 
renewal of war with France was that of SUbjugation of the clans, and 
the removal from their possession of all possible means of revolt. 
On 8 July 1748, Lord Findlater wrote to the Duke of Newcastle: 12 
It is said that there is an intention to turn the two 
lUghland regiments into Independent Companies to be sent 
to the Highlands •••• I am sure it \,rould prove a most 
pernicious scheme, for it would effectually spread and keep 
the \'larlike spirit there and frustrate all measures for 
rooting it out •••• It would be dangerous to scatter such a 
number of military Highlanders in their own country •••• 
No lUghlander ought to be employed in the Highlands, but a 
small number of picked ones to serve as guides for the 
regular troops. 
Despite the fact that the great majority of the Highlanders under 
arms in 1748 ",ere of the loyal clans, especially the Campbells, Munros, 
31. 
Grants and l1ackays, anti-Jacobite feeling was at such ~ level that 
very little distinction 'vas made between those ,.,ho had fought for 
and.those who had fought against the Stuart cause. Official policy 
during this period, then,woUJ.d not allow the raising of troops from 
the Highlands despite the very sound arguments put forth by such 
notables as Forbes and Argyle. 
With the outbreak of war in 1756, the official anti-Jacobite 
Position came under new consideration, though at a low key. The 
Duke of Newcastle tentatively proposed raising regulars from the 
Highlands, but King George would not accept the plan.13 The proposal 
lay dormant for that year. The military reversals of 1756, though, 
caused a re-thinking of the policy towards the Highlands. 
In late 1756, the Duke of Cumberland recommended the raising of 
Highlanders through the utilization of' former rebel chieftains' in a 
,letter to Lord Albemarle using the pseudonym, "Germanicus-Britanicus".14 
Pitt readily accepted the idea but,was faced·.with the task of convincinB' 
the Cabinet and King George. Pitt's argument was that by removing those 
of the disaffected clans from the Highlands and engaging them in 
fighting the French, a two-fold purpose could be accomplished • 
• 
Firstly, a new area of recruitment would be opened utilizing the martial 
nature of the Highlands and thus alleviating the chronic shortages of 
manpm.,er to fill up the depleted ranks of the army. Secondly, by 
removing from the Highlands those most prone to rebellion, the 
government could supervise the activities of these men in service 
while consequently removing the necessary supporters that any 
Stuart attempt would rely upon. This was, in essence, the argument 
PUt forward by Forbes ru1d Argyle. Pitt argued that it was far better 
to have the Jacobitasfighting the French than fomenting disaffection 
in the Highlands.15 'fue argument vias persuasive and the need for 
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troops imperative. The Cabinet was convinced as to the soundness of 
Pitt's proposal. The King acquiesced and issued a Royal Order dated 
1 January 1757 for the raising of 2,000 troops in the Highlands.16 
The first of the regiments to be raised was the 77th or 
Montgomery's High1~~ders under Colonel Archibald Montgomery, son of 
the Earl of Eglinton. Eighty Gaelic-speaking non-commissioned 
officers were posted from other line regiments to train the new 
battalions which were to be composed primarily of men who had been 
out in rebellion in 1745 or who were of the Jacobite clans.17 A mixture 
of loyal and rebel clansmen was achieved in the 77th as the list of 
18* 
recruitment by companies and region demonstrates. 
Officers 
Lt.-Col. l1ontgomery •••••••• 
Major Grant •• , ••••• 
Major Campbe11 •••••••• 
Captain Sinclair •• y ••••• 
Captain 11acKenzie •••••••• 
Captain Gordon •••••••• 
Captain A. I'1acKenzie •••••••• 
Captain MacDona1d •••••••• 
Captain Nunro ......... . 
Captain HacKenzie •••••••• 
yfuere CompanY'~sed 
Atho11 
Strathspey and Urquhart 
West Highlands 
Sutherland and Caithness 
Glasgow and Ross-shire 
Edinburgh and Aberdeenshire 
Perthshire and Aberdeenshire 
Edinburgh and Skye 
Fairn Dona1d 
Kintai1 
Areas of intense Jacobite activity were concentrated upon such as 
Kintai1, the northwest regions and Ross-shire, home of. the MacKenzies. 
A goodly number of the recruits from the loyal areas . were mixed with 
the former Jacobites. The combination was to prove successful as this 
reeiment gave excellent service while on duty in Canada and America. 
The second Highland regiment embodied in 1757 was the 78th or 
Fraser's Highlanders, raised and commanded by Simon Fraser, eldest son 
of Lord Lovat who had been executed in 1747 for his role in the '45. 
-
* See Appendix D for copy of commission as Major of Alexander Campbel1 
in 77th and signed by \-Til1iam Pi tt. 
Young Simon Fraser had been forced into the revolt by the machinations 
of his father and was subsequently pardoned in 1750. The Fraser estates 
and title had been forfeited, therefore, Fraser operated as a commoner 
with no 1andor tenants. Despite this handicap, he managed to raise 
some 800 men in a period of weeks, largely dravm from his family's former 
estates.19 Again, as with Montgomery's Highlanders, the rank and file 
were largely recruited from the areas of formerly Jacobite' sympathy. 
And, as with the 77th, the 78th gave excellent service in North America. 
* Both regiments were disbanded in 1763. 
Pitt's gamble had been a success. The martial inclinations of the 
Highlanders had been turned from anti-Hanoverian to pro-government and 
the last hope of the Jacobite cause had been quashed. Pitt claimed 
credit for having first raised the Highland regiments after 1746. It is 
true that he had been the minister responsible for doing so; however, 
the original idea was not his own. Years afterwards, Pitt, then the 
Earl of Chatham, p~oclaimed to Parliament,20 
I sought merit where it could be found ••••• It is my boast 
that I was the first minister who sought for it and found 
it in the mountains of the north. I called for it and drew 
into your service a hardy and intrepid race of men whom the 
jealousy of party had made a prey to the artifices of our 
enemies. Speech of 14 January 1766. 
By 1763, over 65,000 Scots were in the services, many of whom were 
Highlanders and many more were to serve throughout the next 60 years.2l 
-
* A number of other Highland regiments were also raised for the 
Seven Year's War. See Appendix A for a complete listing. 
SECTION 3 
Reconciliation ~ the Reasons !2! Raisine. 
Government policy toward the Highland corps until the mid-1790's 
was one of indifference as to the manner.' in which the regiments were 
raised. The press gang and the ballot box methods of procuring recruits 
in other parts of the country were largely unnecessary in the Highland 
regions for the Fencibles and regulars of the line. Official policy 
was to grant warrants for raising, supply a certain number of officers 
and funds for the cost of bounties, recruiting expenses and the initial 
uniforms and equipment. It was then left to' the raiser to procure the 
troops in whatever manner he deemed necessary. The relati~e freedom 
given to the raiser in his activities was certainly an inducement to 
many of the lUghland aristocracy to offer to raise a regiment and there 
were a number of landowners or prominent persons who were willing to 
do so for a multitude of reasons. In some cases, financial considerations 
and patronage were the primary motivators. After the successful 
implementation of the policy of allowing Scottish aristocrats to raise 
Highland corps after 1757, it became a very desirable undertaldng and 
actually became quite fashionable in the 1790's. Landowners made 
continuous offers to raise units, many of which were accepted, as 
evidenced by the proliferation of regular and Fencible Highland units 
after 1793. Indeed, so many corps were embodied by the~early 19th 
Century, that many recruits were drawn from non-Highland districts. 
This factor prompted the \var Office in 1809 to remove the Highland 
dress and other distinctions from a number of regiments such as the 
72nd, 73rd, 74th, 75th, 91st and 94th.22 
Of more immediate concern in the mid-18th Century to many Highland 
notables was the loss of titles and estates as a result of participation 
in the Jacobite rebellions. In return for service to the nation, which 
llsually meant the raising of troops, estates were returned to their 
previous owners or heirs. Through this policy, not only did the Crown 
manage to reconcile a number of former Jacobites, but also received a 
great many troops in the process. 
Three examples of the success of the policy of reconciliation are 
Worthy of note. Simon Fraser had been pardoned for his role in the 
'45; nevertheless, the Lovat estates were held by the government. 
Despite this handicap, Fraser raised his regiment, the 78th, for the 
Seven Year's War and proved himself to be a talented military commander, 
attaining the rank of Brigadier-General in 1771. For his distinguished 
military service, Fraser was given the Lovat estates in 1774 for the sum 
of £20,983.23 This amount represented the debts on the estate which 
were required to be cleared before he could take possession. In order 
to pay the debt incumbrance, rents were raised. Much of the remainder 
of the sum was recovered through the successful manipulation of 
patronage which was made possible through the raising of a HiGhland corps, 
therefore, the raising of a }~gh1and regiment was a viable means of 
restoring a family's position, a factor not overlooked by many of the 
owners of forfeited estates and titles. 
The title of Baron Fraser of Lovat was not restored until 1837; 
. 24 however, Simon Fraser did, through his efforts recover the land. 
So successful was the raising of the 78th in 1757. that General Fraser 
again raised a corps of 2,340 troops in 1775 for service in the American 
Revolutionary War. The 71st, or Fraser's Highlanders, was officered by 
at least 6 clan chiefs,,2 sons of chiefs and several lesser chieftains 
or their sons. 25 
Following the successful example of Simon Fraser, Lord MacLeod, the 
heir to estates in Cromarty, raised a regiment for the American War in 
1777 which vIas numbered the 73rd Regiment. NacLeod had fled to Sweden 
fol1mvinG' the t 45 despite a pardon on the grounds of his youth. He 
served for 27 years in the Swedish service, rising to the rank of 
26 Lieutenant-General. In 1 777, MacLeod returned to Great Britain 
and offered to raise a battalion from among his former tenantry in 
Cromarty and Lewis. A total of 1,100 men were raised initially of 
which 840 were Highlanders, the remainder being Lowland, Irish or 
English.27 A second battalion vIas subsequently raised. Of the total 
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of 2,200 troops, over 1,800 were from the Cromarty estates. For his 
services, Lord MacLeod was allowed to purchase the forfeited estates 
of the Earldom of Comarty in 1784 at a cost of £19,000 or that amount 
of debt accrued on the estate. 29 
A third instance of this type concerned the heir to the Earldom 
, 
of Seaforth, Kenneth MacKenzie, a grandson of the late Earl whose 
estates had been forfeited for his role in the uprisings of 1715 and, 
1719. In 1777, MacKenzie was allowed to purchase the estates of his 
grandfather and the following year, offered to raise a Highland regiment 
which became the 78th, Seaforth's High1anders. 30 
The policy of reconciliation with the former rebels was, by any 
standard, an incredible success. Not only did this policy remove the 
underpinninGs of previous Jacobite success, that of disaffection with 
the Hanoverian governmE:nt, but it also offered a great scope for royal 
patronage. An underlying motivation for a110vring Jacobite chiefs to 
raise troops was the need for the final reconciliation of the Scottish 
aristocracy to the Act of Union. Since 1707, the Scottish aristocracy 
had been relegated to an inferior status to that of England. Frustration 
over the lack of access to Government patronage had been a primary root 
cause of disaffection and Jacobitism. An important tool of Crown 
patronage throughout the 17th and 18th Centuries had been the granting 
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of warrants to raise regiments. Through the granting of such warrants, 
the government sienalled to the Scott1sh nobi.lity and gentry that it 
~ad finally accepted them as equal partners in the Union, thus ending 
a half-century of bitterness and frustration. A further extension of 
this policy was the granting of new titles. In 1777, Macdonald of 
Sleat was made Baron Macdonald on the Irish Peerage as a result of the 
new policy towards the Highland aristocracy. Lord Macdonald raised 
the 76th Regiment, Macdonald's Highlanders the following yeax. 
other factors affected decisions to raise Highland corps. Some 
regiments were raised at great expence to the officers. Other officers, 
unable to advance throueh ordinary means, raised troops from among 
their kinsmen for promotion. Allan Cameron of Erracht had been retired 
in 1783 on half pay as a Lieutenant in Tar1eton's British Legion. 31 
In 1793, his offer to raise a Hiehland corps'~las accepted and the 79th 
Carneron's Rigblanders was embodied. No bounty money for recruitment 
was provided for this regiment by the government, therefore, it was 
at a great expence to himself and his officers that Carneron managed 
to recruit his regiment. He was promoted to colonel, a considerable 
rise in rank. Carneron WBnt to great lengths to raise a purely Highland 
corps and originally only Gaelic speakers were taken into the ranks.32 
Frank AdWl, writing on the history of the Highland regiments, 
proposes the theory that the 89th Regiment, the first of the Gordon's 
Highlanders, was raised in 1759 by the Duchess of Gordon and her second 
husband, Major st~.:t_es Long Horris, to counteract the political 
influence of the Duke of Argyle. The future Duke of Cordon was still 
in his minority at that time. 33 The theory does not seem unreasonable 
conSidering the friction and jealousies between the great houses of 
Scotland during the period. 
Many factors were involved in the raising of regiments. Initially, 
some regiments were raised in exchange for the return of forfeited 
properties or titles as with NacLeod or MacKenzie. Family prestige \'las 
also of importance. Finally, by the 1790's, the raising and commanding 
of a Highland regiment had become so popular that lesser gentry such as 
Cameron of Erracht were willing to go to great expense to raise and 
equip a regiment despite the lack of gover:nment money. .And, certainly, 
extra income could be generated by a regiment, particularly in a period 
of rising prices and ostentatious living by the aristocracy of Scotland 
* when traditional revenues were proving insufficient to meet costs. 
* Chapter Ill, Section 3, deals with the financial aspect in depth. 
SECTION 4 
Types .2! Reeiments, l7.1.Q. to 1815. 
The response to the government's efforts at raising troops from the 
Highlands was considerable after 1757 as indicated by the great number 
of all types of regiments embodied. There were" during this period, 
five distinct types of llighland corps embodied either fo~ home defence 
or service overseas. These corps were: regiments of the line and their 
reserve battalions; Fencible regiments of foot; County Hilitia; Volunteer 
regiments; and finally, Local Militia. Between the ~ears 1740 and 1815, 
86 battalions were raised in the Highlands for army service excluding 
the Volunteers and Local Militia. The nwnbers raised were: 50 battalions 
* of the. line of which 34 were employed on foreign service; 29 battalions 
. ** of Fencibles; 3 battalions of line reserves; ,and 7 battalions of H~litia. 
A complete listing of the Fencible and line regiments is given in 
Appendix A with dates and details of service. 
The Fencible regiments served in Great Britain and Ireland and were 
primarily for home defence. Of the 45 battalions raised in Scotland 
between 1759 and 1802, the majority were either Highland or recrJ.1 ted 
predominately in the IIighlands as was the case of many border regiments. 34 
Although there had existed some Fencible corps since 1759, the terms of 
service and re&~lations governing the raiSing of Fencibles were 
finally legislated in 1778. The Comprehending Act of 1778 established 
* The remainder never left Great Britain or were drafted into other 
regiments as replacement troops. See Appendix A. 
** For lists of Volunteers and Local l1ilitia, see Stewart, Volume II, 
Pages 437-438. 
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that Fencibles were: 35 
1) voluntarily enlisted (bounty of 3 guineas in 171S), 
2) service confined to Scotland except in case of invasion, 
3) men not to be drafted into other units, 
4) officers to be nominated by raiser. 
A breakdown of the Fencibles raised from the Highlands shows that 
the bulk were embodied between 1793 and lS02. 36 
1) 1759-63 
2j177S- S3 
3 1793 
4 1794 
5) 1795-1802 
- 2 
- 4 
5 (Bredalbane Fencibles had 3 battalions) 
- 11 
- 5 
Service for the Fencibles was eventually extended to Ireland where 
many served throughout the 1790's. The Fencible corps provided replacement 
'-i) 
troops for the line regiments on a regular basis and served as a valuable 
training depot. In June lSOO, for example, SOO Fencible troops were taken 
from those serving in Ireland into the depleted ranks of the 21st, 7lst, 
72nd, 79th and 92nd regiments to fill out those unit's full complement. 
All were volunteers and received bounties of 10 guineas while officers 
received regular commissions based upon the number of privates 
volunteering. 37* 
With the outbreak of war in the 1790's, the need for home defence 
troops was imperative. Accordingly, in 1793, William Pitt the Younger 
advocated the raising of a Scottish and Irish Militia. English 
Political opinion, however, would not support the raising of Militia 
3S . in these countries. The fear of Jacobitism and the new concern over 
French-style Jacobinism prevented the creation of Militia and the 
Fencibles ",ere raised as an e.l ternative. The recruitment for the Fenoibles 
was not by forced ballot and through the appointment of officers by the 
Crown, the Fencibles were oonsidered less susceptible to anti-government 
aotivity.39 
The English Militia dated from 1757 but attempts to create a 
* See Appendix B for text of circular letter sent to the Colonels of 
Fencible regiments in Ireland. 
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Scottish Militia in 1760, 1776, 1782 and 1793 were defeated in Parliament, 
and it was not until 1797 that fears of Jacobitism had subsided to a 
degree which allowed for the passage of the }lilitia Act of 1797 in 
July of that year. 40 
The Act called for the raising of 6,000 troops to serve only in 
. U Scotland and for the duration of the war plus one month. The Scottish 
Militia was chosen by ballot in each parish and a balloted man could pay 
a fine of £10 to the Deputy Lieutenant of the county in order to hire a 
replacement volunteer should be wish not to serve. 42 Those to be 
, . 
balloted were to be fit men between the ages of 18 and 23 and those 
exempted included all married men with two or more children, sailors, 
apprentices, articled clerks, University lecturers, schoolmasters, clergy, 
parish constables and those already serving in any of the armed forces. 43 
The terms of service were quite generous and those disabled were eligible 
for pensions. Any former Militia soldier could practice any trade in any 
corporate town without having to pay the mandatory fees. The officers 
were made up of the local gentry in order to create an atmosphere of trust 
and local familiarity.44 The captains and subalterns were appointed on 
the local level by the Lord Lieutenant of each county while the Crown 
appointed the }~jors and Colonels. 45 
Despite careful measures to insure acceptance of the Militia by the 
populace, a goodly amount of disruption and riot occurred in Scotland froln 
June to November of 1797 and the implementation of the Act was postponed 
until March of 1798. 46 Particularly strong resistance occurred in Aberdeen, 
Athole and the south western Lowlands. Many reasons for this resistance 
to the raising of the Militia have been advanced. The rise of Jacobin 
ideas coupled with mistrust o~ the government's intentions generated some 
discontent. A very real fear of being posted to other parts of the 
country contrary to the limitations of servioe was manifested in opposition 
to balloting. Finally, unlike the English Militia where local clergy 
carried out the balloting, Scottish schoolmasters were called upon to 
carry out this duty and, respected though they may have been, many 
schoolmasters lacked the force of authority needed to carry out an 
unpopular measure. 47 
An interesting feature of the returns for 1797 is the very lo\·r 
number of balloted men from Highland counties as compared with the 
Lmvlands. This was perhaps attributable to the great drain of men for 
the regulars and Fencibles by that year: 48 
Highland Counties 
Inverness-shire 
Cromarty 
Ross'"" 
Sutherland 
95 
- '11 
81 
27 
Lo,.,land Counties 
Fife 
Perth 
Forfar 
Aberdeen 
176 
263 
185 
244 
Due to the lack of manpower, the initial quota for the Scottish }tllitia 
. 49 
establishment was reduced from 6,000 to 5,468. 
< 
With the disbanding of the Fencibles after 1802, the responsibility 
for home defence devolved onto the Militia. A new Act of 26 June 1802 
increased the Scottish llllitia establishment to 7,950 troops and augmented 
the 10 battalions to 15. 50 The initial battalions were of 600 privates 
each and were apportioned over the country as follows: 51 
Regiment 
1st 
2nd 
3rd 
4th 
5th 
6th 
7th 
8th 
9th 
John Carnpbell 
Lord Seaforth 
Duke of 'Hamilton 
Lord Dalkeith 
Duke of Montrose 
Lord Aboyne 
Lord Glasgow 
Lord Douglas 
Duke of Buccleuch 
Count;y 
Argyle, Bute, Inverness, Dumbarton; 
Caithness, Cl:'omarty, Ross, Moray, 
Nairn, Sutherland; 
Lanark; 
Dumfries, Kirkcudbright, Peebles, 
Roxburgh, Selkirk, Wigtown; 
Clackmannan, Fife, Kinross, Stirling; 
Aberdeen, Banff; 
Ayr, Renfrew, 
Forfar, Kincardine, 
Berwick, Lothians. 
A third force for home defence was the Volunteer regiments. These 
local bodies were created in i798 on the sU5gestion of Henry Dundas and 
were disbanded in 1802. The Volunteers evolved from earlier local citizen 
military units called Armed Associations. Efforts at organizing such 
bodies had been previously made often with limited success. 52 The 
Lord Lieutenants were made re'sponsible for the raising of the Volunteer 
regiments after 1798 and government support made the raising of such 
corps easier than had been the case with the former Armed Associations. 
AI though sanctioned by the eovernment, the Volunteers were f1.mded hy 
private subscription and no pay was given unless the troops were 
actually called up for duty. As a result, the government had little 
control over the discipline of the Volunteers; however, these regiments 
could be quite advantageo~s in efforts at repelling any invasion or 
domestic insurrection, therefore, their existence was an integral aspect 
of the home defence strategy.53 
The system of Volunteer regiments affected the efforts at raising 
the Militia since they were not conscripted by ballot and training in 
the Volunteers exempted one from being balloted in the Militia. 54 
~ecause of the conflict, the Volunteer regiments were replaced in 1802 
by' the Local Militia which was selected by ballot. No substitutes were 
allowed and no bounty was given. ~ 1809, 66;regiments of Local Militia 
had been created in Scotland with a total of 45,781 men under arms. 55 
The Local Militia filled the defence gap created by the disbanding of 
the Fencible regiments and the weakness of the Scottish Militia. The 
Local Militia was the predecessor of the present Territorial Army 
Volunteer Reserve. 
With the great success in raising troops 'from the Highlands for 
the Fencibles, the Duke of York proposed in 1797 a plan for the raising 
of 9 brigades of Highlanders to be commanded by clan chiefs and to be 
raised from each chief's district and clansmen. The non-commissioned 
officers were to be drawn fro~ the Fencible regiments and the officers 
from either the line regiments or from the half-pay lists with a 
promotion in rank as inducement to serve. The plan called for the 
raiSing of 15,000 troops to be regimented along clan and district lines. 56 
44. 
The plan was circulated by Henry Dundas to all major Highland chiefs 
and landowners in February 1797. The proposal met with some scepticism 
as a letter from MacPherson of C~uny to the Duke of Gordon i11ustrates: 57 
Your Grace must be very sensible that this county has 
already been much drained by different levies - so much 
so that, if the nwnber now proposed were taken out of 
it, there would be a great danger of a total stop being 
made to the operations of husbandry. 
Letter of 6 March 1797. 
Negative reaction to the plan caused it to be abandoned and the 
Militia and Volunteers were raised in 1798 instead of the Clan regiments. 
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CHAPrER Ill. 
~ Dynamics of Recruiting. 
CFIAPrER Ill. 
SECTIon 1 
~ Importance of Clan ~ District Associations. 
The manner in which a Highland regiment was raised, whether regular 
or Fencible, varied little from the period of the early Black Watch in 
1740 through the 1790's. In the Highlands, regiments were raised as a 
result of an offer from ~ regional magnate and, as has been pointed out, 
required little prompting from the government. Whether raised by former 
Jacobites"seeking the restoration of forfeited properties or for reasons 
of prestige, the pattern for each regiment was similar. 
* Not every offer advanced was accepted, however. Once the 
government had decided to' embody a particular corps, a contract was drawn 
up with the raiser. A Warrant or Beating Order was issued by the 
Secretary at vlar \-lhich authorized the raiser, \-lith the King's authority, 
** to recruit a regiment. The raiser, by the terms of the Warrant, was 
entitled to nominate all or some of the of1icers, subject to the Crown's 
. approval. For example, the Warrant for the raising of the 98th 
Argyleshire Regiment issued on 10 February 1794 to the Duke of Argyle 
states that: l 
His I1ajesty leaves to Your Grace the nomination of all 
officers being such as are well affected to His Hajesty, 
and most likely by their interests and connextions to 
assist in raising the corps without delay, who if they 
meet with His Hajesty's approbation may be assured they 
will have commissions as soon as the Regiment is complete. 
The officers (if taken from Half-Pay) to serve in their 
* An offer by the city of Aberdeen inl778 was declined, for example. 
** See Appendix J3 for the text of the '''arrant issued to Colonel 
Baillie for the raising of the Reay Fencibles. 
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present rank, if taken from Full-Pay to serve with 
one step of promotion; the gentlemen named for ensigns 
are not to be under 16 years of age. 
Money for recruiting and equipping the regiment would be paid 
in gross, from which, subject to bounty restrictions, the officers 
would negotiate deals ,.!i th the potential recr..ll ts. 2 Money for 
recruiting expenses was placed in a common fund known as the stock-
purse from which officers would draw upon and which was maintained 
. * by the Reg~menta1 Paymaster. Any surplus funds were divided among 
the company captains and field officers. In time of war, governments 
often granted extra allowances to compensate for the increase in bOlxnty 
monies required to attract vo1unteers. 3 A detailed description of the 
system of bounties and other financial transactions in recruiting is 
found in Section 3. 
By the terms of the contract, the colonel or raiser was obligated 
to recruit and maintain the numbers of his regiment and a base figure 
of 500 of all ran.:.{s was the lowest that a corps was allowed to fall belm., 
which, individual units were subject to disbandment •. This proved to be 
a serious matter as the supply of men diminished and great numbers were 
lost in combat and by disease after 1793. The manner in which a colonel 
or raiser obtained his recruits was generally of little concern to the 
government as long as the required quotas were reached. A letter to 
Lord Macdonald granting him Carte Blanche permission to raise the 76th 
Regiment, }mcdona1d's Highlanders in 1777 in any manner from among 
his tenantry attests to the great leverage granted to the Highland 
magnates in the raising of their regiments. Should the raiser be 
unable to meet the obligations in numbers, the government was quite 
* The Lord Macdonald papers contain a goodly number of account 
returns for officers recruiting the Regiment of the Isles, 
H.M. Register House, CD 221/100. 
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Willing to buy the existing recruits and distribute them to other 
* standing units. 
Although the legal foundation of the old patriarchal clan system 
had been destroyed by legislation following the '45 and the subsequent 
opening up of the Highlands through the construction of roads and 
commerical enterprise, much of the ties of kinship and the role of the 
chief as father and protector remained throuehout the 18th Century. 
Edward Burt, who provides much insight into the internal workings of 
the clan system prior to ;1747, commented on the position of the clan 
chief: 4 
••• he is their idol; and as they profess to know no king 
but him ••• so they will say, they ought to do whatever 
he requires without inquiry. 
As late as the 1790's, the feeling of obligation towards the 
traditional leader was still of some importance and is co~mented upon 
by several writers for the Statistical Account. The Reverend Mr. Andrew 
Gallie, writing for the Parish of Kincardine in Ross and Cromarty, 
states of his parishioners: 5 
They still retain a sacred regard for the clen.and family 
they are sprung from; 'Uut it must be allowed that this 
feeling is on the decline. 
And on military matters, Colonel David Stewart of Garth states 
that: 6 
The Highland chiefs and landowners were not followed from 
m~rcenary motives, but from a patriarchal, hereditary and 
chivalrous attacmnent to their persons and families. 
While Stewart may perhaps be accused of romanticism; nevertheless, 
the sentiment of his statement illustrates a fundamental aspect of 
Highland society during the latter half of the 18th Century; old 
* See Appendix D for photocopy of letter stipulating these 
condl tlons dated December 1777. --
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clan loyalties to family and chief were still of paramount importance 
at that time. As late as 1799, the Countess of Sutherland could appeal 
to her clansmen to enlist in the 93rd Sutherland Highlanders as a test 
of duty and devotion to the chief and sovereign. 
This feeling towards clan and Clhief was a valuable asset to the 
government which was~wise enough to utilize the tremendous potential 
for manpower possible through the successful manipulation of clan 
loyalties. Old clan hatreds and anti-Hanoverian sentiment were 
successfully transferred. to foreign enemies after 1746. The old 
aristocracy of the Highlands, the chiefs and tacksmen, were the key 
figures in·) this transmission and the primary reasons for the great 
success of Highland recruiting. 
The problem of how to successfully harnass the clan sentiment for 
the government's benefit was approached in ~lhat was proven to be the 
proper manner as shovm by the great success of the policy. By granting 
the right to determine officer's appointments to the colonels or 
raisers or by specifying that they be chosen from among the gentry 
of the region, the clan and regional ties were maintained. 
The lists of original officers for the Reay Fencibles provide an 
excellent illustration of the importance of the gentlemen tacksmen 
officers. In 1793, 21 families held major tacks on the estates of 
Lord. Reay in north western Sutherland. The Colonel, Hugh Mackay 
. 
Baillie, was a cousin of the future Lord Reay, Eric, while the 
Lieutenant-Colonel, George Mackay of Bighouse, was a major tacksman. 
The Major was a native of Armadale, but had married into a Mackay 
family and was a career officer. Of the captains, 7 were major tacksmen 
and 2 were relations of the Colonel and the Lieutenant-Colonel, 
Captains Lamington Baillie and Colin Campbell }~ckay. The Reays carried 
21 Lieutenants on the rolls at raising. 'Of these, fo were the sons 
of major tacksmen or relations of the field officers. Only 2 of tIle 
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Lieutenants were career officers recruited from other corps to add 
military experience and expertise. Of the 8 Ensigns, 4 were again 
sons of the major tacksmen while 2 of the remaining were professional 
surgeons. The Captain-Lieutenant, who actually commanded the Colonel's 
Company, was James Mackay of Skerray w~ose house supplied Lieutenants 
Hector Mackay and William Mackay.1 
The various companies were raised predominantly from the estates 
of the tacksmen officers. The Bighouse Company of the Lieutenant-Colonel 
was raised entirely from the Mackay of Bighouse Strathalladale estate. 
The Mackays of Skerray raised their troops not only from their tacks at 
Skerray, bR~ also-from parts of Farrand Strathnaver. And finally, 
Colonel Baillie of Rosehall and Captain Lamington Baillie's Companies 
were enlisted largely from their Rosehall -estates. 8 
, 
The policy of granting commissions to tacksmen was tremendously 
successful in the Fencible regiments and the importance of the tacksman's 
traditional role as the middleman between chief and clansman was 
successfully used by these corps. The case of the regular regiments of 
the line was somewhat different regarding amateur tacksman officers. 
Although they were to play a significant role in the raising of their 
, 
tenantry for service, there was a definite need for trained, experienced 
officers as opposed to the gentlemen amateurs so abundant in the Fencibles. 
General Wemyss' Warrant for the raising of the 93rd Sutherland 
Highlanders in 1199 specified that the Lieutenant-Colonel and Major 
should come from the half-pay lists or promoted from the full-pay lists 
of other regiments. The 8 Ensigns were to be gentlemen of at least 
16 years of age and of the tacksman class, thus giving some scope for 
patronage. The remainder of the officers were appointed by the 
government either from full ~ half-pay and some were taken from the 
disbanded Sutherland Fencibles, thus allowing for trained officers from 
the Sutherland area.9 
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Local gentry were, however, quite prominent in the first 
gazetteing of officers to the 93rd as the government attempted to 
appoint men with local backgrounds. Of the 7 Captains, 5 were from 
the major area of recruitment in Sutherland. Four of the 11 
Lieutenants were local gentry while 7 Ensigns were of the local 
tacksmen families. It is significant to note that a close examination 
of the returns of the original officers shows that all ranks above 
Ensign were posted from other regiments and of the whole, 2 were 
drawn from the half-pay lists. Of the Captains, only 2 had held 
commissions in the Sutherland Fencibles and one in the Reay Fencibles. 
The remainder had served in various Scottish or English regiments. 10 
'-.' 
This illustrates rather dramatically the prediliction of the Highland 
gentry towards military service. As a result, the government had at 
hand a great reposi tbry;· of Highland officers to post to newly formed 
Highland regiments to not only maintain the important clan and regional 
ties but also to provide the benefit of their experience and training. 
The significance of the clan gentry and tacksmen to the recruiting 
prospects of a Highland regiment is quite well illustrated in numerous 
statements by various writers and two are reproduced as examples of 
the great importance of the role played by the officers who were native 
to the region of recruitment. Colonel 8tewart suggests that:11 
To the south of the hills, no recruits could be obtained 
witho~t money. In the north money had its place, but in 
raising soldiers, it was less regarded than the character 
and family of the person recruiting, and~hose fortunes 
the young,soldiers converted themselves. 
Colonel Cameron, in his Memoirs, stated that "beyond all question, 
it was the personal and family influence which then filled the ranks 
of the Highland regiments' ".12 
SECTION 2 
~ Methods .2f. Recruitine; l!2 ~ !.!ie:hlands. 
Recruiting for the Highland regiments took on many forms in the 
period prior to the end of the Napoleonic Wars. Several methods were 
of primary importance and include the practices of recruitment for rank, 
recruitment by rank, appeal to clan obligations and loyalties and 
. conscription. These several methods of raising troops as well as the 
importance of the non-regular regiments in supplying men to the regulars , 
is now dealt with in this section. 
The system of recruitment for rank has been condemned by some 
...... lJ 
writers as bringing into the service a gTeat number of "bad characters" 
and other undesirables. 13 This criticism may have some foundation, but 
it was a necessary expedient of the times. The Prime Minister, William 
Pitt, initiated the practice in 1793 in order to raise a large number 
of troops in a short period of time. Officers currently holding 
regular cornmissions were given a step in promotion for a certain quota 
of men raised, while civilians were grante'd commissions based upon the 
number of troops delivered. 14 Previous to 1793, the system of raising 
for rank in the llighlands had only been used for the Independent 
Companies.15 After 1793, the 78th, 79th, 92nd and 93rd Regiments were 
all raised using this system. As an example; officers of the 2nd , 
Battalion of the 78th Regiment were given commissions as follows: 100 
men for Lieutenant-Colonelcy, 90 for a Majority, 50 for a Captaincy, 
25 for a Lieutenancy and 20 for an EnSigncy.16 
The system of recruiting soldiers by rank rather than for rank 
had been the normal procedure for decades in the Hil?hland corps prior 
to 1793. The crucial difference in the two systems was the factor of 
pre-appointment to a commission foll9wed by the recruitment of troops 
54. 
55. 
as opposed to the recruitment followed by commission based upon the 
numbers. delivered. Earlier officers did perhaps have more discretion 
in choosing potential soldiers for the service as their commission 
had already been assured. The generally accepted ratio for the period 
of 1740 to 1790 was 35 men for captains, 25 for lieutenants and 15 
for each ensign. These figures did vary from regiment to regiment 
but represent an approximate sampling. In the papers of MacPherson of 
Cluny is found a letter dated 1761 to Colonel Graeme, commanding the 
l05th Regiment, wherein MacPherson defends his nephew, a company 
captain, who was only able to raise 64 men for his company. Since no 
subalterns-'had been appointed to assist in the raising of this company, 
this figure represents a very large body of men for one officer when 
the expected total vTaS near 35.17 
other records suggest more reasonable figures. Por example, returns 
of recruits attested by 12 April 1793 by Lieutenants Morrison and Maine 
of the Eredalbane Fencibles show 13 men each while the return for 
Captain Ronaldson is 28. This regiment is reported to have had no 
difficulty in raising troops and eventually three battalions were 
18 embodied. 
Officers who were unable to meet the requirement set for their 
rank were obliged to pay a fine into the ReGimental Paymaster's 
Account out of which'funds were drawn to fill the vacancies. In the 
Bredalbane Pencibles, the fine was eet at 2 guineas and this sum was 
paid as a bonus to the officer who recruited the extra man to fill 
the vacancy. 
-In the earlier part of the 18th Century, and in various Fencible 
regiments where recruitment was strong, a number of officers recruited 
more than their quota. These surplus men were organized into a single 
replacement company and were known as supernumeraries. If a man was 
/ 
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rejected on the grounds of ~edical; financial or general unsuitability, 
his place was filled by a recruit drawn from the sllpernumerary company 
and the officer who had first recruited the replacement received a 
bonus of 5 guineas per man taken into the ranks.~9 It was, therefore, 
to the great advantage of ever,y offiner to not only meet his quota, 
but to exceed it. 
The purchasing of commissions, a system which existed in the 
British army until the Cardwell reforms of 1871, was not confined to 
the Lowland and English regiments. A number of Highland officers 
managed to receive their corr~issions and rank advancements through 
this system. The financial arrangements of this system are discussed 
in Section 3 in depth. Although 20th Century hindsight condemns the 
purchase of officer's commissions, the motivation for allOWing often 
inefficient and incompetent officers into the service upon a monetary 
payment, was the attempt to make the army incapable of anti-government 
activity. This system was also a great t~ol for government patronage 
as well as a source of income for those who ,undertook the raising of 
a regiment. 
Fencible regiments proved to be extremely valuable as replacement 
troops for the regular regiments and Highland officers were quite prone 
to take advantage of this situation. Stewart of Garth suggests that 
many officers raised'Fencible troops in order to obtain a start in the 
service and endeavoured to move up in the ranks by transferring men 
to the regular line regiments. This system was not always a success 
and many Fencible officers remained in a static Position. 20 A goodly 
number of Fencible officers as well as those from the Militia and 
Volunteers did succeed in transferring into re6~lar battalions. 
Captain Colin Campbel Mackay, who commanded the Grenadier Company of 
the Reay Fencibles is typical of these officers. In 1805", Mackay raised 
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a Grenadier Company for the 2nd Battalion of the 18th Regiment. Through 
the system of recruitment for rank, he was eranted a Captaincy. l'Iany of 
the troops were from his Strathalladale estates and had served under 
this officer with the Reays in Ireland prior to 1803.21 
With the officers chosen for a new Highland corps, whether through 
family patronage, ~urchase of commission or the promise to raise a 
certain number for rank, the more difficult task of raising the 1,000 
er so raruc and file per battalion was begun, a process which might take 
several forms ranging from appeals to clan loyalty to various methods 
of local conscription. 
In the Highlands, family influence would have been quite important 
during this period and a great number of recruits would quickly volunteer 
uPon hearing that a certain officer or family was raising a company. As 
, 
recruiting became more intense and the requirement for the Highland corps 
began to drain off the initial volunteers, certain methods of conscription 
Were employed, though not with the same intensity as with the ballot.used 
by the Scottish Hilitia after 1797. 
A method employed for the raiSing of the 93rd Highlanders seems to 
have been in use for some time when raising clan levies and was again 
employed in 1799. This was the use of the snuff mull or horn. A parish 
meeting of all the males of a prescribed age would be held and the men 
formed into regular rallies. Th~ chieftain or his representative, usually 
. 
the officer recruiting, would pass among the ranks with the snuff mull 
and a bottle of whisl~. Those chosen by the officer would be given a 
pinch of snuff and a dram of whisky while the clerk recorded his name, 
The sienal was the giving of the snuff and each man understood and 
accepted the meaning of this action, Each new recruit would receive 
a shilling and was given subsistence money for the period prior to 
22 
mustering and then sent home. The success of this method depended 
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Upon the acceptance of military servic'e as a duty to one I s superior 
and could only be as succesoful as the feelings of obligation still 
existent in the clan. 
It is reported by the Reverend John Macdonald, a veteran of the 
93rd, that a method of ballot box conscription was used in the Parish 
of Farr where men drew black balls out of a box to signify their 
conscription. 23 It must be stated that references to these methods of 
recruiting by conscription for the regulars and Fencibles are rare and 
were apparently not used to any great extent. The }lilitia and the 
Local }Uli tia after 1802 did utilize ballot conscription. 
A more,,;oeliable method of raising volunteers for service, and one 
that encompassed the traditional obligations of the proprietor to 
tenants, involved the granting of land or lease rights to either the 
Volunteer himself or the man's family. Colonel Cardyne, in his The Life 
--
£f ~ Re~iment, asserts that it was not unusual for officers to arrange 
for the families or recruits to receive extra grazing rights or similar 
favours. 24 This practice seems to have been quite common over all the 
Hiehlands and Islands. A letter from Lord Macdonald to a clansman 
during the raising of the 76th Regiment promises that: 25 
Angus Hathison in Raigil, having given one of his sons 
for the Service, I hereby promise the said Angus 
preference always to the lands he now possesses, espeCially 
as he bears exceeding good character. His children shall 
also have the same indulgence. 
Cruidrach, 17 }larch 1778. 
Promises to recruits or their families varied from situa.tion to 
si tuation. A list of promises to men of the West Fenci ble Rez:iment 
raised by the Earl of 13redal bane during the American \{ar ei ves an 
excellent demonstration of the diversity of grants and promises: 26 
Je,mes Camp1)ell El. NI?thE;.~ - To continue his parents 
in the place they are no,., in, while able to pay 
the rents, and to give hinself one merk land after 
eoing home. 
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Duncan r,1acIntyre of Netherlorn - A house, land and 
two Co\"S for himself \"i thout rent and half a merk 
land for his brother at ~fuitsunday, 1780. 
Duncan SinclEdr of Glenorchy - To befriend himself and 
his parents. 
The agreements might range from a general promise of consideration 
for recruits to a legal promise between la~dlord and tenant for land, 
rents or livestock. Eric, later Lord Reay, promised preferment for 
the granting of tacks and leases to those who enlisted in the Reay 
Pencibles .tn 1794.27 In the more extreme cases, small farmers would 
often offer their sons for service in exchange for enlargement of 
holdincs or the granting of leases, a system which led to some legal 
proceedings '~hen either landlord or tenant renigged on the contract.28 
Prior to the wars after 1792, these agreements with the small 
farmers and tenants were occasionally of a vague nature as seen by the 
Bredalbanemanuscript which simply promises to befriend a recruit and 
his family. With the great pressure for raising troops brought on by 
years of prolonged hostilities, the promises became more exact and more 
beneficial to these enlisting on such terms. A ~ecruiting poster for 
the Canadian Regiment for service in Canada, dated 8 Hay 1804, promises 
that if the Regiment is disbanded in America, those wishing to settle 
Would be granted allotments of land, and wives ru1d families of recruits 
Would be able to accompany the Regiment while on service. A bounty of 
• 29 5 guineas was also promised. 
The practice of settling Highland soldiers was not new, however. 
Follovling the Seven Year's \Var and the American War, solqiers of the 
Hiehland regiments were allowed to settle in Canada. Privates were 
Usually allotted 100 acres, non-commissioned officers 200 acres and lower 
grade officers 400 acres. It was from these settled veterans of the 
42nd, 77th and 78th regiments that Sir Guy' Carleton was able to mount 
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a force to repel the American invasion of Canada in 1115. These 
veteran sett1e~were eventually brought onto the establishment in 
1119 as the 84th, Royal Highland ID:nigrant Regiment. 30 
As the pressure on the population for recruits increased throughout 
the 1190's, landlords were forced to offer better terms to those not 
wishing to settle in Canada and became more bold in their promises to 
their tenantry. In Sutherland, General Wemyss had found recruitment 
"-
extremely difficult, largely due to the great numbers of troops already 
taken from the area. In response to the situation, the Countess of 
Sutherland agreed to grant free land leases to recruits in exchange 
for their services. Those areas immediately available were given out 
"" 
at existing rents while the bulk of the leases were due at Whitsunday 
* 1801 when the land was due to be reset. The terms of the lease were 
, 
set at 1 years, somewhat better than the annual lease which was the bane 
of many small farmers at that time. 3l The age of the clearances and 
removals to make way for the larGe sheep farms had not come to Sutherland 
in 1199 and the promise of small lease holdings was considered feasible 
at that time. \-lith the economic pressure to modernize and increase the 
rent trucings, the sheep farms began to appear in Sutherland by 1801 and 
Some difficulty was found in meeting the promises of land holdings given 
to recruits seven years earlier. 32 The Sutherland papers contain several 
*.1E-
copies of petitions ~or redress of grievances on this account. 
When a regiment was embOdied and sent on service, there was a 
continual need for replacement troops. This was particularly critical 
in the regular regiments which suffered casualties not only from enemy 
action, but also disease and natural disaster, especially those on 
* A sample letter appears in Appendix B._ 
1(-* See Appendix B for text of Petitions. 
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service in the tropical areas. Casualties in the West Indies normally 
ran several times the number brought about by enemy action. In addition 
to casualties and disease, retirement through age or general unfitness 
for service placed a constant drain on the strength of a regiment. 
FortunRtely, losses through desertion were quite rare in the Highland 
corps of this period, and the increase in desertions after 1800 is 
Usually credited to the influx of non-Iliehlanders, especially Irish 
recruits. 
In order to maintain a regiment's strength, each corps constantly 
sent recruiting parties to Scotland, not only to the Highlands, but 
also to the,~arket and manufacturing towns in the Lowlands and borders. 
In 1802~03, the Gordon HiGhlanders maintained recruiting stations in 
Dundee, Huntly, Aberdeen, Paisley, Stirling, Inverness, Fort \'lilliam and 
Perth. 33 Recruiting was reasonably successf~l at fairs and markets where 
young Highlanders would travel· to in search of employment. 34 
At any given time, a great many of a regiment's members would be 
aSSiGned to recruitment in Scotland. The inspection report of Sir John 
Moore for the Reay Fencibles in Ireland for May 1799, lists the following 
as absent on recruiting duty in Scotland: Officers - 4, Sergeants - 6, 
Corporals - 2, Drummers - 1, Privates - 7, or a total of 20. 35 The 
report for the following year in Jl1ay 1800 gives the numbers at 18 or: 
Officers - 2, Sergeants -" 3, Corporals - 2, Drummers - 1 and Privates 
_ 10.36 
The constant need for replacements for the line regiments presented 
a sizeable problem for the government. Efforts to raise new replacements 
Were often frustrated and it was not unusual for a recruiting party to 
report a monthly return of no men enlisted. Two policies were inaugurated 
in order to fill the ran:.cs of the regulars. Hen were encouraged to 
volunteer from the Fencibles into the regular regiments, particularly 
62. 
those Fencibles serving in Ireland. A more drastic measure was taken 
in 1796 when all Pencible corps in Ireland were reduced to 500 rank and 
file. The hope of the War Office ,..,as that a number of the discharged 
troops would volunteer for regular service. 37 The Fencibles were later 
augmented up to their original numbers, however. Many of the retired 
Fencible men did join the regular regiments following the disbanding of 
the Fencibles by 1803. The 93rd Regiment received some 250 of its 
. , 38 
initial recruits from the ranks of the disbanded Sutherland Fencibles. 
Of the Clan Alpine Pencibles, a total of 350 troops joined regular 
reginlents and 200 of the Caithness Fencibles volunteered primarily into 
the 92nd an~J79th Regiments. 39 A more striking example illustrates the 
great dependence on the Fencibles by the regulars. In 1800, MacLeodfs 
Bighland~rs received a draft of 800 men from the Fencibles. 40 
, 
A second instrument of government policy was encompassed in the 
Defence Act of 1804 which authorized the raising of 2nd Battalions to 
be used as training and replacement depots for the 1st Battalions 
serving overseas. 41 Although 2nd Battalions had existed for some time, 
they now took on the function of primarily supplying replacements for 
the active service battalions. In 1803, a 2nd Battalion was established 
for the Gordons and the 79th established its 2nd Battalion in 1804. 
The 2nd Battalion of the 91st was raised in 1804 but experienced great 
difficul ty in finding recrm ts. Between September 1804 and I'larch 1805, 
the 2nd Battalion, 91st was only able to raise 144 troops.42 Second 
Battalions did occasionally serve active duty overseas; however, their 
primary function after 1804 wa.s that of a training, recruiting and 
replacement depot. When a 2nd Battalion did serve overseas, one company 
would remain in Scotland to continue the function of that battalion when 
on home service. 
SECTION 3 
The Financial Aspects of Raisin?,' .§l Rep;iment. 
'The system of purchasing commissions in the army had existed 
before the raising of the Highland regiments and, even with the 
conscious attempt to appoint local gentry to commisSions, the practice 
of purchase existed in the Highland regiments. Vacancies in the Highland 
corps were open to negotiation as to cost as well as to position. A 
letter to Lord Seaforth from James PoIson, Esq., illustrates the 
power exercised by the raiser over the appointment of officers and the 
control over the financial aspects of the regiment. The case in point 
"'.:; 
is a request by 11r. PoIson that his nephew, Lieutenant William Gray 
PoIson, be allowed to purchase a vacant company with the rank of captain 
in Seaforth's IIighlanders, prior to the regiment's departure for service 
in the West Indies in 1795. The convention of the times prescribed the 
holding of a lower commission for at least one year before being allowed 
to purchase a company. The episode demonstrates the great scope of 
power which the HiGhland landlords exercised over the purchase of 
commissions. 43 
The cost of commissions in the Highland regiments was apparently 
open to negotiation. A 1794 letter from one 'oJilliam Inglis offered 
£150 as purchase price for an Ensigncy in the 78th Seaforth Highlanders. 
I 
There is no indication as to "Thether the offer was accepted or 
negotiated. 44 The cost of commissions could vary substantially from 
regiment to regiment. On the raising of the 91st Argyleshire 
Highlanders, the price for subalterns was from £200 to £300 along with 
the requirement of raising 15 men. Captains were required to initially 
purchase their Ensigncy and Lieutenancy as well as raise 50 troops.45 
Financial considerations such as these were of importance to the 
non-regular regiments as well. Officers of militia were required to 
have property qualifications. A colonel required property worth at 
least £400 Scots per annum, majors and captains at £300 Scots and 
lieutenants and ensigns at £100 Scots per annum. 46 The reason for 
the property qualifications, and ultimately, the purchase of commissions, 
was the attempt to ins~e that all officers were men of property and 
would thus have a desire for domestic stability and the preservation 
of the status quo. 
Despite the high cost of commissions or property qualifications, 
the officer ranks of the Highland regiments were seldom vacant during 
the 18th C~ntury. A great many fathers were quite willing to pay the 
.~ 
cost of securing a commission for their sons and, indeed, by 1790, 
Highland regiments had begun to attract a number of full or half-pay 
officers who had earlier joined Lo\yland or English regiments when 
their native reeion had been untouched by the War Office. 
Of more importance to recrui ting in the Hic;hlands was the 
attaining of suitable rank and file, an effort which was quite costly. 
The price of bounties paid rose sharply after 1793 as the need for 
great numbers of troops increased and competition for recruits grew 
more intense. In 1793, bounties paid to volunteers for the Fencibles 
were set at 3 to 5 guineas for ordinary recruits and could go as high 
as 10 per man for ve~erans of other reC;iments. 47 For the regular 
regiments, the cost per man in 1793 was set at 10 guineas, but by 1794 
had doubled to 20. In areas of intense recruitment such as market 
towns near the Highland border, prices of ,0 guin~as were not uncommon. 48 
In an attempt to check the mountine cost of bounties, the \Jar Office 
issued a circular on 21 February 1795 limitinG bounties to 15 guineas 
for regulars and 10 guineas for the Fencib1es. 49 Despite such efforts, 
the pressure of supply and demand in a period of continuous warfare 
undermined all attempts to control the massive inflation of bounties. 
~ 1812, the government was paying £23.17s.6d. for every recruit over 
5 foot 3 inches, under 40 years and who would volunteer for unlimited 
service. 50 
From the bounty money paid, the recruit was required to purchase 
certain items. In 1793, the requirement for the Fencibles was somewhere 
in the range of: 2 white shirts at 5s.3d. each; one pair of good black 
shoes at 5s.0d.; one haversack at ls.Od.; and 3s.6d. was forwarded to 
regimental Head Quarter~ to purchase other necessaries and was used as 
a general purchase fund by the Regimental Paymaster. 51 
On his enlistment, a recruit was given one shilling or "The King's 
Shilling" and subsistence pay granted for the period prior to his 
YI 
reporting to the depot for inspection and ap9roval. Any recruit who 
renigged on his contract to serve, symbolized by the shilling, was 
required to pay £1, known as "smart money". 52, 
The raising of a regiment was a costly business in the 18th Century 
as Shown by the great sums expended by the regimental accounts of 
Several oorps. Not only was the cost in arming, supplying, feeding, 
housing, uniforming and maintaining a oorps expensive, but recruiting 
,costs were equally high. In 1794, the levy, or that amount given each 
officer per man recruited, was set at £15 of which £5 was earmarked for 
recruiting costs and £10 for the recruit's bounty, most of which was 
retained for necessarl expenditures. 53 Due to the lower bounties paid 
to the Fencibles, the cost was somewhat lower and levy money per recruit 
in the Regiment of the Isles, for example, stood at only £5.5s.0d. in 
1799. 54 
Not only were levy and bounty monies costly, but subsistence pay, 
or that amount paid to the recruit between the time of attestation and 
actually being taken into the ranks, ,-ms quite costly. The account 
returns for Captain John Macdonald's Company of the Regiment of the 
Isles for the period 7 August 1798 to 24 April 1795, amounts to 
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£98.6s.2!d. for subsistence pay on 15 recruits. 55 A more comprehensive 
view of the cost situation is given in the abstract of monies paid out 
to recruiters for the 93rd Sutherland Highlanders in 1799. Subsistence 
money paid amounted to £10,826.13s.5d. Total bounties paid amounted to 
£8,661 or a total paid out by General Wemyss to recruit his regiment of 
£19,787.13s.5d., a rather considerable sum by the standards of the 
time. 56 
While most of the cost burden of recruiting would have been paid 
out of public funds, great expense was often inourred by the raiser in 
order to fill up the ranks. Local conditions such as the availability 
of manpower, competition from other regiments and similar factors 
~ 
served to drive the costs even higher, and the colonel or raiser would 
ofte~ be forced to supply the extra capital. In order to stimulate 
recruitment, the Earl of Bredalbane went so far as to pay 2 guineas 
per man extra to each officer who raised more than the quota for the 
Bredalbane Fencibles. Those below the quota were required to pay in 
2 guineas. 57 Considering that there was a surplus large enough for 
the embodiment of three battalions of the Bredalbane Fencibles, this 
must have meant a very considerable sum paid out by the Earl. 
Lord Macdonald, in 1790, wrote to the Duke of Portland requesting 
a reimbursement of £2,000 for monies paid out by him for the raising 
of the 76th Regiment in 1777 in compensation for his not being allowed 
. ' 58 
the right to choose the officers of that corps. In other cases, 
the cost to the raiser and officers was much more severe. The 79th 
Cameron Highlanders, raised by A11an Cameron of Erracht, received 
no bounty money from the government, therefore, the reGiment was only 
raised at great exp;nse to Cameron and his officers. 59 
A great deal of money could be gained or lost through the purchase 
of uniforms. Again, a bulk sum was paid to a colonel, who was 
responsible for providing ,the uniforms of a prescribed fashion. Any 
s~plus funds from the uniform subsidy were his own, but in most cases, 
colonels lost money as the subsidies rarely met the cost of outfitting 
the entire regiment to the quality desired by most c01.0nels. An 
interesting account of the relative costs of uniforms is found for 
the Regiment of the Isles in correspondence between Colonel Matthew 
MacAlister and the firm of James Thomson, Junior, of Stirling. The 
60 following abstract is from an order placed for tartan and hose. 
62 yards officer'~ plaid - £7 •. As.8d. 
60 ells fine hose - £9.10s.0d. 
60 ells Sergeant's' plaid - £5. Os.Od. 
60 ells Private's plaid - £3. Os.Od. 
50 ells hose - £6. 2s.11d. 
Significant monetary returns could, however, be made through the 
\) 
raising of a regiment. Monies paid for cornmissions could add to the 
colonel's income. Surplus funds from the government money appropriated 
for recruiting was divided among the company captains. Field officers 
continued to have companies until into the 19th Century, ,therefore, 
they also received a portion of the surplus funds 'should there be any. 
Successful manipulation of clothing funds, which did occasionally lead 
to substandard uniforms, was another method of creating possible 
revenue until 1854 when the responsibility for uniforming a regiment 
61 Was removed from the colonel. 
An income source which is difficult to measure was the effect of 
removing a sizeable portion of the population from the land. Highland 
families tended to subdivide their holdings causing congestion and 
limiting the ability of the land to support the rising population. 
~ removing oeveral thousand men from the land and placing the 
-
* The hose worn in the 18th Century was not the modern knitted 
type, rather, it vlas a piece of cloth cut· and fitted to the 
leg and then sewn. 
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responsibility for their subsistence, clothinG and food with the 
government, the pressure on the small tenants was decreased and the 
family income was spread over a smaller number of people. In a 
surplus labour market, the absence of one or two males in a family 
. * rarely caused a decrease in the total ~ncome. Arrears in rent could 
more easily be paid, an important factor when land rents began to rise 
sharply in the late 18th Century. Army pay had the beneficial effect 
of injecting significant amounts of outside capital into the over-
** Populated and under-developed Highlands. This capital also had the 
effect of removing the burden of feeding and clothine the soldier from 
the family'~. household account. 
<) 
\{hile the raising of a Highland re0iment could be a costly enterprise, 
a landowner who successfully manipulated the system of patronage, 
bounties, subsidies, clothing funds and the lessening of the population 
burden created by recruitment, . could realize a sizeable return on his 
investment. 
* See Malcolm Gray's ~ Highland Economy for a view of the dynamics 
of the Highland economy during this period. 
** Rates of pay for 1801 are listed in Appendix C. 
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CHAPI'ER IV. 
The OriF'ins and Background of the Recruits. 
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CHAPrER IV. 
SECTION 1 
Numbers of ~ Enlisted, l1.2.§. to 1815. 
Followin6 the initial raising of several IIi€;,hlarla corps during 
the Seven Year's War, all but the 42nd Royal Highlanders had been 
disbanded by 1766. The total number of Highlanders .... lho served in 
these regiments between 1757 and 1766 would have been close to 10,000 
men, either in the regulars or the Fencibles. This does not represent 
an exorbitant number given the population of the period. Dr. Webster's 
figure for\the population in the Highl~~ds in 1755 is 652,000.1 From 
his' calculations of fighting men per parish, roughly taken as 20 per 
cent. of the total, an estimated 130,400 men were available for military 
service.2* The Seven Year's War, then, did not place a great strain 
Upon the manpower resources of the Hib"hland s • 
The outbreak of the American Revolutionary \{ar in 1775 created an 
immediate need for troops. The second regiment raised by Simon Fraser 
was quickly embodied and readied for American service as the 71st 
Fraser's Highlanders. So prolific was the response to the recruitment 
efforts that within ten weeks, over 3,000 troops ".Tere raised in the 
llighlands for service in the 71st and 42nd Regiments. 3 
The government of Lord North did not expect the rebellion in the 
colonies to last for any length of time and no other regiments were 
drawn from the Highlands during the next two years. By late 1777, 
however, the situation in the colonies had altered dramatically. 
The surrender of General John Eurgoyne's army of 7,000 troops at 
Saratoga in October 1777, startled the 1:lar Office into vigorous 
-
* 20 per cent. of total population, or men aged 18 to 56. 
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recruiting activity. The blame for this loss of thousands of trained 
and veteran British troops can be laid on the general indifference 
towards the rebellion and primarily on the incompetence of 
Lord George Germaine, the Secretary at War. With the surrender at 
Saratoga, it became highly likely that France would come into the 
war on the side of the American revolutionaries thus creating a need 
for many new regiments. 
Jolted into activity, the government authorized the raising of 
several new Highland corps. In the first five months of 1118, 9 new 
battalions were raised in the IIighlands. Each battalion was divided 
into 10 com~~nies of 105 rank and file plus officers. These were the 
~ , 
13rd, 14th, 16th, 11th, 18th, 81st and the Argyle Regiment of Fencibles. 
A total of 12,500 recruits were raised north of the Tay between 1118 
and early 1180. 4 Of the several regiments raised, only the 14·th and 
76th actually served in the American colonies while the remainder were 
posted to other parts of the empire, notably, Gibraltar and India. 5 
In addition to those regiments recruited primarily in the Highlands, 
the 84th Royal Highland Emigrants was raised in Canada. 
Following the Treaty of Paris in 1183, only the 42nd, 13rd and 
18th Regiments were retained on the establishment. But the greatest 
need for Highland troops did not occur until after 1192 with the 
outbreak of hostilities \-lith Revolutionary France. Between November 
1793 and March 1194, over 30,000 troops were raised in Scotland for 
both the regtllar and Fencible regiments. 6 A great many of these 
troops were from the Highland districts. During the period of 1193 
to 1800, 30 r~giments of the line and Fencibles were established. 
From 1800 to 1804. a further 1 battalions were raised, some of which 
were 2nd Battalions for the existing regime~ts.1 
Not only was there a sizeable turnout for the regulars and 
Fencibles, but service in the Volunteers and Nilitia after 1191 drew 
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off a great number of men., though it must be remembered that many of 
these would have been veterans of other corps while some eventually 
volunteered into the regulars or the Fencibles. At the Peace of Amiens 
in 1801, there were 11;500 men under arms in either the Militia or 
Volunteers in the Highlands. With the declaration of War against 
France in 1803, a total of 13,323 troops were serving and by the 
termination of hostilities in 1815, a total of 34,785 Highlanders had 
served in the Militia, Volunteers or Local Militia. 8 
The year 1803-04 might be taken as representative of the period 
following the great surge of new regiments b~tween 1793 and 1800. 
The figure for that year may be somewhat higher due to the raising of 
"¥j 
new battalions of reserves; however, the returns for the year give an 
indication of the numbers enlisted from the Highlands after 1801. It 
must also be noted that the Fencible corps raised between 1793 and 
1800 were disbanded by 1803 as a result of the Peace of Amiens and 
that many of those represented in the 1803-04 returns would have been 
Yeterans of the former Fencible corps. The years 1803-04 are important 
in that the government was recruiting heavily following the renewal of 
War with France in May 1803,9 
-
Reserve 
Militia 
Supplementary Militia 
Canadian Fencibles 
2nd Battalion 78th 
2nd Battalion 79th 
Substitutes for Militia 
Recruits for line regiments -
Total for 1803-04 - 8615. 
1651 
2599 
870 
850 
714 
618 
913 
350* 
"* These are only the troops drawn from the Highlands and d.oes 
not include those from the Lovl1ands, England, Ireland or 
elsewhere. 
75. 
An exa~ple to illustrate the incredible number of men serving 
is 'the situation of the Isle of Skye, an area known for providing 
numerous soldiers. Between the years 1793 and 1805,3,680 men were 
under arms from the estates of Lord Macdonald, MacLeod of MacLeod, 
the Isle of Raasay and other parts"of Skye. lO Finally, from 1792 
to 1837, a period in which 21 years were in warfare, the Isle of Skye 
provided for the British Army:~l 
21 Lieutenant-Generals or r·1a.jor-Generals, 
48 Lieutenant-Colonels, 
600 other officers, 
120 Pipers, 
10,000 Private soldiers. 
This figure ~epresents a significant proportion of the population of 
'n . 
the Isle of Skye and illustrates the number of troops drawn from the 
Highlands and Islands prior to the end of the 18th Century wars in 1815. 
, 
The creation of such a large nu~ber of corps meant a serious drain 
on the Highland population, despite the growth experienced during the 
latter half of,the 18th Century. From 1793 to 1808, an estimated 
70,000 Highlanders served in the British army. Excluding those who 
served in the navy, this represents an incredibly high proportion of 
the total number of males of military age. Based upon the unofficial 
census figures of the early 1790's from the Statistical Account and 
the official government census of 1801, the approximate percentage of 
Highlanders in Army service during this time waa roughly 14 per cent. 
of the total male population.12 
It is difficult to determine exactly the numbers of men enlisted in 
the services during this period. The extremely long period of warfare, 
Coupled with the shifting about from unit to unit by volunteering for 
regular service from the non-regular corps, makes this figure difficult 
to estimate simply from the returns of the regiments. Based upon the 
total amount of troops given for the various corps, it would probably 
not be out of line to advance the figure of somewhere near 100,000 
Highlanders serving in all corps. Even allowing for the rapid growth 
16. ' 
in population, this figure represents a proportion totally unknown 
to previous :British experience. Perhaps no more than 10,000 total men 
served the Young Pretender in 1145-46. The figure in government service 
somewhat overwhelms that and proved that Mr. Pitt's gamble in 1157 was 
worthwhile. 
• 
I 
SECTION 2 
.Areas ".There Troops J)raim ~. 
In order to understand the patterns of recruitment by geography 
in the Highlands, it might be instructive to examine the reeimenta'. 
returns with particular attention to references to Parish, county, 
district or surname. The latter is especially helpful in plotting the 
geographic patterns in the Highlands due to the phenomenon of clanship 
~hich led to cornnon surnames being widespread in a given district. The 
main areas of recruitInent for several regiments, primarily those of the 
post-1793 period, are here listed and patterns of recruitment by district 
\-, 
examined. In general, the policy of the Highland corps was to raise the 
bUlk of troops from the estates of the raiser or his family. The 
remainder would be obtained from those estates of the officers. In 
Practice, however, this system was only partially successful and as the 
pressures for increasing numbers of troops grew, more and more men were 
Sought in the urban and non-Highland areas. Several regiments are now 
analyzed with respect to geography: 
1) 73rd Regiment, Lord X1acLeod's Highlanders, 2 ba.ttalions raised 
in 1777. 
Of a total of 2,200 troops in both battalions, 1,800 were drawn from 
the lands and district associated with the :r.1acLeods. The 2nd Battalion 
• ~as raised in Dumbarton, consequently, a great many were drawn from the 
Clasgowarea. The regiment was later to become the 71st Regiment in 1786 
and in 1808, the Glasgow Highland Regiment owing to the great numbers of 
Claswegians in the ranks.13 The estates of Lord MacLeod would have 
COVered a goodly portion of the Isle of Lewis and parts ef the mainland, 
especially the northwest. 
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2) 76th Regiment, Macdonald's Highlanders, raised 1777 and 
disbanded 178". 
780 Highlanders, 200 Lowlanders and 100 Irish in one 
company - Total of 1,086 troops. 
Most of the native Highlanders were recruited in the areas owned 
or influen9.ed by Lord l1acdonald and the branches of the Clan Dona1d, 
particularly Skye, Uist, Rum arid Raasay.14 }'Iany of the Lowland 
recruits were found in Edinburgh as evidenced by a letter to 
Lord Macdonald from Lieutenant David Barclay dated 1 April 1778. 
Barclay had found 40 men by that date and reported having tremendous 
~ 15 
success in recruiting. 
3) 78th Regiment, Seaforth's Hiehlanders, raised 1778, later 
renumbered 72nd Regiment. 
On the initial raising of the 78th in 1778, a total of 500 men 
were recruited from Lord Seaforth's estates and a further 400 were 
raised from the estates of the MacKenzies of Scatwell, primarily the 
Parishes of Applecross ruld Red Castle. Of the remainder, 157 were 
Low1anders and 43 were Irish, though Stewart gives no indication of 
the county of origin of the Lowlanders.16 In 1793, the estates of 
the Earl of Seaforth on Lewis furnished 732 men in the first months 
of the war for the new 78th Seaforth's Highlanders raised by Francis 
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Rumberstone MacKenzie of Seaforth and known as the Ross-Shire Buffs.17 
4) 8lst Aberdeenshire Highlanders, raised 1778, disbanded in 
1783. Commanded by Colonel William Gordon. 
Of the 980 men enlisted initially, 650 were from the Highland 
districts near Aberdeen and mostly from the extensive estates of 
the Duke of Gordon. Many others were recruited from the city of 
Aberdeen.18 
5) The 74th Regiment, raised in 1787 by Sir Archibald Campbe11. 
This regiment was later removed from the Highland establishment 
~ . 
in 1809 and had, from its inception, been made up of large numbers of 
Lowlanders, especially from the Glasgow region. Of the 960 of all 
ranks mustered in 1787, 400 were Lowlanders. 19 The bulk of the 
IIighlanders came from the estates of the Duke of'Argy1e. The minister 
. of the Parish of Inverary in Argyle reports that the county of Argyle 
supplied the bulk of the recruits for the 74th and almost one entire 
battalion of the 7lst (raised as 73rd in 1777).20 
6) 98th Argyleshire IIighland Regiment, later renumbered 9lst, 
raised by Duke of Argyle in 1794. 
This regiment experienced great difficulty in raising its 
required number of recruits. Initially, only! were llighlanders 
and the majority of those were drawn from the estates of the Duke of 
Argyle. The bulk of the troops were Lowlanders from Glasgow and 
21 Edinburgh with a large number drawn from Ireland. In addition to 
the Lowlanders, the 9lst was forced to recruit heavily in England 
~here men were found primarily in Wiltshire and 50 were obtained in 
. . 
22 the city of London in early 1795. The high proportion of non-
llighlanders in this regiment caused it to be taken off the Highland 
establishment in the reforms of 1809. 
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7) 92nd Gordon Highlanders, originally numbered loath, raised 
1794 by the Duke of Gordon. 
Colonel Gardyne in ~ ~ ££ ~ Regiment, gives an excellent account 
of the recruits of the Gordons in 1794. It is interesting to note that 
there were only 20 officers and men of the name Gordonon the rolls for 
1794.23 Since i of the original recruits came from the Gordon estates, 
this phenomenon illustrates the great humber of families and districts 
under the sway of the IIouse of Gordon. Of the remaining t of the troops, 
most came from Aberdeen, Moray, Banff and from the non-Highland districts.24 
Prom the original muster rolls for 1794, the following numbers per region 
are found. 25 
* Inverness-shire 
Aberdeenshire 
Banffshire 
Axgyle 
English 
Welsh 
Irish 
Edinburgh 
Glasgow 
- 241, 
92 
58 
~33 
.15 
1 
45 
26 
54 
The remaining Highlanders were dra.wn from the counties of Caithness, 
Sutherland, Ross, }loray, Perth, Nairn and Stirling. In 1794, roughly 
15 per cent. of this regiment was drawn from non-Highland areas. This 
contrasts sharply with the returns for the earlier Highland regiments 
and is especially important when it is remembered that the Gordons were 
considered a true Highland regiment unlike others such as the 91st or 
74th. By way of comparison, the returns for the 42nd Regiment at the 
beginning of the American \jar for 10 April 1776 are here given: 26 
-
* This figure would have included troops from the West Highlands 
as well as from the Hebrides. 
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Highlanders - 931 
Lowlanders 74 
English 5 
\olelsh 1 
Irish- 2 
A pattern of growing reliance on Lowland and non-Scottish troops 
was developing after 1793 which was to have significant influences on 
the character of several.Highland regiments. The most drastic result 
was the reform of 1809 which is discussed in Chapter V. 
A further complication for recruiting for the 92nd was the conflict 
of territorial interests with the 109th Regiment being raised by 
Colonel Hay. Since the 109th was disbanded after a brief existence, 
\0 
many of the recruits were taken into the Gordons. 27 Again, a situation 
whereby territorial magnates competed for the dwindling supply of 
manpower needed to fill up the ranks of the regiments, placed strains 
Upon the ability of the Highlands to meet the demand. 
8) 93rd Sutherland Highlanders, raised 1799-1800 by Colonel 
William Wemyss. 
This was the last of the regular regiments raised in the Highla.."'1ds. 
By that late date, the over-recruiting of the Highlands had begun to 
be apparent as evidenced by the extraordinary promises of land leases 
given by the Countess of Sutherland in exchange for service in this 
regiment. Although 40 per cent. of the original recruits were obtained 
from the disbanded Sutherland Fencibles, difficulty was had in filling 
up the ranks of the 93rd.28 Eventually, however, the Regiment vIas 
embodied with only 3 Irish or English recruits. Of the total, 519 
were Sutherland men, 97 were from Caithness and only 37 were from other 
Parts of Scotland.29 It is rather remarkable that with the difficulties 
experienced in finding willing recruits that the proportion of 
Sutherlanders and Highlanders was so high. A return of the principal 
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surnames from the original draft illustrates the propensity of the 
major clans of the area for service in this regiment. From the 
muster rolls are found: 30 
Mackay 91 
Sutherland 60 
Grant 17 
MacLeod 25 
Gunn 25 
Mathieson 15 
Ross 19 
MacDonald 27 
Munro 26 
Gordon 15 
MacKenzie 10 
MacPherson 12 
Fraser 14 
The 9<~d was perhaps the most regional of the lligh1and regiments 
raised after 1793 and the muster roll resembles a list of the principal 
clans of the northwest Highlands. Very few recruits were obtained south 
of Lock Arkaig or east of Loch Ness. The regional nature of the 93rd 
was maintained while other regiments were forced to take on large 
numbers of men from Ireland and England. By 1811, of 1,014 of all 
ranks, the Sutherland Highlanders still had only a total of 35 non-
Scots. 31 
The Fencible regiments tended to be somewhat more regional in 
nature than the regulars. The terms of limited service within the 
country often attracted men who were otherwise unwilling to enlist in 
the regulars for unlimited service. Five regiments of Fencibles are 
here presented with the same purpose as that of the aforementioned 
regulars, to determine regional patterns of recruitment. 
1) Sutherland Fencibles. 
Three regiments of Sutherland :Pencibles wexe raised, in 1759, 
1779 and 1793. These troops \-,ere raised largely from the estates of 
the Sutherland family and of Lord Reay. The proportion of family 
and regional names in the Fencibles is roughly the same as that of 
the 93rd. This is not surprising given that 250 volunteers went from 
the Sutherland Fencibles to the 93rd Sutherland Highlanders. The family 
names given again indicate the highly regional nature of this Fencible . 
regiment. Muster rolls for 1793 ~how that of a total of 1,084 of 
all ranks, there ",erc: 32 
Mackay 
Sutherland 
Murray 
Ross 
MacLeod 
MacDonald 
}lunro 
2) Bredalbane Fencibles. 
211 (7 were officers) 
- 128 
42 
34 
29 
29 
28 
Three battalions of the Bredalbane Fencibles were raised between 
1793 and 1799 and the whole was commanded by the Earl of Bredalbane 
whose estates stretched from western Argyleshire into Perthshire. In 
order to fill the ranks of these battalions, a mammoth effort was 
undertaken by Bredalbane. In 1793, the population of the Bredalbane 
estates was 13,537 persons. In that year alone, 1,600 men enlisted in 
the Bredalbane Fencibles. 33 Using the figure of 20 per cent. of the 
Population being of military service age, this figure represents 
approximately 12 per cent. of the total population of the estates 
enrolled in the Regiment. Despite the incredible turnout of volunteers, 
there were not enough Highlanders to fill the three battalions which 
would have required some 2,500 to 3,000 men. To meet the demand, the 
rural Lowland areas were heavily recruited and some troops were obtained 
from as far away as Dublin and Nottingham. 34 A return of recruits from 
12 April 1793 by'county and parish shows the numbers drawn from the 
estates and neighbouring count~es:35 
County Troops 
Perth 
Forfar 
- 132 
2-
- Stirling 
Inverness 
krgy1e 
Caithness 
Sutherland' -
Lanark 
4 
3 
5 
2 
1 
1 
. While many of the above recruits came from Lowland areas, these men 
were generally from areas bordering immediately on the Highland line 
and directly adjacent to the Breda1bane Highland estate, especially 
the Perthshire Lowlanders. 
3) The Northern, or Gordon Fencibles. 
The nuke of Gordon was active in the raising of a corps of Fencibles 
from his estates in the districts of Strathspey, Badenoch and Lochaber. 
Another 150 troops were raised from the Duke's Lowland estates. 36 
4) Glengarry Fencibles. 
This regiment was raised by the chief of the Glengarry MacDonald's, 
Alexander MacDonnell of Glengarry in 1794 and was reduced in 1802. 
Stewart of Garth reports that over one-half of the troops were raised 
from the Glengarry estates, but no mention is made of the origins of 
the remainder. 37 It would not be unreasonable to suppose that a good 
many were enlisted in the neighbouring districts and from among the 
Camerons, NacDonalds, MacLeods and Grants. 
5) Reay Fencibles, or Mackay's Highlanders. 
The Reay Pencibles were ,raised primarily on the estates of 
Lord Reay by his heir, the Honourable Eric Nackay, and by Colonel 
lIugh JlTackay 13aillie. The Regiment was embodied in 1794 and ",as 
reduced in 1802. Of the original drafts of recruits in 1794, some 
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600 were from the Reay country and a large number were obtained in the 
surrounding counties of Ross and Caithness. As with the Sutherland 
Fencibles and the 93rd Regiment, an examination of the muster.:rol1s 
for 1794 reveals that a significant number of the Reays were of the 
principal clans of the north''i'est. 38 
Mackay 209 
HacLeod 63 
l1acKenzie 40 
Sutherland 35 
Morrison 32 
Despite the great success in raising recruits from the Highland 
districts, the vast numbers of men required to fill the ranks quite 
often caused the ,eruption of old regional and family jealoUSies. As 
\) 
seen from the returns of several of the regiments, a number of troops 
were recruited from districts "li thin the traditional areas of influence 
of other magnates also raising recruits, either for line or Fencible 
regiments. Since the '.Jar Office had left the de'tails of raising troops 
to the colonels, and, since the Highland landlords exercised no legal 
control over the military services of their tenantry, a great amount 
of competition for recruits led to such excesses as bounties' of £50 to 
£60 being paid in some areas. 39 Despite these factors, it may generally 
be concluded that a regiment's primary area of recruitment was the 
district in which the colonel or raiser either held estates or exercised 
some influence and the incidents of poaching on a rival raiser's estates 
Was not that corr~on until well after 1794 when the majority of regiments 
had already been initially raised. 
SECTION 3 
Variations in Proportions Raised ~ Rekion. 
John Nackay of Hereford writes that "no part of the Highlands 
sent forth more gallant soldaers in proportion to its population 
than that part of Sutherland called Duthaich Nhic Aoidh. 40 A 
thorough examination of the evidence provided by the regimental 
histories, estate records ru1d accounts by parish clergy tend to show 
Mackay's assertion as being re~sonably accurate. A tremendous 
proportion of the population of the northwest Highl~nds and Islands 
did do service of some form in the British army in the period of 
\, 
1756 to 1815. The reasons for this are complex and are related to 
the state, both socially and economically, of the northwest Highlands 
in the 18th Century. 
To simplify the problem, a line may artifically be drawn through 
\ the llighlands, starting in,th~ Islands of Coll and Tiree, extending 
northe£1sterly through the Frith of Lorn and through northern Argyleshire 
and running just east of the Great Glen to western Perthshire and 
finally curving westward and ending at Inverness. To the north and 
west of this imaginary line is found the area of heaviest recruitment 
for the army, and especially the far northwestern areas of the Hebrides 
and the counties of Ross, Sutherland and Caithness. Within this area 
are found the Frasers, Grants, Mackays, l1acDonalds, Camerons, }1acKenzies, 
MacLeods and I-iunros. Examination of the muster rolls of the period 
demonstrate an extraordinary number of these surnames among the ranks. 
Below the line, recruiting for the army seems to have bee~ less 
favourable. Of the 23 principal regiments raised between 1757 and 1800 
in the Highlands, a full 10 were recruited almost exclusively in this 
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north",estern region. A great many of the remaining regiments, while 
geographically situated in the southern or eastern Highlands, drew a 
Sizeable proportion of their recruits from the northwest. The largest 
representation for the 92nd Gordon Highlanders, for example, was drawn 
from Inverness-shire, reaching from east of the city of Inverness j.nto 
the western areas and including parts of the Hebrides. 
From the evidence, three principal reasons for the preponderance 
of northwestern Highlanders in the regiments emerge: the north,V'est was 
a more traditior~l area and less developed; the problem of rising 
papulation with an excess of manpower; and the propensity for naval 
service in tre southern Highlands and Islands. 
~J 
Although General Wade's roads had begun the process of opening up 
the inner Highlands to easier access from the Lowlands, the northwestern 
areas were the last to be affected by this process and remained the 
bastion of the old clan patriarchy. It was not until the early 16th 
Century that the Crown of Scotland was able to exercise soverignty over 
the area following the decline of the Lordship of the Isles. During the 
Jacobite uprisings from 1689 onwards, several great houses consistently 
SUPPorted the Oranee and Hanoverian governments, notably the Campbells 
of Argyle, who maintained hegemony throughout most of the southwest. 
Though some members of the Houses of Athole and Gordon in the east and 
northeast did support the Stuarts, these Houses remained on reasonably 
good terms with the government. Through these great regional magnates, 
mUch of the government's policies for the Highlands were carried out. 
The main centres of disaffection, then, were lareely in the central 
and northwestern Highlands and it was to these areas that the policy 
of reconciliation was directed. With the great rise in the need for 
troops, a good deal of attention was turned to this area, not only to the 
loyal clans of the Mackays, Munros and Grants, but the former Jacobite 
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clans as well. Although the legal right to force one's tenantry into 
arms had been abolished, the clans of the northwest were able to appeal 
to the ties of kinship in supplying the massive numbers of troops which 
were drawn from the area. 
The distance from and geographical hinderances to intercourse with 
the Lowlands aided the northwest in maintaining its traditional culture 
long after the legal breakdown of the clan system. \Vi th the extension 
of the rationalization and modernization of agriculture, which advanced 
out of the Lowlands, those areas of the south and east in close proximity 
to the Lm.,rlands showed a swifter breakdown of the old practices and 
economics. \';Phe old clan society had been founded on the land and land 
tenantry was the central bond of society. The Highland areas of the 
northwest were the last to begin the transformation to modern agriculture, 
a change which ultimately destroyed the last renmants of the clan system. 
Since the less accessible regions of the northwest retained their 
traditional ties over a longer period than did the south and east, appeals 
to clan loyalty and obligation were still potent and the remnants of the 
traditional mode of raising troops generally meant a far better chance 
for recruiting from this region than from other parts of the country. 
A second important factor influencing the success of recruitment 
trom the northwest was the dynamic of population growth. From the 
Period 1755 to 1790, the area from southern Argyleshire, through 
Perthshire and north to Inverness experienced a moderate popUlation 
growth. Fr()11119 Morve .... to Cape Wrath and the more northerly- islands, rates 
of growth as high as 34 per cent. were experi~nced in this 35-year period. 4l 
A more stark figure from the region is found in the northwest counties when 
taken from 1755 to 1831 where a 48 per cent. increase was experienced. 
The outer Hebrides islands of Lewis, Harris and Uist encountered a 
Phenomenal 139 per cent. population increase in this 75-year period. 42 
The great increase in population, coupled with a general introduction 
of improved agricultUre, especially sheep fanning, during the period 
* after 1745, created a tremendous surplus manpower pool in the northwest. 
Seasonal migration to the Lowland areas for employment was much more 
difficult from these regions due to poor travel conditions and distance. 
A great deal more men from the south and east were able to find seasonal 
or permanent work in the gro'Vling border towns and urban centres such as 
Glasgow and Aberdeen. Despite seasonal migration and emigration to the 
colonies or other parts of Britain, a severe surplus manpower pool in 
the northwest usually meant better success for army recruiters when 
coupled wit~ the persuasive appeal to clan and regional loyalties. 
~J 
Although clan loyalties could be successfully appealed to in the south 
and east, the desperate nature of overpopulation and under-employment 
were not as heavily felt in those areas where the surplus could more 
easily travel out of the Highlands. 
The growing aversion to a mi~itary career on the part of many southern 
Bighlanders can be seen in the comments of The Reverend James V~cLagen 
for the Parish of Elair Athole in Perth: 43 
••• and though the common people have learned to despise 
a soldier's pay and to hate a life of servitude, yet they 
still have a deal of martial spirit remaining and make 
very good soldiers when once they undertake it. 
A soldier's pay to an unemployed labourer in the northwest could 
be the difference between starvation and survival. The con~ent 
illustrates the tiTowing influence of a moneyed economy which was rapidly 
developing in the southern and eastern Highlapds. Well into the 19th 
Century, the military life was considered an honourable occupation by 
-
* Chapter V deals with the problem of population growth and 
cbanging economic and social conditions. 
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the natives of the northwest, a natural extension of the warrior ideal 
of clan culture. 
So great were the pressures of population growth and its concurrent 
~ack of employment, that the Reverend Mr. John Downie in the Parish of 
Urray in Ross credits the loss in population of the Parish, from 2,456 
in 1755 to 1,860 in 1792, to emigration to the harvests in the south 
and the great numbers enlisted in the Highland regiments in the two 
previous wars. 44 From the Parish of Fearn, again in Ross, a similar 
phenomenon occurred and prompted men to join the 71st, 73rd, 75th and 
42nd Highland Regiments. This Parish experienced a population loss 
from 1,898 tp 1,600 people in the years after 1755 in a period when the 
entire region was undergoing rapid population acceleration. 45 
A third factor which caused the south to be less fertile than the 
northwest for recruiting was the naval conflict. This phenomenon occurred 
espeCially in the island areas off the coa~t of Argyle where seafaring 
Was a more natural endeavour than in the inland mountain regions. 
Though some Highlanders and Islanders on the northwest coast did serve 
in the navy, the majority opted for army service. For the American War, 
the Parish of Dunoon in Argy1e sent a total of 90 men to the navy from a 
total population of near 1,700. 46 
Other parishes in Arey1e and the islands experienced similar conflicts 
between the services for recruits. The Rever(:1d Douga1 MacDougal states 
that the people of Lochgoilhead in Argyle were: "never fond of a military 
life, and few of them ever enlisted in standing regiments". This parish 
did, however, raise a company of Fencibles, but most of those in the 
services went to the navy.47 The Parish of Kilmalie and Kilmanivaig ~n 
Argyle furnished 750 men for service in the Seven Year's War, but again, 
recruitment for the Highland regiments was hampered by conflict with the 
navy which obtained the majority of the vol~ntcers.48 
This pattern of conflict between the services was fairly widespread 
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over the southwestern mainland coast and islands. Advancing up the 
imaginary line towards Inverness and Perth, the naval conflict decreases; 
however, from these areas, men were drawn into the farm lands of the 
Lowlands or into the developing urban and manufacturing area between 
Glasgow and the Lothians to Edinburgh. 
A traditional society which espoused the virtue of military service 
and one burdened with an excess population and underemployment proved 
to be a fertile region for army recruitment. A lieutenant of the 
10lst Johnstone's Highlanders commented'that: 49 
It was not necessary, in those days (1760), to go to 
\ 
manufacturing towns to bribe with whisky and high 
bounties, the idle and profligate; we got plenty of 
men in the country. 
And finally, Stewart of Garth cornments: 50 
When a man of address and knowledge of human nature 
meets with proper encouragement, recruiting has seldom 
failed in the north. 
The system was to break down. After 1793, not even the northwest 
Could supply the vast numbers of troops demanded by the government for 
the wars against Revolutionary France and Napo]eon. The great storehouse 
of troops, the northwest Highlands of Ross, Sutherland, Cromarty, 
Inverness and the Hebrides, ultimately failed to meet the demand. It 
can generally be demonstrated, however, that the region of the northwest 
did supply the bulk of the recl~its for the Highland regiments and only 
after the area had been drained and over-recruited to the limit that the 
northwest ultimately failed to supply the manpower for the Highland 
regiments. 
SECTION 4 
Age, Soclal and Economic BackgTound of ~ Recruits. 
Before turning to the discussion of the ultimate breakdown of 
recruiting in the Highlands and the reasons for and.consequences of, 
a short examination of the individual recruits obtained from the 
Highlands is in order. Muster rolls for the various regiments are quite 
instructive of this account with regard to age, physical features and 
socio-economic background. 
Regimental returns for the Bredalbane Fencibles of 1793 provide 
an excellent illustration of age and occupation. The return of 
\ . 
6 April 1793 for Captain MacLean's Company shows that the majority of 
the men were between the ages of 17 and 25; however, some older men 
were recruited as seen from a reproduction o.f the roll's figures by 
age: 51 
11 
18 
,19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
21 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
Number 
T 
10 
5 
9 
6 
2 
4 
5 
3 
2 
2 
o 
o 
3 
o 
o 
o 
o 
2 
1 
Percentage 
11 to 20 52% 
21 to 25 33% 
26 to 30 CJA 
31 to 36 5% 
Total 
31 
20 
7 
3 
61 
The official War Office requirement at the beginning of the wars 
of 1192 to 1815, was set at ages 18 to 35 for the Highland regiments 
.92. 
and 5 foot 5 inches in height. 52 As early as 1794, variations in 
this pattern are seen. The Reay Fencibles, for example, ranged between 
the ages of 16 and 55 officially, though it is reported that some of 
the privates listed as 16 were actually younger. 53 
As the war continued and replacements were needed for casualties 
andretirees, the age standards were relaxed. In 1805, the War Office 
authorized the enlistment as privates of not more than 10 boys per 
company, not to be over 16 years of age and to be paid lOde per day. 
These youngsters were to be taught trades or to serve as drummers. 54 
Although young boys, usually starting at age 14, had traditionally 
~,> 
served as drummers in the army, the allowing of up to 10 per company 
was a radical change from previous years when only 2 or 3 would have 
been allowed. 
The 2nd Battalion of the 78th Regiment serves as an excellent 
example of the use of increasingly younger men to fill up the ranks 
of the regiments. In 1806, there were nearly 600 men under age and 
with a majority of the officers having very little experience. 55 By 
1814, the extreme youth of this battalion had not altered greatly and 
·there were only 43 rank and file over the age of 22. 56 
Again, looking at Captain MacLean's Company of the Bredalbane 
Fencibles, an idea of the civilian occupations of the rank and file 
is indicated: 57 
Parish 
ColI Labourer 30, Tailor 5 
Tiree do. 1, Weaver ".1 
Small Isles do. 11 
Kilnian do. 1, Tailor 1 
Ross do. 1 
Kilmore do. 4, \{eaver 1 
Kilfinch do. 1 
The return shows that by occupation percentages, the labourers total 
49 or nearly 85 per cent. with the tailors and weavers substantially 
behind. Those enlisted in urban areas show a somewhat more diverse 
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occupational background, especially in the skilled trades. A return 
for those men enlisted in Perth during l1arch 1793 for the Bredalbane 
Fencibles show: 58 
Craft Number Percentage of Whole 
Wright 2 4% 
Weaver 11 22% 
Smith 1 2% 
Barber 1 2% 
Musician 1 2% 
Shoemaker 1 2% 
Tailor 1 20/0 
Butcher 1 2% 
Mason 1 2% 
Sawyer 1 2% 
Flaxdresser 1 2%-
La90urer 20 4g;~ 
,~, 
Total 42 
Again, in this list as with the first, the labouring group tends 
to be overwhelmingly predominant. Wnat is curious about the returns is 
not what is included, rather, it is the total exclusion of any mention 
of "small farmers". This may perhaps be explained if the system of~ 
recording lists the son of a farmer simply asa labourer. Again for 
the Eredalbane Fencibles, a list of 12 April 1793 presents a description 
for each new recruit under the heading "By Whom Presented,,:59 
Volunteers or "of himself" 
Given by father, brother or 
other relative 
Listed as given by tacksman 
or as tenant of 
34 
75 
In all likelihood, the sons of the small farmers would have been 
given to the service by their fathers and simply recorded as labourers 
since they would not have had a tack of their own. Most of the 
volunteers or "given of himself" category are of the tradesmen and 
artisan group and no apprentices were allowed to be recruited. 
Similar patterns are found in the' regular regiments as well. The 
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muster roll for the Duchess of Gordon's Company of the 71st Fraser's 
Highlanders in 1776 Show: 60 
~.) 
The major 
Labourers 
Shoemakers 
Gardeners 
Hecklers 
Squarewrights 
Merchants 
Tailors 
Dayl ab our er 
Mason 
Tobacconist 
Butcher 
Lent Dresser 
Wool Comber 
Fiddler 
Miner 
Chapman 
Weaver 
Brickmaker 
occupations found 
Labourers 
Weavers 
Shoemakers 
Tailors· 
Blacksmiths 
Wool Combers 
Wrights 
60 
; 
; 
2 
2 
2 
4 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
in the 92n,d 
442 
- 185 
;1 
42 
17 
20 
Stocking Hakers -
Gardeners 
1; 
6 
8 
8 Miners· 
Masons 
Servants 
Slaters 
Sawyers 
Butchers 
Carpenters 
Nailers 
Cotton Spinners -
Farmers 
11 
7 
6 
5 
5 
5 
5 
4 
4 
Gordon Highlanders 61 are: 
The muster rolls are rather useful in exploring the economic and 
social background and occupational status of the Highland recruits. 
The high number of labourers listed may be a reflection of the lack 
of skilled tradesmen in the IIighlands or it may simply have been the 
manner of recording the sons of small farmers. It is beyond the scope 
of this thesis to explore this aspect of recruiting in any depth; 
96. 
nevertheless, this examination provides an insight into the background 
of the soldiers who enlisted for service in the Highland regiments of 
the 18th Century. 
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CHAPl'ER V. 
~ Breakdown of Hifhland Recruiting After .!1.2.i. 
CHAPrER V. 
SECTION 1 
~ Difficulty l-.!! Raising Recruits After lm. 
The Highlands supplied an ~NOJ':"~~'S number of troops between 
1793 and 1800. By the year 1800, however, the situation had begun 
to alter in terms of ease in recruiting in the IIighlands. Although 
no regular Highland corps were raised in the Highlands after 1799 
and the Fencibles were disbanded shortly thereafter, the regiments, 
in their need for replacement troops, had drained the area of men far 
beyond the limit which the Highlands might be reasonably expected to 
supply. The period of almost limitless recruits available was past 
and the problem of maintaining the already ,established corps became 
the great challenge to recruiters. Their success was only limited. 
The over-extension of the Highland's ability to supply men led to the 
influx of non-Highlanders, mainly Enelish, Irish and Lowlanders, who 
changed the character of the Highland regiments to some degree. 
There is a wealth of evidence demonstrating the degree of 
difficulty in finding suitable men and of the collapse of Highland 
recruiting. Despite the continually high bounties being paid by 
1803 at the start of the Napoleonic Wars, the difficulty in obtaining 
men had become acute. Muster rolls of the various regiments reflect 
this difficulty and some selected ,examples show the general state of 
recruiting after 1800. 
The Clan Alpine Fencibles, the last of these regiments raised 
prior to the Peace of Amiens, reported in 1800 that recruiting was 
very difficult due to the great numbers of recruits already raised 
in the Highlands. l This , ... as in contrast to the ease with which such 
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regiments as the Reay and Bredalbane Fencib1es had been raised six years 
earlier. It had been traditionally less difficult to raise troops for 
* the,Fencib1es due to the limitation of service to the British Isles. 
In early 1799, when General \Hlliam 'ltlemyss undertook the raising 
of the last of the Highland regular r~giments, the 93rd Sutherland 
Regiment, it required from April 1799 to August 1800 to raise 653 troops 
despite the enlistment of 259 rank and file who had served with the 
Sutherland Fencibles.2 Earlier regiments of the line had seldom required 
more than three months to raise 1,000 or more troops. So difficult was 
the task, that General Wemyss was given permission to raise his troops 
from any county or area of Scotland in late April 1799.3 This emergency 
\J 
measure was not resorted to as evidenced by the singularly high proportion 
ofSutherlanders on the original muster rolls. There were, however, no 
supernumeraries as had been the case with ea;lier regiments. 4 
other Highland regiments experienced similar difficulties in raiSing 
troops. The 91st Argyleshire Highlanders found recruits so scarce in 
1803, that some monthly reports show no men attested. In order to stimulate 
the nurnbers brought in, the expedient of recruitment for rank was used and 
in 1804, four officers were assigned to recruiting duty in the north 
with the promise of promotion. 5 Between the years 1798 and 1800, the 
72nd Seaforth's Highlanders could only find 200 men to fill up the ranks. 6 
And, finally, three years, from 1810 to 1813, were required to raise only 
400 replacement troops for the 2nd Battalion of the 78th Regiment. 7 
The example of these several regiments is repeated over and over 
in the various Highland corps. Not only were new men difficult to find, 
* Although the Royal Clan Alpine regiment was the last home service 
Fencible regiment raised in'Scotland, the Canadian Fencible Regiment 
was raised in the Highlands in 1804 for service only in Canada. 
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but many of the veterans of the Fencible regiments were unwilling to 
enlist in the regulars after 1802 and the numbers who did volunteer were 
insufficient to complete the ranks of the regulars for renewed operations 
against the French. l1any veterans who served overseas did not return as 
evidenced by the numbers of the 42nd, 77th and 78th Regiments who settled 
in Canada. The Isle of Tiree had sent 57 men to the army from 1757 to 
8 1763, however, only 12 eventually returned. 
By the late 1790's, the situation had become so severe that the 
responsibility for raising replacements was gradually removed from the 
colonels, a practice which had existed since the initial raisings of 
the Highland regiments, and was placed in the hands of the various 
L, . 
corporations of Scotland. The need for troops had outstripped the 
colonel's abilities to meet the demand.9 ¥~litia ranks were drawn upon 
, 
and large drafts of troops were found not only from the Scottish, but 
also the English and Irish Militia. By the end of the wars, the majority 
of the replacement troops were drawn from the Local Hilitia and very few 
were actually raised within the Highlands, other than from this source. 
D~spite the length of the ~ars from 1793 to 1815, casualtie~n the 
Highland regiments do not seem to have been particularly heavy. This has 
been attributed to the usually high state of discipline and aggressiveness 
of the Highland regiments, characteristics which usually mean a low rate 
of casualties in combat. Disease took a much greater number of lives 
than did combat. The casualty counts of the Highland regiments were 
approximately 1 in 30 as seen from the returns of men killed in action 
of five regiments from 1793 to 1814. Of these 5 regiments, a total of 
20,500 served during this period,lO 
~ ~suc.I-I,t-s ;'~V'e (;.",,," 
t~1IeJ. ,'AI c.c..-/ ,o;J ~"d 
1Ir'-' pA,)e /p3 ~fe..- U~/'1 h 
/VO! fY':SS:f\j1 (kl'l~reJ or j.J4'n.J~J. 
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Regiment 
~~ 
78th (1st Btn) 
79th 
92nd 
93rd 
Total 
Casualties. 
235 
103 
89 
181 
60 
668 Killed in action. 
An average, then, of 4,000 men served in each of these regiments during 
the twenty-year period; however, casualties in battle average only 133 
per battalion. The more important figures than that of casualties are 
the number of replacements required to fill the depleted ranks owing 
to disease, discharges and natural attrition. 
A factor which cannot be overlooked was the extreme longevity of 
the war, a situation which always places strains upon the ability of 
regiments to maintain their numbers. Very few men actually served the 
entire period of warfare, though this was not totally uncommon as 
demonstrated by the casualty fig~es for the rruL~ and file of the 92nd 
Gordon Highlanders at Waterloo where 2 of the killed in action had 
served in the regiment since 1794.11 
'In order to demonstrate the very marked use, of non-Highlanders 
in the regiments after 1800, as the Highlands failed to meet the 
requirement, an examination of the rolls of several of the regular 
regiments of the line is in order. 
1) 42nd Royal Highland Regiment. 
Colonel Gardyne states that a return for the Black Watch of 
October 1815 shows the following rAtional proportions of men in the 
ranks: Scottish 444, Irish 40 and English 16.12 A detailed examination 
of the Regimental Adjutant's Roll of the rank and file who fought at 
Quatre Bras and Waterloo (15-18 J~~e 1815) gives a more accurate idea 
of the regional origins of the rank and file. Of 541 total rank and 
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file, there are 159 total identifiable English, Irish or Lowland 
surnames or thosehaving no clan affi1iation. l ; Of the clan surnames, 
a goodly number are from the border or non-Highland familes such as 
. * Douglas, Hamilton, Cunningham, Scott, Lindsay, Inglis and Ivallace. 
It is highly unlikely that those with border or Lowlru1d names would 
have been recruited in the Highlands. Among the obvious Highland 
surnames, there seems to be no clear clan or district preponderance, 
indicating a general area of recruitment rather than a specific clan 
or district attachment, a feature common to the other Highland corps. 
The most commonly occurring Highland surnames and their numbers are 
here listed:l~ 
Camp bell 9 
MacDonald 
-
24 
. MacGregor 
-
19 
MacLean 6 
MacLeod 5 
Cameron 6 
Stewart 5 
Henderson 
- 5 
MacPherson - 5 
MacIntosh 
-
8 
Fraser 8 
MacKay 19 
Sutherland - 11 
Munro 8 
Ross 7 
MacKenzie 10 
The high proportion of those names from the northwest such as Ross, 
Munro, MacKenzie, MacKay, Sutherland and l1acDonald lends some validity 
to the theory of higher rates of recruitment from the northwest and 
iSlands. The relative lack of Campbells is especially curious since 
this regiment was largely recruited fro~ among the Campbells in 1739 
and afterwards. 
2) 78th Ross-shire Highlanders. 
-
* See Black, The Surnames of Scotland for description of geographic 
origin of Scots surnames. 
, 
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Upon embarkation for the Cape of Good Hope in June 1796, the 
15 rolls of the regiment show the following national proportions: 
Highlanders 
Lowlanders 
Irish and English 
970 
- 129 
14 
The returns for March 1811 sho .... l a sharp drop in the Olli'l1ber of 
Highlanders, a slight increase in the proportion of Irish and English 
and a substantial increase in the percentage of Lowlanders in the 
16 
ranks: 
Highlanders 835 
Lowlanders 184 
Irish and English - 17 
The 2nd Battalion experienced difficulty in raising native Highlanders 
'v 
and initially showed a return of 560 Highlunders and 190 Lowlanders. 17 
3) 93rd Sutherland Highlanders. 
The Regimental Digest of this regiment for 1813 comments on the 
< < • t t . f th < • t 18 s~ ua ~on 0 e new rec~ s: 
Notwithstanding the great influx about this period of 
recruits into the Regiment of much more questionable 
character than the respectable men of whom it was 
originally composed, the 93rd still continued to be 
distinguished, above all corps, by the general propriety 
of demeanour upon every occasion. 
The men of bad character usually referred to those brought in from 
the Irish Militia. A number of writers commented upon the difficulties 
faced by regiments in being forced to rely upon these recruits. It is 
, 
also interesting to observe that the reporting of incidents of desertion 
and severe punishments, almost unknown in the pre-1793 Highland 
regiments, rose proportionate to the number of non-Highlanders used 
to fill up the ranks. 
While stationed in Ireland in 1808, the 93rd was comprised of 
the following numbers by national! ty: 19 . 
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Ranks Officers 
Scottish 856 Scottish ;6 
English 16 English 6 
Irish 21 Irish 4 
Foreign 5 Foreign 1 
It should be pointed out that the foreigners were listed as to place 
of residence rather than nationality, though some battalions did take 
on genuine foreigners by 1813. The foreign officer of the 93rd was 
a Scot and the privates listed as such were sons of men in the ranks 
whose place of residence was overseas. 
The unfortunate problem in returns of this type is that no 
. 
differentiation is made as to Scots Highlanders and Scots Lowlanders, 
\ therefore, one can only guess as to their place of origin or by finding 
the original muster rolls which list the recruit by parish. Again, 
there is no easy way to determine how many of the recruits were native 
Highlanders who had migrated to the Lowlands in search of employment, 
a factor which would cause them to be listed as being Lowlanders. 
Upon embarkation for the New Orleans expedition in 1814, the 1st 
Battalion of the 93rd showed a return of 929 rank and file of whom 
* 690 were Highlanders, 225 were Lowlanders and 14 were English. A full 
544 of the 690 Highlanders were Sutherland men, a rather large percentage 
for 1815, by which time, even Sutherland recruiting was breaking down 
d th t . f t· it· 20 un er e s ra~n 0 con ~nuous recru ~ng. 
4) 9lst Argyleshire Highlanders. 
This regiment depended even more heavily upon non-Highlanders than' 
* This figure for Lowlanders included the lowland plains on 
the coast of Sutherland and Caithness, but these men would 
have the characteristics of Highlanders. 
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did other corps. The proportion of Highlanders to Lowlanders is given 
in the casualty reports of the 1st Battalion between 1794 and 180;. 
From the reports can be found 68 Highland names, 128 Lowland names and . 
4 Irish, indicating the heavy reliance of this regiment on Lowland 
recruits.21 Again, there is no indication as to the number of 
Low1anders who were actually transplanted Highlanders. A better 
indication of the reliance on non-Scots is shown by the collected returns 
for the years 1800 to 1818 for the 1st Battalion. Within this period, 
there were enlisted some 970 Scots (Highland and Lowland), 218 Irish, 
,171 English and 22 foreigners. 22 These figures represent only 2 to 1 
ratio of Scots ~o foreigners. The figures for the 2nd Battalion between 
1807 and 1814 are even more surprising. They show enlisted 559 Scots, 
168 English, 142 Irish and 197 foreigners, many of whom were Swedes, 
Pomeranians and Germans who were obtained while the 2nd Battalion was 
on service in the Low Countries in 1813.23 Recruiting parties were sent 
to all parts of the EritishIsles in addition to the Lowland cities and 
towns. Recruiting stations were established in London, Nottingham, 
Limerick and Dublin and a number of men were drawn from the Irish Militia. 
Recruits were apparently easy to find in Ireland at this time due to the 
worsening economic and land situations as evidenced by a letter from 
the Co1onel,Campbel1 of Lochnell, to the Lieutenant-Colonel, Catlin 
Crauford:24 
Armagh, Ireland 
17 January 1801. 
I think I can get you plenty of good men from this 
county; the times here are particularly hard, linen 
cloth (the staple of the county) at a very low price, 
and provisions dear, men enlisting by the hundreds. 
The experiences of these.Highland regiments seems to have been 
universal. Some regiments were not as fortunate as the original 
79th Cameron Highlanders, which in 1794, had only 278 Highlanders of 
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an original return of 600 men.25 The situation in the case of this 
regiment resulted more from Cameron of Lochiel supporting the efforts 
of the Duke of Cordon and the 92nd over those of his kinsman, Cameron 
of Erracht"and the 79th. Erracht managed to raise an almost completely 
Gaelio-speaking regiment by recruiting a great number of young 
Highlanders who had emigrated to the Lowlands in search of employment. 
( 
This resource of Highlanders ceased to be lucrative as other later 
efforts depleted this source of Highlanders as they had done in the 
Highlands themselves. 
In addition to the lack of manpower, added burdens were imposed by 
the Wax Office\~rom time to tirna as prompted by the necessities of war. 
Prior to 1800, the British army had relied upon hired mercenaries to 
perform the duties of the Rifle Corps. In 1794, the Crown hired 34,000 
troops, mostly Hessians and some Hanoverians, to serve as light cavalry 
or riflemen (J~gers).26 In order to create a British rifle corps, 
the War Office raised in 1800, the Duke of York's Rifle Corps which 
drew heavily upon the Highland Fencibles in Ireland.27 This action 
placed an added burden on recruitment as several hundred replacement 
" troops had to be raised from the Highlands. 
By 1809, a large proportion of the Highland regiments were not 
natives and much of the old character of the regiments had been lost. 
This state of affairs prompted the -Vla:c Office into removing several 
of the Highland regiments from the IUghland establishment and placing 
them on the same footing with the Lowland regiments: 28 
As the population of the Highlands of Scotland is found 
insufficient to supply recruits for the whole of the 
llighland corps on the establishment of His Majesty's 
army, and as some of these corps, laying aside their 
distinguishing dress, which is objectionable to the 
natives of South" Britain, would in a great measure tend 
to facilitate the completing of the establishment, as it 
would be an inducement to the men of the English I1ilitia 
to extend their services in greater numbers to these 
regiments: it is in consequence most h~~bly submitted for 
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approbation of His Majesty that His Majesty's 
72nd, 73rd, 74th, 75th, 91st and 94th Regiments 
should discontinue to "rear in future the dress 
by which His Majesty's regiments of Highlanders 
are distinguished; and that the above corps 
should no longer be considered on that establish-
ment. 
In consequence of this action, the 72nd, 73rd, 74th, 75th, 91st 
and 94th Highland regiments all adopted trews and Highland bonnets 
and discarded kilts and belted plaids. The 71st or MacLeod's 
Highlanders were made the 71st Glasgow Highland Regiment in 1808. 
In 1809, it became the 71st Glasgow Highland Light Infantry and became 
part of the first Light Infantr; Brigade under Sir John Hoore.29 
Although most ot these regiments were eventually returned to the 
Highland establishment, the implication of the action was clear; there 
simply were not enough Highlanders available to fill the ranks of the 
many Highland regiments serving in the British Army. 
SECTION 2 
!h! Changing Hich1and Economy. 
Two events of paramount significance to the state of the Highlands 
and Highland society in the 18th Century were the introduction of the 
potato into the region ruld the coming of the sheep farns~ The potato 
was first introduced into the Highlands in 1743 by Macdonald of 
Clrulranald. Although it was slow in becoming popular as a staple food 
crop, by 1790, it had become the principal food source for the common 
Highlander. The greatest advantage of the potato was that it could be 
grown abundantly on tiny plots of land which were low in mineral 
~) 
resources and required only a modicum of labour. The result of the 
introduction and cultivation of the potato was that a greater number of 
persons could subsist on a smaller portion of land, a factor which tended 
to aggravate the already precarious subsistence and reinforce the 
Highlander's uneconomical habit. of constantly subdividing holdings among 
the family. 
The second monumental occurrence was the introduction of improved 
agriculture, notably, the clearing of the land for large sheep runs, 
after 1760. With this new type of improved land usage, thousands of 
former small tenrults were removed from their traditional holdings and 
forced into the newly developed towns and fishing villages such as 
Tobermory, or were compelled to migrate to the colonies or the Lowlands 
in search of work. Eefore looking further at the clearances and the 
-i;ransformation of the Highland economy, the root causes of these 
occurrences should be delved into. 
Prior to the Jacobite risings of 1745, agricultural methods were 
quite primitive and inefficient. The use of the run-rig and infield-
110. 
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outfield systems of cultivation produced barely a subsistence crop 
for feeding the population and any external capital was generated from 
the sale of the black cattle in the Lowland markets. According to 
l1alcolm Gray, land holding in the Highlands '-las set up not so much 
to insure an effective and efficient agricultural economy, as to 
"stabilize a class structure and to verify mutual obligations".30 
The holding of land, not by lease or contract, but rather through 
traditional and hereditary right and the return of services, both 
labour and military, were the underpinnings of the clan system.~ 
FollO\V'ing the rebellion of 1745, many Highland landlords 
attempted to stimul~te the yield of their estates throuGh the use of 
improved agricultural techniques imported from the Lowlands. An 
attempt to root out the inefficient system of run-rig agriculture 
began initially in the south and east where close proximity to the 
Lowlands encouraged the adoption of efficient methods of agricultural 
production. In 1776, the Duke of Argyle ordered the break-up of the 
run-rig system on his estates and the placing of farmers on individual 
plots of land. By 1783, the Bredalbane estates had followed this 
example. The breaking up of the run-rig system came substantially 
later to the northwest and islands, but by 1820, run-rig agriculture 
was practically non-existent.;l 
Concurrent with the stress on improved agriculture came the rise 
of materialism among the aristocracy. Prior to the latter 18th Century, 
the gentry and landlords were not as inclined towards ostentatious living 
as their Lowland and foreign counterparts, though they did live 
comfortably. By the middle of the century; a eoodly portion of the 
Highland aristocracy had become assimilated into the general British 
aristocracy, thus causing a rise in the standard of living and, 
consequently, a need for increased incomes in order to live in the 
112. 
fashion prescribed by that society. In order to finance such luxuries 
as travel, tm.,rn houses in London and Edinburgh and expensive imported 
goo~s, landlords set in motion a series of rent increases and improvements 
which ultimately destroyed the old clan ties of tenant to landlord as the 
common clansmen began to see the landlord less in terms of the patriarchal 
leader and more as simply the owner of the land. 
The coming of the sheep farms to the Highlands and the resultant 
clearances were natural extensions of the need to produce higher revenues 
from what was relatively poor land. Sheep farms required large tracts of . 
uncultivated land, but the benefits in terms of income were enormous 
and collected rents from these enterprises rose far above that collected 
c· 
from the small tenants and tacksmen. Sheep farming began on a large 
scale in the south and gradually moved north. By 1785, MacDonnell of 
Glengarry had begun clearing his estates for ~heep farming. 32 The most 
notorious case of sheep farm introduction and the removal of tenants 
occurred on the Sutherland estates after 1805. Colin 111acKenzie, the agent 
of the Countess of Sutherland until 1807, proposed a combination of sheep 
farms, fishing villages, the reduction of tacksmen and the resettlement 
of the population on muir ground or in newly raised villages. 33 The 
eventual result of the Sutherland clearances and the experiment in improved 
land use led to a bitter and often violent series of confrontations such 
as the Kildonan riots of 1813. 
Sheep farming also introduced into the Highlands a new aristocracy 
of outsiders who supplanted the old tacksman gentry. Sheep farming 
required great amounts of capital in order to stock and lease the land. 
Local gentry rarely had the capital resources and the majority of the 
sheep farmers were from the Lowland or English areas. Therefore, the 
old gentry class was breaking down and a new group of outsiders were 
supplanting them. Unfortunately for Highland recI~iting, these new men 
113. 
could not command the loyal following as had the older body of tacksmen 
who had been displaced. 34 
A second great source of income for the proprietors of the west 
coast and islands was the harvesting of kelp. The surge of this 
industry created not only great profits for the landlord, but allowed 
for an excess of population· to be sustained on a largely stagnant 
. *. 
agricultural base. The height of the boom came in the first decade 
of the 19th Century when kelp was sold at a record high of £20 per ton 
in 1810. By the end of the second decade of the century, though, the 
market had collapsed and prices of only £3 per ton were paid. 35 The 
profits of the kelp boom to certain landowners was phenomenal. At 
t/ 
its height, the annual income from kelp for Lord Macdonald was near 
£20,000 while that of Clanranald stood at £18,000 per annum. 36 
These changing patterns of economy were to have devastating 
effects on the state of the Highlands. The south and east were 
relatively unaffected by the changes in the fundamentals of the old 
economy in comparison to the northwest •. These areas generally had 
more arable land, access to employment in the Lowlands for the surplus 
manpower and a generally healthier total economy, On Islay, for 
example, improved agriculture had very positive results. In 1775, 
the island imported 3 - 4,000 boIls of meal per year. By 1786, Islay 
was exporting 5,000 boIls of meal per year despite a significant 
population increase. 37 
The north and west suffered the effects of improvement somewhat 
more severely. These areas were faced with a rapidly growing 
population, stagnant modes of agricultural production and physical 
* . Some land reclaimation was carried out iJ;l parts, but these 
activities were of limited success in an area as mounta.inous 
a.s the Highlands. 
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limitations to the spread of cultivated land. 38 Malcolm Gray 
summarizes the effect of the: new modes of agriculture and land usage 
in these years in the northwest: 39 
The formative years had formed notluing but the 
enlarged image of an old society, but a society 
that worked in economic conditions that were in 
some ways disastrously new. 
The new economy was to have totally opposite effects on army 
recrui ting, at least, in the initial sta.:ges. The Lowland areas where 
the press of population was less heavily felt and where wages for labour 
were rising fairly evenly with economic growth did not rely as heavily 
on the services as did the northwest as an outlet for surplus manpower 
or unemployed tenants. The Reverend }1r. Patrick Grant writes of the 
Parish ol'Duthil and Rothil Hurchas in Inverness-shire and Horay: 40 
Until of late, the people were very fond of a 
military life, but the wages of servants, increasing 
so exceedingly, that the spirit is almost totally 
overcome. Formerly none would enlist but in a 
llighland corps. Bounty money now determines the 
choice. 
In the overcrowded and under-developed northwest, a totally opposite 
effect to the improvement was seen. The great surplus of labour working 
smaller holdings created a vast reserve of excellent soldiers, a resource 
which was to become quickly drained off with the rush of Riehland corps 
raised bet"leen 1793 and 1800. The pastor of the Parish of Wick in 
Caithness, the Rever~d }1r. William Sutherland writes: 41 
Want of manufactures and other means of employment, 
made young men, who are averse to labour in 
husbandry and have no way of livelihood, readily 
betake themselves to the army and navy, more 
especially when a Highland corps is to be raised. 
SECTION 3 
~ Breakdown £f !b! Traditional Society. 
The introduction of Lowland agricultural improvements in the 
Highlands brought not only displacement but began a series of changes 
in the fundamental structure of Highland society. Within a very few 
years, the old patriarchal culture based upon land tenure had succumbed 
to the new commercial values of capitalism based upon the rational and 
optimum use of land resources. To the common Highlander, brought up 
in the traditional values and beliefs of kinship and subsistence 
agriculture, the rapidity with which these changes came about were both 
unsettling and frightening. The ultimate result of these changes was 
the total collapse of the old clan culture as it had existed for 
centuries. Commercialism djd~ in a few years, what government 
legislation and suppression had been unable to do for decades, the 
destruction of the old clan system. 
The expanding of a wealthier aristocracy, either as a reeult of , 
kelp production or improved agriculture, created a wedge which was to 
separate the clansman from his traditional leaders, a situation which 
was to effect, perhaps not so much numbers, but very definitely the 
spirit with which the Highlanders enlisted in the army. The bulk of 
the new wealth generated by the aristocraoy in the late 18th Century 
was spent on conspicuous consumption rather than efforts to improve 
the life of the people, a break with the traditional mode of life 
from which the Highland society was not able to recover. The minister 
of the Parish of Applecross in Ross co®nented in the early 1790's 
that: 
The influx of money, and their communications 
with other oO~Dtries hath introduced a desire 
for better living; and wi tll a desire for better 
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living; and with the rapacits of the superiors 
in applying all the advantages of the times to 
their own private interest, that he effectually 
relaxed those attachments. 
Rever~nd 11acQueen went on to state that the traditional attachment to 
superiors held by the lower classes "hath for some time back, been 
graduallyabating".42 
An indication of the extent of the adoption of Lowland manners and 
lifestyles is reflected in the changing patterns of dress. By the 
provisions of the "Disldlting Act" of 1747, the traditional Highland 
clothing had been outlawed and despite the restoration of the right 
to wear Highland clothing after 1782, many areas had lost their native 
costume almost completely. The minister of the Parish of Cromarty 
__ .'t'1 
reports that many were wearing English dress and that printed cotton 
was becoming very popular. 43 Even in the more conservative Islands, 
fashions were altering, particularly among the gentry. The Rever~ld 
Donald }1artin of the Parish of Kilmuir in Skye states that: 44 
Fifty years ago, theolu Highland dress universally 
prevailed. Hats, long coats, boots, spurs, watches 
etc. were rare. Now every gentleman wears them, and 
persons of substance, of both sexes, dress fashionably, 
and like in a style so elegant, as those of the same 
rank in the southern parts of Scotland. 
The changing patterns of dress, either from the introduction of 
cheap manufactured goods or through a conscious desire to e~ulate 
the English and Lowlanders, and the rise in conspicuous consumption 
did not, in themselves, break down the old Highland society. These 
new life styles merely reflected the revolutionary changes which were 
taking place in the Highlands in the late 18th Century as old customs 
and values were assimilated into the pattern of the country as a \-lhole. 
. Perhaps the most signifi?ant change in the social structure which 
influenced the state of recruiting for the army was the demise of the 
tacksman class. These gentry families had served as the middlemen 
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between the chief and the common clansmen. The tacksmen had officered 
the clan regiment and had served as the military elite of the clan. 
The tacksmen families had been responsible for rousing the tenantry 
for military action. With the end of the clan armies and the 
introduction of government service on a grand scale into the Highlands, 
the tacksman class played an equally vital role in the recruiting for 
the regiments. Entire companies were frequently raised from one 
tacksman's estates, a company which was often officered by the tacksman 
and his relatives, thus maintaining the blood kinship and district ties 
which had been a foundation of the old clan army. In the 73rd Regiment, 
commanded by Colonel NacKenzie, 19 officers had the surname HacKenzie. 
The list of the officers originally gazetted to the 98th (9lst) 
Argyleshire Regiment shows that the Colonel, a major, 4 of 7 captains 
, 
and 7 of 13 lieutenants were-all of the name Campbell. Of the 
remaining officers, many Argyleshire names such as !f:acDougal, Stuart, 
MacNab and I1acLaine are in evidence. 45 The case of almost every 
regiment indicates a reliance on the local gentry class not only to 
officer, but also to raise the rank and file. 
The destruction of the tacksman class as a viable social force 
in the Highlands and their replacement by a new aristocracy based on 
capital rather than traditional social standing occurred throughout 
the Highlands and not only in the more modernized areas of the 
south and east. The tacksmen of the estates of Lord }lacdonald on 
Skye were removed in 1777. The Argyle tacksmen had begun to be 
removed as early as 1737 and the Duke of Argyle replaced the traditional 
gentry with business-minded tenants. 46 
The removal of and eventual emigration of much of the tacksman 
class broke down clan cohesion and undercut the authority of the chief • 
• 
Further, it removed from the scene one of the cornerstones of clan 
118. 
society and created a two-tier system of large holders and small 
farmers. By 1844, only 3 of 23 parishes in one section of the 
northwest had more than a 6 per cent. middle class population and 
the high figure for any area was only 15 per cent. 47 
For the army and recruiting, 8.ppeals to clan kinship ties, 
initially very potent, became progressiveiy weaker and the government 
eventually found that the only effective recruiting was brought about 
by high bounties and the desperation created by overpopulation and 
under-employment, neither of which tended to produce the best quality 
recruits. By removing the tacksman class, the landowners destroyed 
the most important tool for recruitment available and the ranks of 
the Highla~~ ,.;regiments began to be filled with men brought in not by 
love of clan and kinship, but by strictly economic motivations. 
Not only did the economic changes alter Highland society, but 
other external influences were making an impression on the culture, 
'notably, the introduction in the 18th Century of popular education. 
Government education acts in 1696 and 1708 legalized the establishment 
of parish schools and required the tacksman to financially support 
these schools. 48 Perhaps the single most important organization was 
the Scottish Societ~ for the Propagation of Christian Knowledge (SPCK), 
established in 1709 primarily to teach English in the charity schools. 49 
So great was the effect of these schools in certain areas that Lachlin 
Shaw wrote in 1775 that "heathenish customs are abandoned".50 
From 1811 onwards, Gaelic Societies of Inverness, F~inburgh and 
Glasgow were formed to teach children in the Highlands. In 1826, 
of 500 schools operating in the lIighlands, ! were parochial, i were 
SPCK and 40 per cent. were operated by the Gaelic Societies. 51 The 
educational habits of the aristocracy changed as well after 1700. 
Prior to the 18th Century, the sons of chiefs and chieftains were 
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reared by foster parents who imb«ed the young men with the ideals of 
the clan culture. By the 18th Century, many sons were sent out of 
the Jlighlands to Lowland schools and were reared at home. In this 
manner, ties with the common clansmen,' highly important to the 
Btruoture of clan society, ,'[ere beinG' broken up. Education from the 
Lowlands was also breaking up and undermining the old clan values. 
Had not the government abolished the legal structure of the clans in 
1748, they would surely have eventually succumbed to the pressures 
e~erted from the outside as a traditional, tribal society inevitably 
does when overcome by a more advanced, modern culture. 
The breakdown of the society came swiftly and military recruitment 
suffered. While the population growth and unemployment created by 
/ , 
the changing economics did initially produce a surplus manpower force 
beneficial to the regiments, the breakdown of the clan values and 
attitude~ insured that Highland recruiting failed once the surplus was 
drained off and recruiting became more difficult than even that of 
England, which was traditionally poor. Argyle was particularly 
~usceptible to the change in attitudes. This change in military values 
in the southwest is demonstrated by the refusal of the population of 
Iona to enter military service in 1799.52 While he may be overstating 
the case, the comments of Dr. Samuel Johnson on the state of the 
Highlands in his liorks is instructive in its assertion regarding the 
decline of the old Highland society. 53 
There was perhaps never any change in national 
manners so quick, so great, and so general as 
that which has operated in the Highlands-by the 
last conquest and the subsequent laws. We came 
hither too late to see what we expected - a 
people of peculiar appearance, and a system of 
antiquated life. The clans retain little now 
of their original character: their ferocity of 
temper is softened, their military ardour is 
extinguished, their dignity of independence is 
depressed, their contempt of government subdued, 
and their reverance for their chiefs abated. Of 
what they had before the late conquest of their 
country there remains only their language and 
their poverty. 
SECTION 4 
Shifting PopuJ.ati.on and, Ji~mjgrat:i.on. 
The problem of a rapidly increasing population in the High1e.ncls 
has been discussed in previous sections. Generally stated, the lligh1ands, 
and particularly the northwest and Islands, experienced a rapid growth 
in the population after 1750, a trend which was only reversed in the 
mid-19th Century. Not only did the increase in population provide a 
surplus manpower, but it also set in motion a period of increasing 
emigration, a process which eventually reduced the Highlands to .a sparce1y 
populated region of small crofters. The shifting patterns of the IUgh1and 
population did play an influential role in the success of Highland 
recruiting. 
') /\ 
, 
Initially, landowners were reluctant to allow massive emigration from 
their estates and a delibe!ate policy of emigration did not evolve until 
after 1800, and especially in the 1820's when clearances for sheep runs 
were in full operation. 54 Emigration from the Highlands began about 
1740 and was mainly organized by tacksmen who.took large n~sbers of 
the tenantry with them, usually to either New York or North Carolina in 
the American co1onies. 55 The removal of the tacksmen from their 
traditional landed status prompted many to opt for emigration, especially 
those from areas such as Skye and the Macdonald estates. vIi th the 
clearances, many of those removed emigrated, and it is reported that of 
those deposed by sheep farms on Skye, 2/3 emigrated, generally to 
North Caro1ina. 56 The return of the discharged soldiers after the 
Napoleonic Wars added further pressure on the population, and between 
1815 and 1834, over 30,000 persons emigrated from the Highlands to the 
overseas colonies or the United states. 57 
120. 
121. 
Not all emigration from the Highlands was to overseas destinations. 
Of the total number of emigrants, 69 per cent. went to other counties of 
Scotland, notably Renfrew, Lanark, Dumbarton, Ayr and Lothian, in search 
of employment in the growing industrial areas of the south. 58 It was 
in these areas that Highland recruiters were quite successful in the 
enlisting for service of expatriate Highlanders. 
Some examples from various parishes illustrate the nature and 
number of emigrants in the late 18th century. The greatest areas of 
emigration ",ere the Islands, especially Skye, Lewis, Harris and Uist. 
Following the Islands in numbers of emigrants were the western seaboard 
areas of Sutherland and Inverness-shire. Far behind in total numbers 
were the counties of Cromarty, Ross, Caitrmess and ArgYle. 59 The Isle 
of Skye, however, illustrates most graphica~ly the situation encountered 
in the Islands and northwestern Highlands. The massive emigrations 
began in 1769 when a goodly number of tacksmen on the HacDonald estates 
1eft. 60 This process continued until interrupted by the American War. 
The most famous of th~ J1acDonald gentry emigrants were Flora HacDonald 
" 
and her husband Allan NacDonald of Kingsburgh, who settled in North 
Carolina in 1774. Flora returned to Skye in 1778 while her husband 
remained a prisoner-of-war in New York. 
From the Parish of Braccada1e, the following statistics are given: 61 
Dates Number 
t-migrated 
1771 - 1774 128 
August 1780 200 
October 1790 - 200 
Destination 
America 
do. 
do. 
-
Total population of 2,250 in 1792. 
The Parish of Durnish experienced similar numbers. Between 1772 
and 1775, 204 males and 207 females emigrated from Durnish to North 
Am . 62 er~ca. Between August 1771 and October 1790, a total of 8 large 
transports sailed from Skye to America carrying a total of 2,400 people 
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from that island. 63 ]y 1803, over 4,000 persons had emigrated from the 
Isle of Skye. 
Other parishes suffered similar population losses. The report from 
the Parish of Glenshiel in Ross states: 64 
In 1769 and a.gain in 1772, a number of substantial 
farmers emigrated to North Carolina with their 
families and their connexions, which not only at 
that time, but for some years after, very sensibly 
diminished the number of inhabitants. 
The Reverend 11r. Patrick Campbell of the Parish of Kilmelfort comments 
that: 65 
The great and chief cause of the frequent and 
numerous emie-rations from the Highlands to America, 
is the natural fertility of the soil, which does 
not furnish the means of subsistence proportional 
to the increasing population and the number of 
inhabitants: and therefore when they cannot procure 
employment in their native country, they are of 
necessity obliged to search for it in distant and 
more fertile climes. 
Attempts were made to control the emigration of Highlanders and to 
maintain a reasonable standard for their passages. The Passenger Vessel 
Act was enacted in 1803 and made such provisions as a surgeon on board 
each vessel per every 50 passengers and limited the numbers per ship 
by requiring at least 2 tons of ship's burden per passenger. 66 
The problem created for army recruiting by emigration was not the 
drain of the population. The rapidly rising population of the Highlands 
could certainly support a certainamolli1t of emigration as a safety valve. 
Two difficulties in recruiting did arise, however. Firstly, the age 
factor of the males emigrating and secondly, the loss of substantial 
farmers and tacksmen. 
A full 52 per cent. of those Highlanders who em~grated from 1770 
to 1815 were between the ages of 20 and 35. 67 This was, of course, 
the prime age for military service. Of the remainder, many were children 
,."hose services '{QuId have been subsequently removed for future years. 
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Of those under 30 years of age, a high proportion were unmarried men 
who were more prone to serve in the army than were married men. Through 
heavy emigration, thought to have been as high as 12,000 people to the 
colonies between 1782 and 1803, a great many potential recruits were 
lost to the llighland regiments. 68 
The second important loss through emigration was that of the 
tacksmen. Many of those displaced by the landowners emigrated and 
carried with them a substantial number of their tenants, or those 
likely to enlist in the army had the tacksmen remained and undertaken 
I 
. 
recruiting for a regiment. The loss of the tacksmen was particularly 
acute in the western isles and on Skye, Not to be overlooked was the 
removal of the traditional link between the clansman and the clan chief, 
a role filled by the gentry tacksman. 
Although emigration in itself did not threaten Highland recruiting 
in terms of population depletion, it did remove a sizeable number of 
those men most eligible for service or most capable of raising troops 
for His 11ajesty's service, a factor which cannot be overlooked when 
examining the breakdown of Highland recruiting after 1793. Although 
the llighland population was generally increasing at a high rate during 
this period, those most amenable to military service were often lost 
either through emigration to the colonies or to the industrial Lowlands, 
where the traditional clan and kinship ties were undercut by a society 
with vastly differing concepts of the virtue of military service. 
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SEC'I'ION 1 
?atternB of Recruitment. 
As demonntratcd in the prcyious sections, the IEghla..'1ds of 
Scotland provided an incredible number of troops for the British army 
in the period following the final military defeat of Jacobitism as a 
serious political force. Tl=1e need for troops was imperative for the 
colonial and continental wars of the 18th and early 19th Centuries. 
Traditional mistrust of the army in England, aggTavated by the 
unattractiveness of the army life, hampered recruiting efforts for the 
rank and file. It is to the great credit of 'villiam Pitt the Elder 
that he set in motion a policy which was to have significant results. 
Not only did the government receive the services of thousands of loyal, 
reliable, disciplined and first-rate troops, but the policy of raising 
regiments from the Highlands sealed the reconciliation of the Highland 
aristocracy to the Act of Union. The Highlands genuinely became a 
viable partner in the Union with the raising of the regiments. The 
reconciliation of the Scottish political nation as a whole, ended 
centuries of hostilities bet\.Teen the Highlands and LOv/lands, between 
Scotland and England, and especially, extinguished the smouldering 
Jacobitism which had threatened the political stability of the nation 
since 1689. 
From 1757 until the end of the century, the Highlands provided a 
storehouse of troops which seemed inexhaustable. Population growth, 
improved agriculture and the lack of industrial development created a 
manpO\ver surplus of unemployed Highlanders who, when imbued with the 
clan ideals of a wa-~ior society, were eager to take the King' Shilling 
J.27. 
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for service in the Highland regiments. 
But, a fundamental change was taking place in the Highlands after 
1745, the roots of which lay in the dominant philosophy of 18th Century 
western Europe, that of rationalism, improved agriculture and the 
emergence of capitalism as a positive force in economics. The traditional 
Highlands, burdened with generally unproductive land and with a 
patriarchal, tribal-orientated culture, could not accorr~odate and 
assimilate the new forces and the old society crumbled under the impact 
of the new influences. The result of these changes, brought about over 
a period of half a century, set in motion such processes as massive 
emigration out of the Highlands, the breakdown of the clan and kinship 
ties of the patriarchy and altered the rudiments of the Highland economy 
to a point which was unworkable to the average Highlander. 
A result of these changes in the nature of the Highlands was the 
eventual breakdown of Highland recruiting after 1793. Emigration carried 
away a number of potential recruits. The decline of the clan feeling 
coupled with the replacement of the old gentry by newcomers destroyed 
the single most important mechanism for raising Highland troops prior to 
1800, the appeal to clan and kinship ties. And, finally, by that date, 
the previous success in raiSing troops from the Highlands had totally 
drained away the surplus manpower to an extent that the existing 
Highland regiments were unable ~o maintain their required numbers and 
began the process of non-Highland recruitment. The eventual demise of 
Highland recruiting is best symbolized by the "Jar Office action of 1809 
which removed several Highland regiments, some of 30 year's standing, 
from the Highland establishment. 
Despite the eventual breakdown of Highland recruiting in the early 
19th Century, the Highlands provided thousands of able troops for the 
services of the nation during a most vital period in the formation of 
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the modern British state and at a time when their services were most 
needed. 
SECTION 2 
~ pources. 
This thesis has relied heavily on 5 pri~~sources of information: 
" 
The Honourable J.W. Fortescue's monumental History of ~ British Army; 
Colonel ]avid Stewart's histories of the regiments; the regimental 
histories of the individual corps; the Statistical Account £! Scotland 
by Sir John Sinclair, Bart.; and, finally, muniments of several Highland 
landowners who were involved in the raising of Highland troops. An 
analysis of each source and its importance to the thesis is in order. 
J.W. Fortescue's History £! ~ British Army is the definitive 
work on the 18th and 19th Century history of the British army, its 
campaigns, battles, strengths, weaknesses and character. Although very 
little factual evidence on the recruitment of the Highland regiments per 
se is found in Fortescue, the context in which the Highlanders fought and 
the military events which shaped the period have no better source than 
this work and it was used as a structural background to add shape and 
dimension to the history of the Highland regiments. 
For the actual regimental histories, two areas of research were 
delved into. Colonel David Stewart of Garth, writing in the period just 
after Waterloo, must be considered as a ,~J(.l~historical source. 
Stewart actually served with and com~anded Highlanders throughout the 
period of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. In addition, 
this source provides numerous statistics such as numbers recruited, 
s~~~ngth and ~ationality of regiments, casualties and the general service 
of every regiment. In the same line as Stewart are the individual 
regimental histories. Although these were compiled several decades after 
the period being considered, the authors generally rel~ed upon regimental 
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documents, muster rolls and returns, therefore, their figures and 
statistics are presumably reasonably accurate. 
The Statistical Account 2! Scotland again provides first hand 
sourcei~material. It must be admitted that the writers of these accounts 
we.re clergy rather than professional historians and their cOJlunents must 
be viewed in that respect. Nevertheless, these sources do provide 
valuable insight into the workings of Highlands~ciety in the 1790's 
and particular attention was paid to the comments on the breakdo\fn of 
clan society, emigration, population growth and the numbers of men 
serving in the armed forces from each parish. In these areas, the 
Statistical Account proved invaluable. 
Finally, estate papers, letters and other muniments, either in 
original form or edited and printed, provided not only information 
on the nature of the Highlands of the period, but, more importantly, 
primary military research material. The Bredalbane estate papers were 
perhaps the most useful and hundreds of military documents, primarily 
muster rolls, are preserved in the Eredalbane collection in H.M. Register 
House. 
SECTION 3 
~ Significance of .!h! ~. 
The study of the Highland regiments in the 18th and early 19th 
Centuries may perhaps be accused of drawing too much attention. The 
Celtic Revival of the Regency Period kept alive the more romantic and 
colourful aspects of clan culture. The new Celtic Revival, most noticeable 
, 
in the United States in the past 20 years, has set off a new fascination 
with the clan system and especially the regiments. The Highland regiments 
have always played an important role in Highland affairs simply because 
they were such a dominant part of Highland life in the post-'45 period 
and were an integral part of that society. For this reason, the accumulation 
of knowledge on the regiments is valuable to the study of the Highlands and 
not simply for the Celtophiles of the 20th Century. 
Most important, perhaps, to the study of and appreciation of the clan 
culture, is the fact that the regiments were the sole agents in maintaining 
at least the accoutrements of clan culture. The bagpipe and tartan clothing 
were proscribed by la"l until 1782, except in the army. Colonel Stewart, a 
Highland officer as well as an historian, may be credited for much of the 
Celtic Revival of the 1820's, not only through his writings, but also his 
role in staging the visit of King George IV to Scotland in 1822. As 
evidenced by remarks of the various ministers writing for the Statistical 
Account, the aristocracy down to the common people were wearing garments 
of non-Highland fashion by the 1790's, a result of the assimilation of 
the Highland aristocracy into the general British pattern and the growth 
in the manufacture of cheap textiles. Therefore, the army, through the 
wearing of the kilt, hose and bonnet, the playing of the bagpipe and the 
method of recruiting tpxough clan ties, preserved some of the clan culture 
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which most surely would have disintegrated under the stress of legal 
restriction and cultural assimilation. 
The Highland regiments reflected the events in the Highlands after 
1745 more than any other institution. The reconciliation of the 
aristocracy to the Union, the economic changes, population growth, 
emigration, clearances and the eventual breakdown of the old clan system 
are not only reflected but magnified by the history of the Highland 
regiments. Through the study of these corps, the broader spectrum of 
Highland society, culture and history are seen and for this reason, the 
study of this subject is not just of value to the military historian, 
but also to social, economic and political historians as well. 
It is rather surprising that no significant work on Highland 
recruiting has been produced considering the importance of this area 
of in~uiry. Most writers of the history of the Highland regiments such 
as Colonel Stewart or Frank Adam, do go into some detail as to numbers 
of troops, areas where raised and so forth, but no work strictly based 
on the mechanics of recruiting has yet been produced. Peripheral studies 
to this field are in print, notably, John Prebble's work on the Highland 
mutinies. The majority of the mutinies of the Highland regiments were 
caused by the government brealdngthe terms of service and attempting to 
send Highlanders out of the country or to the colonies in violation of 
the terms of enlistment. This evil WaS not confined to the Highland 
regiments or to anyone government and was the factor most responsible 
for creating disturbances when ~lilitia were being raised, in Scotland 
in 1797 and in England in 1757. Works such as Prebble's do touch upon 
certain aspects of recruitment which are important, in this case, the 
terms of service promised. 
\ 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to delve too deeply into 
anyone area of recruitment patterns, and, for this reason, it has 
necessarily been confined to the broader aspects of whom, when, what, 
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where, how many and why the regiments were raised. An aspect which has 
been touched upon and w~ich would prove to be an interesting topic for 
further in-depth analysis is that of the occupational and social status 
of the recruits. A good deal of first hand evidence is provided by the 
muster rolls still extant. A second topic for more intensive research 
is the parish by parish analysis of how many men were recruited. The 
general pattern of geographical recruiting is touched upon in Chapter Ill, 
but again, this is necessarily sketchy. And finally, the relationship 
between the breakdown of the old Highland Society and the effects on 
the success of Highland recruiting could be a topic of intensive study 
with particular attention to instances of some form of local conscription 
such as that used in the raising of the 93rd Regiment in 1799. 
There is, in short, a wide range of areas covered by this M.Litt 
research thesis which might be examined on a deeper level. Despite the 
necessary shortcomings of this research work, it is hoped that it can 
be of use in future to the understanding and study of the Highland 
regiments in particular and the history of the Highlands in general and 
will also add to the accumulation of knowledge, 
APPElIDICES 
and 
-
SOURCES. 
APPENDIX A. 
! ListinG 2£ ~ Highland Fencibles ~ Regular Regiments 
of ~~, with J)3.tes .2.£ Service ~ Colonels. 
SECTION 1. ~ Fencibles. 
1) Argyle Regiment, raised July 1759, disbanded 1763, Colonel, Duke 
of Argyle, served in Scotland. 
2) Sutherland Regiment, raised July 1759, disbanded 1763, Colonel, 
Earl of Sutherland, served in Scotland. 
3) Argyle, £! Western Fencible Regiment, raised February 1778, disbanded 
April 1783, Colonel, Lord Frederick Campbell, served in 
Scotland. 
4) Duke of Cordon's North Fe11cibles, raised Hay 1778, disbanded 1783, 
---- -- Colonel, Duke of Gordon, served in Scotland. 
5) Sutherland Regiment, raised January 1779, disbanded 1783, Colonel, 
William Wemyss of vlemyss, served in Scotland. 
6) ~ Argyleshire Rer,iment, raised March 1793, disbanded 1799, Colonel, 
Narquis of Lorne, served in Scotland. 
7) Bredalbane Regiment, Colonel, Earl of Bredalbane, 
1st :Battalion, raised }larch 1793, disbanded April 1799, 
served in Scotland. 
2nd Battalion, raised Narch 1793, disbanded April 1799, 
served in Ireland. , 
3rd Battalion, raised December 1794, disbanded July 1802, 
served in Ireland. 
8) Grant ~ Strathspey Regiment, raised March 1793, disbanded April 
1799, Colonel, Sir James Grant of Grant, served in Scotland. 
9) Sutherland Regiment, raised !>larch 1793, disbanded Harch 1799, Colonel, 
Hajor.Q;neral Williarn Wemyss of Wemyss, served in Scotland 
and Ireland. 
10) ~ 'Northern,.E Gordon Fencibles, raised Narch 1793, disbanded 
1799, Colonel, Duke of Gardon, served in England. 
11) Rothesay ~ Caithness Hiehlanders, Colonel, Sir John Sinolair 
of Ulbster. 
1st :Battalion, raised !-1arch 1794, disbanded Nay 1799, 
served in Scotland and England. 
2nd Battalion, raised November 1794, disbanded July 1802, 
served in Ireland. 
12) Dumbarton Regiment, raised August 1794, disbanded October 1802, 
Colonel, Colin Campbell of Stonefie1d, served in 
Guernsey and Ireland. 
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13) Glengarry ££ British Highland Regiment, raised August 1794, 
disbanded July 1802, Colonel, Alexander HacDonnall 
of Glengarry, served in Jersey, Guernsey and Ireland. 
14) Reay Highland Regiment, raised October 1794, disbanded October 
1802, Colonel ,~:.Bugh l1ackay Baillie of Rosehall, 
served in Ireland. 
15) Princess of Wales' (Aberdeen Hi~hland) Regiment, raised October 1194, 
disbanded September 1803, Colonel, Sir James Leith, 
served in Ireland. 
16) ~ Argyleshire Regiment, raised October 1794, disbanded July 1802, 
Colonel, Henry Clavering, served in Ireland. 
17) Caithness Legion, raised Hovember 1794, disbanded 1802, Colonel, 
Sir Benjamin Dunbar of Hempriggs, served in Ireland. 
18) Ross-Shire Highland Regi~ent, raised November 1794, disbanded 
1799, Colonel, }:ajor Colin NacKenzie of J.1ountgerald, 
served in Scotland. 
19) Royal Inverness Hi~hlanders, raised November 1794, disbanded August 
1802, Colonel, John Baillie of Dunean, served in Ireland. 
20) Fraser Regiment, ,raised November 1794, disbanded July 1802, Colonel, 
James Fraser of Bella~~, served in Ireland. 
21) ~ Regiment of .1h!. Isles .£! l'Iacdonald Fencibles, raised May 1798, 
disbanded July 1802, Colonel, Lord Nacdonald, served in 
Scotland and England. . 
22) 3rd Argyleshire Re~iuent, raised June 1798, disbanded July 1802, 
Colonel, Archicald NacNeil1 of Colonsay, served in 
Gibraltar. 
23) Lochaber Fencibles, raised June 1798, disbanded June 1802, Colonel, 
Donald Ca~eron of Lochiel, served in Ireland. 
24) Princess Charlotte 2.!.. \\Ta1e9' .£! Loyal }lacLeod Fencibles, raised 
June 1798, disbanded June 1802, Colonel, John NacLeod 
of Colbecks, served in Ireland and England. 
25) ~ .§E£ Cromarty Ra.n~ers, raised August 1798, disbanded July 1802, 
Colonel, Lewis EacKenzie of Scatwell, served in Scotland 
and Ireland. • 
26) Royal Clan Alnine Re~iment, raised September 1798, disbanded July 
-1802, Colonel, Alexander HacGregor Hurray of Napier 
Rusky, served in Ireland. 
27) Perthshire Hif,hlancers, raised October 1794, disbanded February 1799, 
Colonel, \'lllliam Robertson of Lude, served in Scotland. 
(very few Highlanders). 
28) Canadian Ref?iment, raised 1804, served in "'est Indies, disbanded 
because of violatio~ of terms of service. 
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SECTION 2. The ReP-,'Ulars of the Line. 
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1) AreYleshire E}ghlanders, raised 1689, disbanded 1697, Colonel, 
Earl of Argy1e, served in Soot1and and Fl~~ders. 
2) ~ Regiment, later ~ Royal Firshland Reginent, ~ Black "latch, 
raised 1739, Colonel, Earl of Crawford. 
3) Loudon's Highlanders, raised 1745, disb~~ded 1748, Colonel, Earl of 
Loudon, served in Scotland and Flanders. 
4) 11:J:b. Regiment, 11ontgomery's Hi ghla.nders , raised 1757, disbanded 1763, 
Colonel, Archi bald i·~ontgomery, served in North America. 
5) 18th Begiment, Fraser's Highlanders, raised 1757, disbanded 1763, 
Colonel, Simon Fraser of Lovat, served in North America. 
6) 87th Regiment, __ Keith's Highlanders, raised 1759, disbanded 1763, 
Colonel, Robert ~lurray Keith, served in EU2'ope. 
7) ~ p.egiment, Ca:npbell' s Highlanders, raised 1759, disbanded 1763, 
Colonel, John Campbell of Dunoon, served in Europe. 
8) 89th Regiment, ~ ££ Gordon's HiGhlanders, raised 1759, disbanded 
1765, Colonel, Staates Long l·Iorris, served in India. 
9) 10lst Reg'iment; Johnstone's Highlanders, raised 1760, disbanded 1763, 
Colonel, Sir James Jollnstone of Westerhall, served in Soot1and. 
10) 100th Regiment, raised 1761, disbanded 1763, Colonel, Colin Campbel1 
of Kilberrie, served in \.,rest Indies. 
11) 105th Regiment, Queen's Highlanders, raised 1761, disbanded 1763, 
Colonel, ]avid Graeme of Gorthie, served in Ireland. 
12) MacLean's Highlanders, raised 1761, disbanded 1763, Colonel, Allan 
Maclean of Torloisk, furnished recruits to regiments 
serVing in Germany and America. 
13) 113th, Royal Highland Volunteers, raised 1761, disbanded 1763, Colonel, 
James Hamilton, served in Sootland. 
14) llst Reciment, Fraser' s Highlanders, raised 1715, disbanded 1783, 
Colonel, Simon ~raser of Lovat, served in Amerioa. 
15) :I.2!:.£ Regiment, l·~acLeod 1 s Highlanders, later ?lst Glasgow }fighland 
Light Infantry: (1808), raised 1771, Colonel, Lord HacLeod, 
served America, India, B~ope. 
16) 1.4.:!:h Rep,'iment, The Argyle Highlanders, raised 1778, disbanded 1783, 
Colonel, John Campbell of Barbreck, served in America. 
17) 76th Regiment, Hacdonald's !iiehlanders, raised 1778, disbanded 1784, 
Colonel, JOhl'l NacDonnell, served in America. 
18) 111h Reeiment, Atholl Highlanders, raised 1778, disbanded 1783, 
Colonel, Duke of Atholl, served in Irelar.d. 
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19) 78th Regiment, Seaforth ll1ghlanders, later 72nd'Regiment (1786), 
raised 1118, Colonel, Lord Seaforth, served India and 
Europe. 
20) 81st Rerriment, Aberdeenshire Highland Regiment, raised 1778, 
disbanded 1783, Colonel, The Jlonourable William Gordon, 
served in Ireland. 
21) 84th Regiment, Royal Highland Emigrants, raised 1775, disbanded 1784, 
Colonel Allan Naclean, served in Canada and America, 
composed of settled veterans of 42nd, 77th and 78th 
Regiments. 
22) 2nd Eattalion 42nd, later ~ Perthshire Regiment (1786), raised 
1780, Colonel, IiiacLeod of ¥m.cLeod, served in India. 
23) 1A!h Regiment, raised 1787, Colonel, Sir Archib~ld Campbell, served 
in India and Ireland. 
24) 121h, Stirlingshire Regiment, raised 1787, Colonel, Robert Abercromby 
of Tu11ibody, served in India. 
25) 78th Regiment, Ross-shire Highlanders, raised 1793, Colonel, Francis 
Humberstone l'iacKenzie of Seaforth, 2nd Battalions raised 
in 1794 and 1804. 
26) 12ih Regiment, Cameron Highl~~ders, raised 1793, Colonel, Allan Cameron 
of Erracht, served in Europe and \vest Indies, 2nd :Battalion 
raised 1804'. 
27) 21ih Strathspey Regiment, raised 1794, disbanded 1795, Colonel, Sir 
James Grant of Grant, served as Marines and drafted into 
other regiments. 
28) 98th Argyleshire Highlanders, later 91st {1798), raised 1794, Colonel, 
Duke of Argyle, served South Africa and Europe. 
29) loath Regiment, The Gordon Hie:hlanders, later 92nd {l799), raised 
1794, Colonel, Duke of Gordon, served in England, Ireland 
and Europe. 
30) 116th Pert shire Regiment,. raised 1794, disbanded 1794, Colonel, 
Alexander Campbell of Monzie, served in Ireland and drafted 
into other regiments. 
31) 132nd Highland Regiment, raised 1794, disbanded 1794, Colonel, Duncan 
Cameron of Callart, drafted into other regiments. 
32) 133rd Highland Regiment, raised 1794, disbanded 1794, Colonel, Simon 
Fraser, drafted to other regiments. 
33) .2..2!.£. Sutherland Highlanders, raised 1799, Colonel, William vlemyss of 
Wemyss, served Guernsey, South Africa, Europe and America, 
2nd Battalion raised 1813. 
This list only includes those regiments actually placed on the establishment 
and not those which failed to reach their numbers and thus cancelled. It 
also only pertains to the situation and service until 1815. 
APPENDIX B. 
Letters and Documents. 
Graham of Gartmore Hanuscript. From page 6, Section 1.1. 
The confusions and disorder of the country were so great, and the 
Government so aosolutely neglected it, that the sober people were obliged 
to purchase some security to their effects, by shameful and ignominious 
contracts of blackmail. A person who had the greatest correspondence 
with the thieves, was agreed with to preserve the lands contracted for 
from thefts, for certain sums to be paid yearly. Upon this fund he 
employed 'one half of the thieves to recover stolen cattle, and the other 
half to steal, in order to make this agreement and blackmail contract 
necessary. The estates of those gentlemen who refused. to contract, or 
give countenance to that pernicious practice, are plundered by the 
thieving part of the watch, in order to force ~hem to purchase their 
protection. 
Mitchell, History of ~ Highlands, p.583. 
Letter from the J'Iarquis of Tweeddale to Lord President Duncan Forbes. 
From page 10, Section 1.2. 
The Earl of Stair has proposed, that a n~~ber of blank co~~issions 
be sent down to be.distributed ~~ong the well - affected clans. As Your 
Lordship shall think proper. This I heartily second; as I know Your 
Lordship will make a right use of this mark of His z.:a.jesty's confidence. 
Such a number of Highlanders being joined into regular Companies will 
not only prevent more men raising for the Pretender's Service, but a 
part of them may go and live in the Country which the Rebells leave; or, 
if it shall be thought more necessary, either the whole or any part of 
them may march into the South Country with Sir John Cope, according to 
the orders they shall receive. 
This proposal His l~ajesty has agreed to, and accordingly, a number 
of blank commissions are sent down by this Express, which will be 
forwarded to Your Lordship without loss of time. 
Culloden Paners, p.2l9. 
Letter from Duncan Forbes to Lord Hilton, Lord Justice-Clerk, dated 1738. 
From page 18, Section 1.3. 
I propose that Government should raise four or five regiments of 
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Highlanders, appointing an English or Scottish officer of undoubted 
loyalty to be colonel of each regL~ent: ~~d naming the lieutenants, 
majors, captains and subalterns from this list in my hand, which 
comprehends all the chiefs and chieftains of the disaffected clans, 
who are the very persons whom France or Spain "rill call upon in case 
of war to take arms for the Pretender. If Government pre-engaged the 
Highlanders in the manner I propose, they will not only serve well 
against the enemy abroad, but will be hostages for the good behaviour 
of their relatives at home; and I am persuaded it will be absolutely 
impossible to raise a rebellion in the Highlands. 
Nitchell, History.£f. ~ Highlands, p.594. 
Circular letter to Fencible Colonels from Adjutant-General's Office, 
Dublin, 26 June 1800. From page 40, Section 2.4. 
Sir,- I have the honour to enclose to you a copy of a circular 
letter which has been written by the Lord-Lieutenant's directions to 
the Gencral Officers of the Staff in Ireland, on the subject 6f procuring 
from the regiments of Scotch Fencibles of Infantry to complete certain 
Scotch regiments of the line therein named, and His Excellancy is 
persuaded that the exertions of the officers will co-operate ,with the 
ardour of the men in giving effect to so serviceable an object. 
Lord Corni{allis desiretthat you will make known and explain to 
the regiment under your command that the men who will volunteer for 
general service will be transferred to the regiment of which they m~~e 
choice on their arrival at Newry or Fermoy, as far as the superintending 
officers at those places can do it ccnsistently with the object of 
equalising the regiments of the line which are to receive vol1L~teers. 
You will observe that the regiment is to continue to recruit to 
replace the men who volunteer, and to have credit on its establishment 
for the number so volunteering. 
Lord Cormmllis requests your attention to the circular letter 
enclosed, addressed to the General Officers on the Staff, which fully 
explains the terms on which the men are permitted to volunteer, and 
His Lordship hopes that as a proportion of the officers of the 
regimented will be permitted to accompany the men the nmnber of 
volunteers required will be furnished in a very short time. 
Scobie, ~ ~ Hi~hland Fencible Corps, 
pp.265-266. 
Warrant to raise Reay Fencibles to Colonel Hugh Hackay Ilaillie. 
From page 48, Section 3.1. 
Whereas we have thought fit to order a Regiment of Fencible men, 
to be forthwith raised under your comrr.and, which is to consist of ten 
companies, of 4 sergeants, 5 corporals, 2 drummers and 95 private men 
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in each, with 2 fifers to the Grenadier Company, besides a sergeant-
major and quartermaster-sergeant, together with the usual commissioned 
officers; which men are to serve in Great Britain and Ireland only. 
These are to authorize you, by beat of drum or otherwise, to 
.raise so many men in any county or part of our Kingdom of Great Eritain, 
as shall be wanted to complete the said regiment to the above-mentioned 
numbers. .And all J.1agistrates, Justices of the Peace, Constables, and 
other of our civil officers whom it may concern, are hereby required 
to assisting you in providing quarters, impressing carriages, and 
otheTIvise, as there shall be occasion. 
Given at our Court at St James, this 24th day of October 1794, 
in the 34th year of our Reign. 
:By His Hajesty's Command. 
(Signed) vI. \oJindham 
Scobie, ~Q1£ Highland Fencibl~ Corps, pp.365-366. 
Letter to Dona1d Sutherland from Co1in }~cKenzie, John Fraser and 
General 1tlemyss dated Dunrobin Castle, 21 September 1799. 
From page 60, Section 3.2. 
As you have voluntarily enlisted yourself in the Sutherland Highland 
Regiment now raising by General Wemyss, we as agent and Factor for the 
.Right Honourable Earl Gower and Countess of Sutherland do hereby agree how 
soon the present lease of the Davybeg of Strathbrora expires to put you, 
or your Father in your name in possession of any of the four possessions 
on Amat and Dalbreack that you or your Father may fix on; that you shall 
continue thereon for Seven Years after your entry, at such rent as shall 
be made thereto by two, or four Nen mutually chosen; or if you prefer, 
we shall put your Father in possession at Whitsunday next, of that half 
of Crislich presently possessed by the Widow of Alexander Clyne, and 
Wi11iam her Son, and to continue thereon for seven years at the present 
rent after 'Vlhi tsunday next which you may rely. 
Adam, Sutherla.nd Estate Management, Vol. II, p.25. 
Petition for Grievance of Donald 1'1acLeod dated 14 August 1805. 
From page 60, Section 3.2. 
Unto the Right Honourable }mrchioness of Stafford The Petition 
of Donald HacLeod in the Lyne Parish of Assint Host Humbly Sheweth That 
about six years ago Hr Fraser Your Lad.yship'sFactor and Co1in HacKenzie 
Esquire, Edinburgh, were pleased to grant a letter of obligation extended 
upon your stamp paper to your Petitioner promising him ten Herks Old Rent 
of the lands of Ryancraich on account of your Petitioner's Brother going 
to the 93rd Regiment. NOti-li thstanding of all this your Petitioner 
",as driven away in the 1803 by Hr Isaac Jopling J·1arble Cutter Assint 
as he got the tack of Ryancraich, hoping he might safely continue on 
account of said obligation. Mr Jopling brought officers from Dornach 
who not only discovered your Petitioner's house but also drove away 
your Petitioner's Cattle, so the your Petitioner being destitute of 
said lands has been mostly ruined in regard of his Effects having no 
settled habitation where he may pasture his Cattle. Besides the above 
soldier of the 93rd your Petitioner and his Brother served Your 
Ladyship in the late Fencibles and after all your Petitioner is treated 
is above said: 
May it therefore please Your Ladyship to consider the 
promises and grant such redress to your Petitioner 
as to you shall seem proper and if it be not convenient 
for Your Ladyship to relieve your Petitioner at this 
period your Petitioner expects that Your Ladyship shall 
be pleased to tell your Petitioner that Your Ladyship 
shall grant him redress again the next sett, and your 
Petitioner shall ever pray. 
Enclosed: Obligation by John Fraser, attested by Colin MacKenzie to 
Donald 1-1acLeod: Dunrobin Castle, 24 July 1799. 
I Factor for the Right Honourable Earl Gower and Countess of 
Sutherland Considering that William }~cLeod Your Brother has voluntarily 
enlisted himself as a Soldier in the Sutherland Highlanders now raising 
by General Wemyss Do therefore as Factor aforesaid Bind and Oblige myself 
to put Donald NacLeod brother to William in possession of ten Merks Pay 
of Old Rent of the lands of Rhincreach and that of the term of vlhi tsunday 
next Eighteen hundred and to continue you therein for Seven Years 
thereafter at the present rent. The part to be given is the 7-?t Herks 
possessed by Donald I1acKenzie and to add 2·k I·lerks more to it. I also 
agree to continue your father in his present possession of 10 Merks Old 
Rent of Leadrnore during the continua~ce of the present lease thereof. 
at the present rent, and to implement this obligation to you under the 
penal ty of paying the rent of ten T1erks of Rhincreach yearly till it is 
implemented. On witness whereof I have written and subscribed this. 
Adam; Sutherland Estate Hanae:ement, Vol. II, 1'1'.50-51 • 
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APPENDIX C. 
Charts and Statistics. 
SECTION 1. Rates E.!.. Pay in l§.Ql. From page 68, Section 3.3. 
Rates of pay for Regulars per annum. 
Pounds Shillin6:s Pence 
Colonel 410 12 6 
Lieutenant-Colonel 290 9 1 Major 251 
° 
5 Captain-Lieutenant 171 11 1 
Lieutenant 85 3 4 Ensign 66 18 4 Sergeant 28 10 3 3/4 
Corporal 21 13 5 1/4 
Drummer 20 18 2 3/4 
Private 18 5 
° Chaplain 114 13 
° Paymaster 273 15 
° Adjutant 13 
° ° Quartermaster 85 3 4 
Surgeon 171 11 1 
Assistant Surgeon 91 5 
° Surgeon's Mate 63 17 6 
Quartermaster-Sergeant 37 12 9 3/4 
Sergeant-r-1ajor 31 12 9 3/4 
Paymaster-Sergeant 28 10 3 3/4 
For private soldier, Is. per day in 1797: 4s. per week deducted for mess; 
1s.6d. for necessaries; Is.6d. for washing and cleaning; 3d. to barber; 
stoppage while in hospital was 3s.3d. per week; beer and bread 
allowance in camp of sid. per week. 
SECTION 2. 
Highlands 
Lowlands 
Central 
Scobie, ~ 2l£ Hi6:hland Fencible Corps, p.131. 
Cavendish, ~ 21!£ Sutherland Hi~hlanders, p.21. 
POEu1ation Statistics. 
Area in Fraction POEu1ation ~ 
Sq. Miles of Whole 1755 
21,230 5/1 652,000 51 
4,269 1/1 464,000 31 
4,196 1/1 149,000 11 
Kyd, Scottish Population Statistics, p.xviii. 
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Population Growth ~ County. 
County Webster 11.2.2. 1801 1811 1821 
- -
Argyle 66,286 81,277 86,541 92,316 
Bute 7,125 11,791 12,033 13,797 
Caithness* 22,215 22,609 23,149 29,181 
Inverness 59,563 72,672 77,671 89,961 
Ross and C:romarty 48,004 56,318 60,853 68,762 
. Sutherland** 20,774 23,117 23,629 23,685 
Kyd, Scottish POEulation Statistics, pp. 82-83. 
* Caithness, while not slufering greatly from overseas emigration, 
did lose a substantial number to the Lowland areas. 
** The west coast of Sutherland lost many to overseas emigration and 
to the Lowlands on the east. Also, a great many migrated to 
Ross and Caithness in search of employment, thus keeping the 
population growth figure somewhat depressed. 
APPENDIX D. 
Photocopies .£f. Orie;ina1 Documents. 
1) Recruiting Instructions Perth Highland Fencibles. 
2) Commission of Alexander Campbel1 in 77th Montgomery's Highlanders. 
Signed by William Pitt, 1757. 
3) Letter to Lord Macdonald regarding the raising of the 76th Regiment 
of Foot in 1777. 
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RECRUITING INSTRUCTIONS 
. 
For tIle Of!icers of the PER TH Hig~1and Fencible Regiment of Foot, . 
. commanded by Colo~d WILLIAM ROBER TSON.· 
1 •. you mufr obey implicitly all Orders you may receive from the Colonel,. or Officer. 
. commanding at Head ~artc:rs, to whom you will punCtually tranfinit weekly 
Returns of the Recruits you have got, according to the Form herewith fent. You will 
alfo acquaint him of all your Proceedings, and be c. ... re~ul to l.et him know your Addrt:fs. 
. . 
II. You are not to deviate in the leafr from the Letter of Service, of which Extracts are' 
annexed, to prevent all Poffibility of Doubt or Mifunderfrallding. 
Ill. You mufi: take care not to inlifr any indented Apprentices, without previotlfly getting' 
tlP their Indentures difcharged. N or are you to inlifr Deferters from other Corps, nor' 
any Weaver engaged with an unfinifl1ed \Veb, unlefs he agrees to purchafe it out of his 
Bounty, previous to his being attefred; for all Men not properly a~tefted a~d inlifted, 
or who defert, or may be rejected by the Officer who may be appomted to mfpect the 
Regiment, will be at your own Riique. '." . . 
IV. All your Recruits mufr be inlifred entirely as private Soldiers, and .no abfolute Pro .. 
mifes muft be made of appointing them Non-commiffioned Officers: but the Colonel 
however permits each Captain to appoint one Seljeant and one Corporal i f'ach Lieute .. 
. nant a Se~jeant, and each Eniign a Corporal; but it ~s to be underftood, their being 
ugimenred as fuch will depeI?d upon their own Conduct and Abilities. , .. t: 
V. Each Captain may inlifr a Drummer for his own Company, if he is perfeCtly ~cqu~inted 
with his Duty as fuch, but not otherwife. _. . . . ':~ . 
. . . 
VI. It muft be particularly underftood, that the Men are all to be regimentally engaged, 
:lnd that no Officer is to have any Claim on particular Men, who mull: be entirely at the 
. Difpofal of the Commanding Officer in forming the Companies, who at the fame time' 
:--: .. '-'" ... will pay particular Attention in accommodating both Officers and Men in thac Refpetl:. . 
.. . . '. (i .' f " ........ ". 'J~,..... .. . :_ ., " . :. .. , 
VII. You are on no Account to make over any Man inlir~ed forOthis"Regiment to any."":. ,'r. 
other Corps whatever. . . . ,'" 
VIII. Previous to a Recruit's 'being ·:ittefted, you mufr have him car~fully and fl:riCtly 
; examined by a Surgeon of Character; and, to prevent lmp~fition, endeavour to wait 
tlpon the Surgeon yourfelf. . " .. ' . ....... . 
. 
. IX. Officers employed on the Recruiting Duty are to make themfelves acql.lainted with, 
. .1l1d ftriCtly adhere to, . the {bnding Orders of the Army, by procuring Copies of the 
. Articles of War. . .. 0 • • • 
. . 
. x. Immediately on your Arrival in any Town, Fair, &c. where you intend to beat IIp, 
. you muft wait upon and acquaint the chief Magii1:ratc of the l»lace, and C~mmanding 
Officer of. the Troops, and fhew them your Beating Order •.. 
. . " 
, , 
XI. The Colonel allows you the full Levy-Money he receives from Government, viz. 
: Ten Guineas for each Man approved of, at the lnfpeccion of the Regiment. , . 
·XII. No Bread NIo~ey to be" paid. to the Recruit,' till he is approved of by thc' In~')c:cHng 
, Officer.. ' .. ~ . . 
'.A~"'.·''':'f'·''·'·'''''''''·' , .• ~~.. ~.' ••. ~:.:.;.:,*' .. ~~ ............... ,; ..• :, ~It ',,'.;1,._ " 
• ..,'" ' .' " '. ". -t. : • . . 
.. XIII. Each Recruit mu11 purchafe, out of his Bouncy, Necdfaries according to the Lift 
. annexed; the Recruiting Officer referving the Sum of Three Guineas out of the 
•. I '. Bounty Money, for which the Recruit will be fupplied with Slop Cloathing, immediately 
on his joining at I-lead ~arters. If the Officer negleCts to referve the above Money, 
he will be anfwerable fOl" the Price of the Slop Cl9athing, which is ·to be provided by 
. •. the Colonel, and other Necdfar.ies which may be wanting. 
. . . 
. XIV. To prevent any Complaint on the part of the Recruit, you will, before fending him to 
He~d Quarters, fettle wich him for his SubIii1:cnce and Bouncy promifcd him j after refer-
ving the Three Guineas as above mentioned.' . 
...... , ...... . .. "\ xv . 
. '. , 
.,. 
... ' 4 ~ ,I 
..., .... ,'~.-lo ..J. 
( 2) 
XV. On procuring Five Recruits you may fcnd them to. the H,ead Ol:artcrs oC tl1e 
Regiment under the Charge of a careful Per[oll; but all who dIe or ~dcrt before the 
Regiment is infpefted, will be at your own Rifllue. 
XVI. One Hundred Pounds to be drawn at a time by the Captains, and Fifty Pounds by 
the Subalterns. The Recruiting Accounts, agreeably to the annexed Form, to be rent.: 
, once a Fortnight to the Agents, Melfrs. COX: and GREENWOOD, London; and 
to the Pay-mai1:er of the Regiment. \Vhen you have OccaCion to draw.for a fecond 
Sum, it will be necert"ary 'to fend in your Account how the former Sum has been 
expended. 
• fP'. ~ ,. 
_ Lffi if Slop Chathil1g and Nt'~eJfo~les to h jilrnijhed fir tach R~crUl'( out f( /;is BOWlt], ... , 
\. 
" 
r A fcarlec J acker, with white Cuffs, Collar, and Buttons 
, 1 A twilled white Flannel Wait1:coat ,,' , 
Slop Cloathing{ A Pair of Flannel Drawers , , , 
1 ' " ' 0 ' 
LA Bonnet and Feather " .. ";",. " 
(Three Shirts , .... ith Frills'·· I Two Pair of Hofe 
( Two Pair of Shoes 
N tr.' 'A Comb ' eccuanes -< A Pair of' Brufhes and Black-ball 
, ,I A black Leather Stock and Buckic 
A Leather Hair Rofe 
LA Haverfack 
., 0 
" 
, , ~' 
" . 
.~ . 
!.. " 
" 
. 
, ' 
. '
, ~ i 
, ,e 
.• i 
The PayoC the Officers to commence from the Dates or their Commimons,' and the Pay 
of che Non-commiffioned Officers and private Men from the Dates of their refpdl:ivc 
Attefrations, and not (ram the Date of Inlii1:ment. 
Lery Money of Ten Guineas per Man will be allowed in aid of the Expences of raifin~ 
this Corps. . . . . 
~ one of che Officers are to have Rank longer than while the Corps remai;s oh the Ena. 
bli1hment; nor, when reduced, are they to be intitled to Half-pay_ . There Circum .. 
fiances are, I know, perfectly underfrood by yourfe1f; yet I mull: take the Liberty to 
add, that you cannot too fully explain them to the Gentlemen you mean to 'propo(e for 
Commimons, in order that they, may not, either now or in future, conceive that they, 
have derived any Claim to permanent Rank in the' ArmYI or to Half-pay from their , 
Service in this Regiment~ , 
lt may however be proper to mention, th:1t Officers taken from Half-pay into the Siruation 
of Field Officers or Captains of Companies on the Fencible Eilabli111ment, will, on He-
duttion) be reftored to their former Half-pay; and fuch as may be appointed to the 
_ ' Subaltern or Staff Cor 1.miffions" will be entitled to receive' their Half-pay, together, with 
their Pay in the Fencablt;s. .' ' , ,~ '(, , '. ' ~ , / 
.'The Men are to feeve in any Part of Great Britain or Ireland, but not elfc,,;hrre. ,They 
are not to be draughted j and in the Event of their Removal from Nol'th Britain, they' 
are not to be difembodied until their Return to the County in ~orth Britain where they 
wer~ principally raifccl" or as near thereto as pallible. 
'. < 
The King hopes that the Corps will be compleatcd in three r..1onths; and although it has • 
been cufrornary in new Levies to limit the Age and' Size of the Recruits, yet His Ma4 
jei1:y thinks it lmnece{fary to prefcribe fuch Limits on the prc~cnt Occafion, in full Con ... 
fidence 'that every Exertion will be u[cd, &c. " , 
" , 
.. 
Perm' , 
. , 
IMAGING SERVICES NORTH 
BostQn Spa, Wetherby 
West Yorkshire, LS23 7BQ 
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